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Moiseyev Comments on Strategic Arms Treaty

PM0608093591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Aug 91 First Edition pp 1-2

[Interview with Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of USSR Armed Forces General Staff, by observer M. Ponomarev; date, place not given: "Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty and USSR Security"]

[Text] [Ponomarev] The Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Moscow a few days ago, has elicited a multitude of comments both in our country and abroad. The majority of them concur that the realization of the treaty will result in the strengthening of strategic stability, lower the level of military confrontation, and reduce the likelihood of nuclear conflict. Is it possible, Mikhail Alekseyevich, to agree with such an assessment?

[Moiseyev] Putting it in a nutshell, I could say: "Undoubtedly." But, obviously, such a laconic reply would not be enough. In order to explain why I think this, I would single out certain aspects of strategic stability.

The provisions contained in the treaty represent, on the whole, a balance of the interests of the USSR and the United States, reached on the basis of compromise decisions. The chief objective during the talks, in my view, was the search for approaches which would not give the other side an opportunity to secure unilateral military advantages nor allow our country's security to be reduced. At the same time the constant orientation toward preserving strategic stability, i.e. a situation devoid of preconditions for the outbreak of nuclear war, was exceptionally important. Both sides strove for this.

Back in the early seventies, being concerned to strengthen its own security, the Soviet Union created a nuclear potential comparable with the U.S. potential. Strategic parity and strategic equilibrium were thereby achieved between the USSR and the United States. In speaking of this, I would particularly like to emphasize that we have always endeavored to regard the existence of military-strategic parity between the opposing sides not only as the quantitative equality of nuclear arms or the comparability of their specifications and performance characteristics but also from the viewpoint of the sides' capacity for a nuclear counterstrike which would deprive the attacking side of all the military advantages of inflicting the first strike.

At the same time it was absolutely clear that the levels of strategic nuclear arms which the USSR and the United States had accumulated by the early eighties were excessive. As new and increasingly sophisticated strategic arms were being created, their cost rose—which had a negative impact on the economy. All the more so as the buildup of strategic nuclear potentials was not helping to strengthen security but, paradoxical though this may sound, was undermining it. The threat of a nuclear catastrophe was intensifying, not diminishing. Both sides clearly understood this.

What was the reason for the emergence of military confrontation at superhigh levels? In my view, the cause lay in the choice of the way in which security was to be achieved. It so happened that the sides were building up their nuclear might in a practically unlimited way in the pursuit of security. The results are well known.

The mass media had already reported that today we have 2,500 delivery systems, and the United States 2,222. It must be remarked here that on signing the treaty the U.S. side made its data more precise, and the Memorandum of Understanding now states 2,246 delivery systems (10,563 weapons).

Without any particular arguments the sides reached agreement that the levels of strategic offensive arms must be seriously reduced. It was not at all difficult to set the limits: 1,600 delivery systems and 6,000 nuclear charges. But I would describe the whole subsequent course of the talks as a period of dogged, painstaking work to preserve the sides' existing structures of strategic offensive arms in the process of their future reduction. I believe that this was achieved. This is very important, for a review of the structure of our strategic nuclear forces in addition to their reduction would require big additional expenditure. On, let us say, for example, the building of modern, and very costly, strategic bombers to replace the land-based ICBM's which are to be eliminated.

Thanks to such an approach, the treaty makes it possible, in the final analysis, to strengthen strategic stability appreciably under conditions of reducing strategic offensive arms. After they have been reduced, the temptation to inflict a surprise nuclear strike will also diminish, since the role of a counterstrike is being preserved and the regime envisaged in the treaty for verifying the sides' strategic nuclear arms reduces the likelihood of any surprises—in other words, the likelihood of a nuclear conflict.

[Ponomarev] In this connection could you speak about the correlation of strategic nuclear forces between the USSR and the United States and explain what it will be like after the treaty obligations have been fulfilled?

[Moiseyev] Of the 2,500 delivery systems which we have deployed, 1,398 missiles are sited on land, of which 321 ICBM's are mobile. All these missiles are capable of carrying 6,612 nuclear charges—this is 64.4 percent of all the nuclear charges housed in our strategic offensive arms. Precisely 940 missiles with 2,804 nuclear charges (27.3 percent) are located on submarines. As regards strategic aircraft, we have 162 heavy bombers with, according to the established rules of counting, 855 nuclear charges (8.3 percent). These three kinds of based strategic nuclear arms constitute our strategic triad.

The United States also has a triad of strategic offensive arms. However, the distribution of delivery systems is

somewhat different there. Precisely 1,000 ICBM's with 2,450 warheads (23.2 percent) are deployed on the ground, and there are not yet any mobile missiles in the United States. There are 672 missiles and 5,760 warheads (54.5 percent of the total number) on submarines. The strategic air force has 574 heavy bombers and 2,353 nuclear charges (22.3 percent) according to the agreed rules for counting them.

Thus, land-based missiles constitute the basis of our strategic forces. The greatest number of nuclear charges in the United States are sited on submarines. The United States has a considerable advantage in terms of heavy bombers. At the same time we have superiority in terms of land-based missiles.

[Ponomarev] But does such asymmetry make it possible, Mikhail Alekseyevich, to say that parity nonetheless exists and the levels of strategic offensive arms are balanced?

[Moiseyev] Yes, this is so. Historically the triad has developed differently in our country and theirs. Because of our geostrategic position we devoted most attention to ground missiles, and the United States, above all, to sea missiles and strategic aircraft. The stability of the situation, as I have already said, is determined not only by quantitative levels but also by the sides' possibility of inflicting a counterstrike which would be sufficient to undermine the enemy's defense potential. I have already seen articles in the press which base their entire analysis on calculating the correlation in the numbers of strategic offensive arms. I would like to warn against such an error. This is an obsolete approach which has not justified itself. It was this that brought both sides to an unbridled arms race. This mistake should not be repeated today. Although, of course, I do not deny that the number of strategic offensive arms is still an important criterion for assessing nuclear potential. But, nonetheless, the most important thing is a comprehensive approach taking all aspects of the problem into account.

Just such an approach to the problems tackled by the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty was a characteristic feature of it. Its signing—and this, in my view, is the unanimous opinion of all thoughtful observers—is one more step toward a world in which security will be guaranteed by a smaller number of arms and in which the balance of forces will be replaced by a balance of the sides' interests.

[Ponomarev] All this sounds very convincing. Nevertheless, we know that the treaty has met not only with approval and support, it has also met with criticism. People, including critics in our country maintain, for example, that the treaty is bad because it does not remove discrepancies with regard to the total number of weapons on delivery systems, and the United States retains the advantage in terms of this indicator. They also say that we are harmed by the sharp drop in the total throw-weight of Soviet missiles and, above all, the 50 percent reduction in our heavy ICBM's. What could you say about this?

[Moiseyev] During the preparation of the treaty, which was conducted with the greatest care—problems of great importance had to be resolved, too much was at stake—the maximum possible was achieved. Of course, the treaty bears the stamp of the time when it was being drawn up, and it is possible to find certain shortcomings in it. But it is impossible to agree in full with the comments in question.

I will repeat once again—simple arithmetic is not fitting in such a complex matter as the preservation of strategic stability when reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms. Higher mathematics is needed here.

The essence of the matter is that the levels enshrined in the treaty for both delivery systems and charges reliably ensure strategic stability. And as regards criticisms, they are chiefly made because of a superficial and, at times, simply dilettante approach to very complex problems and sometimes even simply for effect.

I will dwell on just one question—that of our RS-20 (SS-18) ICBM's. We have now 308 of them deployed. Yes, it is a formidable weapon, and yet these missiles appeared back in the sixties. A considerable proportion of them are already in need of either replacement or serious modernization. And so, in agreeing to the treaty, we realized that either way some of these missiles would have to be removed from the arsenal. While agreeing to the reduction of 154 RS-20's, at the same time we preserved within the effective combat strength of our strategic nuclear forces such an important element as heavy ICBM's, which the Americans do not have.

[Ponomarev] Does this mean that it is possible to maintain unequivocally that the treaty signed in Moscow is a considered, balanced document which does not infringe the sides' interests or undermine their security?

[Moiseyev] I believe I have already answered this question to some extent. I can only emphasize once again that we would never have agreed to the treaty if it infringed upon our national security interests. A balance of interests was reached as the result of exceptionally painstaking work, since everyone realized that a mistake would be very costly. Because strategic arms—the basis of the country's security—were being examined. It had long been an historical imperative that the levels should be lowered. But in practice things were proceeding slowly. A tremendous positive role—and I must point this out particularly—was played by the concept advanced by the country's political leadership of the new political course. As a result, during the talks the sides got away from the former absolute mistrust and suspicion. This was a great help.

As regards what the correlation of strategic offensive arms will be like after their reduction, i.e. seven years after the treaty comes into force, it will be within the

framework of the set limits: no more than 1,600 delivery systems and 6,000 nuclear charges according to the rules for counting them. There is another limitation—there must be no more than 4,900 nuclear charges on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles. And the sides are obliged to keep within these limits. Here, however, different versions of the correlation of various types of strategic offensive arms are possible within the framework of the triad of each of the sides and also, naturally, between the sides. In other words, each side will reduce its own arms proceeding from national interests and from the need to preserve the established structure. We intend that the ground-based missiles deployed within the framework of the set limits would remain as the basis of our strategic nuclear forces. At the same time we will preserve the mobile missiles which, as a consequence of their high survivability, are the most stabilizing factor. Incidentally, the number of mobile ICBM's is not limited within the framework of the agreed levels. However, there cannot be more than 1,100 units of nuclear charges on them.

[Ponomarev] In conclusion, Mikhail Alekseyevich, this question—incidentally, our readers frequently ask it in their letters to the editorial office: Will the realization of the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty not necessitate additional expenditure? And how will fulfillment of the treaty's provisions affect the fate of personnel in those branches of the armed forces with strategic offensive arms in their arsenal?

[Moiseyev] No, we cannot expect any "peace dividends" in the near future. Of course, expenditure is inevitable. While arms are being reduced and the associated procedure of their elimination is taking place, there will also be spending on this. It is perfectly understandable that it is necessary to have the appropriate technological equipment in order to eliminate a missile or a launcher. We envisage various kinds of elimination, proceeding from economic considerations and ecological and security demands. Representatives not only of the Ministry of Defense but also of other departments—industrial ministries and other interested organizations—are working on this.

As for personnel, account must be taken of the fact that the treaty's realization is not an action of a moment but a process designed for a lengthy period. Seven years is a considerable time. We already have experience of resolving social questions in connection with the reduction of arms and the armed forces, and it is being enriched and accumulated all the time. Everything will be done to avoid mistakes in this—I will say it bluntly—difficult matter.

In concluding our conversation, I would like to speak of something else. The material benefit from the treaty will initially be hardly tangible. But this is only during the period of active reductions. Subsequently the advantages will be obvious. The number of missiles and missile bases will fall, for example, and in this connection there will be a drop in expenditure on replacing obsolete arms. Land today occupied by military units which are to be reduced will be returned to the national economy. A considerable quantity of motor vehicle and automobile-tractor equipment, various units, and also buildings, structures, etc. will be handed over to the national economy. In the final analysis, it will be cheaper and easier for the country to maintain in combat readiness the Soviet strategic nuclear forces in a reduced form. And security will be greater. This is the main objective.

Academic Views START Provisions

PM0508100191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 31 Jul 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by V. Chernyshev, deputy general director of the Russian-U.S. University's Center for International and Military-Political Studies: "A Victory for Reason. New Step Taken Toward the Elimination of Nuclear Missile Weapons"]

[Text] In order to assess the scale of the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction [START] Treaty being signed in Moscow today, let us examine its main provisions, agreed upon after long and tense discussions during which compromise steps were taken by both sides. According to the treaty, reductions in strategic offensive weapons will be implemented in three stages over a seven-year period, in other words by the end of this century. After the reductions, the USSR and the United States will have 1,600 nuclear weapons delivery systems in the following categories: land-based ICBM's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's), and heavy bombers. The total quantity of weapons will be reduced to 6,000 units, including up to 4,800 units on deployed ICBM's and SLBM's, up to 1,540 weapons on heavy ICBM's, and up to 1,100 weapons on mobile ICBM's.

However, in actual fact the "threshold" figure of 6,000 weapons remains, I would say, only a "base" figure; the total number of weapons on both sides will in practice exceed it. This is due to the compromise solution of two problems: The elaboration of rules for counting heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM's), and the methodology for limiting long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM's).

Let us take, for example, the rule for counting heavy bombers. These airplanes, which are fitted for nuclear weapons, will be counted as single delivery systems within the ceiling of 1,600 units. Provided such an airplane does not carry cruise missiles with ranges of 600 km or more, it is counted as a single nuclear weapon within the ceiling of 6,000 units. But, for example, the United States has bombers of this type which can carry 20 or more nuclear bombs and "air-to-surface" missiles with ranges of up to 600 km. That means that in reality the number of nuclear weapons per bomber will be not one single unit, but 20 or more units. This is one source for exceeding the ceiling of 6,000 weapons. According to estimates by U.S. experts, up to 3,000 U.S. and up to

1,000 USSR gravity bombs and "air-to-surface" missiles with nuclear "fillings" ccould be left out of the reckoning.

A similar situation—adding up "with an element of underestimation"—arises also in the case of heavy bombers fitted with long-range ALCM's. Different types of airplanes, and different airplanes of the same type, could carry different numbers of such missiles. But after all, it is impossible to subject each and every airplane to constant monitoring. Thus a compromise solution had to be found—to work out "average" parameters for counting nuclear weapons. Ten weapons will be counted per U.S. bomber (in reality there may be 20), and eight weapons per Soviet bomber (in reality there are six on the Tu-95 and 12 on the Tu-160). In accordance with this counting rule, the United States has a possibility of deploying approximately 800-900 more units of long-range ALCM's than the figure that is counted. In order to compensate for the ensuing imbalance, the treaty allows the Soviet Union to deploy 40 percent more heavy bombers with ALCM's than the United States (210 and 150 units respectively).

Finally, about long-range SLCM's: They will not be covered by the START treaty itself. Limitations on these missiles will be implemented on the basis of a separate document taking the form of unilateral statements of a politically binding nature. Thus there is yet another source for the initially agreed levels to be exceeded.

Where do the accords described above lead? In the opinion of U.S. specialists, the United States will reduce its nuclear strategic arsenal from 12,000 weapons to approximately 8,800 units, and the USSR will reduce its arsenal from 11,000 to 7,000 units. This means that the intended 50 percent reduction has not been fully realized. In fact more modest results have been achieved—an approximate 30 percent reduction in weapons for both sides.

The treaty also envisages lowering the total throw-weight (in other words, in effect, the total capacity of the weapons) which can be carried by each side's deployed ICBM's and SLBM's. After reductions this weight will not exceed a level constituting roughly 50 percent of that which exists at the present time in the Soviet Union.

One further detail should be noted: The number of deployed heavy ICBM's held by the Soviet Union alone (SS-18's) will be reduced by one-half, to 154 units. The modernization of heavy ICBM's limited in this way will be possible only within agreed criteria. New types of heavy missiles are banned.

Soviet critics of the treaty note that, in its elaboration, it proved impossible to remove disparities in such an indicator of the two sides' combat potential as the total number of weapons on delivery systems, and the ratio of forces under this indicator remains in favor of the United States. They also point to the fact that the substantial reduction of the total throw-weight of Soviet ICBM's and SLBM's gives advantages to the United States, whose missiles possess greater accuracy, and therefore do not require high weapons capacity. They list the 50 percent reduction in Soviet heavy ICBM's among the treaty's shortcomings. And the permission granted to the Soviet Union in the treaty to exceed the United States' quota of heavy bombers by 40 percent is interpreted not as an achievement but as a "concession" by Washington which is at best useless to our country.

Can these critical attacks on the treaty be considered fair? Let us try to examine them.

Yes, in practice the number of weapons held by the United States will remain somewhat higher and the accuracy of their missiles evidently greater. And the USSR's opportunity to increase its fleet of heavy bombers is by no means a "gift," it will only lay an additional burden on our ailing economy.

But are quantitative and qualitative differences in nuclear arsenals so important, and is there a need to "opt for" our quota of bombers in its entirety? The answer to this question, I think, lies in the following: Authoritative research carried out by U.S. and Soviet Academies of Science testify to the fact that stable nuclear equilibrium can be maintained with 6,000 weapons, or, with a modest restructuring of forces, even with 3,000 weapons. The "distortions" in the treaty are neutralized by an extremely important circumstance: The opportunity available to the USSR to retain 7,000 nuclear weapons for purposes of defense and deterring any party from risky actions offers the potential—and then some, as the saying goes—of inflicting so-called "unacceptable damage" on an attacking side. The remaining nuclear weapon reserves can continue playing the role of a deterrence factor against the mutual launch of war.

As for the 50 percent reduction in heavy SS-18 missiles—indeed the Soviet arsenal's most powerful strategic weapons with the greatest accuracy of delivery to the target—arguments on this point are conducted not only in our country but also in the United States. This provision in the treaty is being interpreted by the U.S. Administration as a major "coup."

At the same time we should not lose sight of another point: Conservative critics of the treaty in the United States are expressing doubt over this "achievement" by the administration, claiming that, by agreeing to permit the modernization of SS-18 missiles, the United States is cancelling out the effectiveness of the reductions in these "first-strike weapons." The CIA recently tried to "confirm" these arguments by the treaty's opponents. In its report, as reported by THE WASHINGTON TIMES, this department claims that, following the 50 percent reduction in SS-18's, Moscow will nevertheless possess the potential necessary to destroy all the U.S. missile forces sited in silos. The Soviet Union, in the CIA's opinion, agreed to the U.S. proposal to reduce the number of SS-18's by one-half "only after it had made sure that this potential could be preserved."

But let us leave these claims by the U.S. department to its conscience and return to the treaty. The Soviet side, although it made big concessions at the talks, managed to uphold a number of provisions that are to its own advantage, making the Americans make compromises in their turn. An extremely substantial element in the Soviet Union's favor, in my view, is the U.S. side's agreement to the deployment of land-based mobile missiles, which possess an extremely high degree of survivability in the event of a nuclear strike. We have such missiles, while at the present time the United States does not. By virtue of their high degree of invulnerability, mainly due to the difficulty in determining their location, they would "survive" a first strike and could be used to inflict a retaliatory blow. Such weapons are a serious means of deterrence.

The following should also be chalked up as a "gain" for the Soviet side: In spite of Washington's initial position, there was ultimate success in imposing quantitative restrictions on ALCM's and SLCM's, in which the Americans are "strong." The treaty also enshrines the USSR-proposed flight range for "air-to-surface" class missiles—600 km and over. The United States was initially insisting on a limit of 1,500 km, then 800, and then conceded, agreeing with the USSR. Consequently, a large range of U.S. "air-to-surface" class weapons comes within the limitations imposed by the treaty.

Compromise has been achieved also on the question of the so-called "off-loading" of missiles. The elimination of missiles will require large financial resources. According to a statement by Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR defense minister, the treaty obliges us to destroy approximately 800 missile delivery systems, which will require about 5 billion rubles. So as to avoid eliminating a larger number of delivery systems, it was proposed to achieve the ceiling of 6,000 weapons simply by removing some of the warheads from some missiles, preserving the missiles themselves. Initially the USSR proposed removing 1,650 warheads altogether, but the United States agreed only to 1,250 units. Then they "came together" on the figure of 1,250.

All the same, readers should not get the idea that the treaty is ideal. Of course, it has serious shortcomings. It will not resolve all the pressing strategic problems, it will not allow nuclear weapons to be reduced even to the levels envisaged by currently existing military doctrines, and it will not halt the modernization of offensive weapons. The treaty puts a bar on the quantitative growth of strategic offensive weapons, but the reduction in the numbers of delivery systems and nuclear weapons can be compensated to a significant degree by qualitative improvement of remaining arsenals. And in this sphere, it should be admitted, the advantages are on the side of the United States.

The treaty did not solve another fundamental problem: It does not properly reflect the interconnection between strategic offensive weapons and defensive weapons. The Soviet side went ahead with the signing of the START treaty without guarantees from the U.S. side that the Americans will not demolish the ABM Treaty, which is the cornerstone in the maintenance of strategic stability. But meanwhile the U.S. administration is pursuing its line of supporting the SDI program, which envisages, in breach of the ABM Treaty, the deployment of antimissile defense systems involving the use of space—a program which, according to THE WASHINGTON POST, is "the most glorious stupidity of all Ronald Reagan's defense follies." If Washington continues to pursue this course, in time the United States will annul everything that was enshrined with such great labor in the START treaty. Such an outcome would be pernicious both for Soviet-U.S relations, and for stability in the world.

The START talks were an important element in relations between the USSR and the United States, and the fact that they were still incomplete after the "cold war" had ended acted as a sort of hindrance to stepping up efforts in other spheres. Now, when economic, political, and regional problems are coming to the fore, both sides have acquired greater freedom to solve them, insofar as this important chapter in the disarmament sphere has finally been closed. At the same time it can be hoped that the START treaty will become the basis for achieving other accords on reducing, and subsequently eliminating nuclear weapons.

START Delegate General Lebedev Interviewed

PM0508110391 Moscow IAN PRESS RELEASE in English 30 Jul 91

[Interview with General Yuriy Lebedev by IAN'S Vladimir Nazarenko; date, place of interview not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction: "General Lebedev on the START Treaty"]

[Text] General Yuriy Lebedev, a member of the Soviet delegation in Geneva is interviewed here by Vladimir Nazarenko of NOVOSTI:

[Nazarenko] The painstaking nine-year-long work on the START treaty is over. For the first time in the history of Soviet-U.S. nuclear confrontation they have come to an agreement on reducing their strategic arsenals. How much will this affect the strategic trends of the world's most powerful nuclear states?

[Lebedev] Each side will reduce the aggregate number of delivery vehicles (deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers] to 11,600, and the number of warheads to 6,000, including ICBM and SLBM warheads to 4,900, heavy ICBM warheads to 1,540, and mobile ICBM warheads to 1,100.

This means that the warheads on strategic delivery vehicles will be reduced by roughly a half, while the number of delivery vehicles will be reduced by less than 40 percent for the Soviet Union and about 30 percent for the USA.

[Nazarenko] What additional limitations does the Treaty envisage?

[Lebedev] The aggregate throw-weight of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of either side shall not exceed the level which amounts to about 50 percent of the existing aggregate weight of the deployed Soviet missiles.

Heavy ICBM's (which only the Soviet Union has) will be halved to 154. Under the politically binding joint statement, long-range SLCM's (over 600 km) that are not covered by the Treaty shall have a ceiling of 880 items.

The USA shall have no more than 150 heavy bombers (within the limit of 1,600 established for delivery vehicles), and the Soviet Union shall have no more than 180. The Treaty also provides for other limitations.

[Nazarenko] What about the verification regime?

[Lebedev] A verification regime that I consider unprecedented has been elaborated for the entire duration of the Treaty (which is 15 years, with possible prolongation for five-year periods). It includes the use of national technical means of control, all kinds of on-site inspections, exchange of data and a system of notifications, as well as binding on-site inspections. In short, there are practically no loopholes in the Treaty.

[Nazarenko] You know all the intricate links between the START Treaty and the 1972 ABM Treaty, on which the Soviet Union and the US could not agree. How was the problem settled?

[Lebedev] Seeking to get out of the deadlock, the Soviet Union agreed to sign the START treaty even if the sides did not come to an agreement on the ABM problem. Simultaneously, the sides agreed that if the ABM Treaty were violated, this would free the Soviet Union of its commitments under the START treaty.

[Nazarenko] Back in the 1970s the Soviet Union and the USA established a rough parity in their strategic forces. Will it not be disrupted as a result of the realisation of the START treaty?

[Lebedev] We have done everything in our power to preserve the balance of the sides' strategic nuclear forces and parity, and thus to serve national interests in full measure. More than that, we have laid a firm basis for continued movement towards deeper reductions of the sides' nuclear arsenals.

Commentator on Mideast Nuclear Nonproliferation

LD0608083991 Moscow Radio Moscow in Arabic 1600 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] In his commentary entitled, "A Gesture From Moscow," Aleksandr Krasnov talks about creating a world free of nuclear weapons. Here is his commentary:

The Security Council will discuss in the coming days the issue of dismantling Iraq's nuclear installations to exclude the possibility of manufacturing nuclear weapons. The commentator ventures to say that the discussion will be conducted under strong influence from the treaty that has been signed in Moscow between the Soviet Union and the United States concerning the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, and under influence from facts which appeared today. M. Gorbachev talked about a case whereby some move along the path of disarmament and toward a world free of nuclear weapons, while others currently find the means to possess their private nuclear weapon. He described this case as being ludicrous. This observation has a direct and complete connection with the Middle East. However, this should not deal with Iraq alone but also with Israel as it actually possesses nuclear weapons though it currently succeeds in staying in the shadow, thanks to the support it receives from some circles in the Senate and the U.S. administration.

Therefore, one of the most important issues today is to complete the mechanism of nonproliferation of nuclear and missile technology. These measures should, in the context of the Middle East, apply to all the countries in the region, in addition to those that have not joined the nuclear nonproliferation treaty until now, among them Israel. It is thought that the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East is a step with great potential. But this idea does not attract attention for its usefulness only. It was first proposed by one of the countries in the region—Egypt—and, secondly, supported by the delegates of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, who recently discussed the issue of limiting the export of conventional weapons and the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In order to implement this idea, the removal of surface-to-surface missiles from the Middle East is being proposed, along with not producing or introducing the components of destructive nuclear warheads to that region and putting all nuclear reactors under the supervision of the International Nuclear Energy Agency. It is natural that to achieve these measures requires a specific standard of trust among the countries of the region. According to the Radio Moscow commentator, when the Soviet Union and the United States started their negotiations years ago to conclude a treaty on offensive strategic weapons, it is unlikely that they trusted one another more than the Arab countries and Israel. However, the realization of the seriousness of the situation and the desire to remove the danger of total annihilation gave them, in the end, the opportunity to find a formula to solve the most intricate of issues and advance to sign the treaty.

As for the Middle East, there are currently more suitable conditions formulating in the region for starting negotiations on disarmament. The commentator says that he is certain that the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and achieving measures to reduce the level of armaments in the region, form a single interconnected operation, which must be conducted in a balanced and parallel manner and support one another.

Therefore, what has been achieved in Moscow in terms of the Soviet-American agreement acquire a special significance, be it with respect to convening a conference for the Middle East, or attempting to work on perfecting the mechanism of nonproliferation of missile and nuclear technology. When the Soviet Union and the United States signed Moscow's specific treaty for offensive strategic weapons, they sent a signal at the same time, to the other nuclear countries and the countries which still want to obtain this weapon, and this signal must be heard and seen for the sake of peace on our earth.

United States & Canada

Bessmertnykh Cited on Baker Talks, Summit Agenda

PM0508133391 Moscow IAN PRESS RELEASE in English (Undated)

[IAN interview with A.A. Bessmertnykh, USSR foreign minister, 29 July in Moscow; first paragraph is editorial introduction: "Ministers Conduct Dialogue During Summit. Aleksandr Bessmertnykh Talks to Vladimir Markov of NOVOSTI"]

[Text] The Soviet-US summit had in fact begun even before President George Bush arrived in Moscow. Seven hours before his arrival, Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh met his US counterpart James Baker for a two-hour talk here. After his talks with Baker wound up, Bessmertnykh gave an interview to Novosti Information Agency.

QUESTION: What did your talks, which have sort of opened the summit, begin with?

ANSWER: Indeed, our present-day talks are being conducted within the summit's framework. We have discussed the contents of joint statements and agreements to be adopted during the summit. We have also made a detailed discussion of the entire range of arms- reduction issues. Having finalized the START Treaty, which is going to be signed in the Kremlin on July 31, we have in fact launched a new round of talks pertaining to future agreements as regards strategic arms.

QUESTION: What can you say about the two sides' approach to arms-control issues?

ANSWER: To begin with, we realize the necessity for holding consultations as regards future talks on ensuring strategic stability, their content, goals and stages, etc. without delay. Both the secretary of state and I have agreed that such consultations should not be postponed and should be held in the near future. We have reached mutual understanding in this respect. However, owing to the fact that these are going to be extremely important and large-scale talks, both sides are naturally thinking about their structure. This question, as well as some others, will be the subject of the forthcoming consultations.

We have discussed other arms-limitation spheres where we should reach additional accords. We have also examined the possibility of transforming the talks' structure and to set up additional working groups, which would act in an entirely different way—that is they would resolve the problems at hand by 'brain-storming'.

The reduction of conventional arms in Europe, the 'open-skies' proposal, the limitation of nuclear tests, the non-proliferation of missiles and related technologies and some other issues were discussed. On the whole, both the Soviet Union and the United States are capable of ensuring uninterrupted arms-limitation process.

QUESTION: Is there any chance of Presidents Gorbachev and Bush calling for a Middle East peace conference from Moscow?

ANSWER: I don't think that the question can be posed in such a manner as yet. We are now discussing it. At present, we are going through a delicate stage of talks, which is aimed at activating the entire machinery of the Middle East settlement. On the whole, time is getting ripe for convening a Mideast peace conference. During the Moscow summit, we are going to discus the expediency of our joint trip to the Middle East together with Secretary Baker.

On the whole, the talks were very good and businesslike. The secretary of state and I have agreed to hold several more meetings. So, the ministers will conduct their dialogue against the background of the main talks between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush. We are ready to tackle specific issues, the resolution of which might be entrusted to us by the presidents in order to ensure the success of the summit, which is called upon to determine the new nature of Soviet-American relations both for the near and remote future.

Continuing Reportage on Summit Events

Shcherbakov on Visit

LD0508123891 Moscow TASS in English 1135 GMT 5 Aug 91

[By commentator Yuri Sizov]

[Text] Moscow August 5 TASS—During an official visit of the President of the United States to the Soviet Union, it was agreed that in the present situation the restrictions of Cocom (Coordinating Committee of Export Controls) with regard to the Soviet Union are unjustifiable, Vladimir Shcherbakov, USSR first deputy prime minister and minister of economics and forecast, told TASS.

He said that during the Moscow summit not only the historic Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was signed, but questions of bilateral economic cooperation were discussed.

As is known, the USSR and the U.S. exchanged memorandums outlining the common interests of the two countries: conversion, processing of farm produce, and development of the fuel and energy complex in the USSR.

Regarding the question of Cocom restrictions which interfere with dynamic cooperation of the two countries, Shcherbakov said that "our investment cooperation with the West cannot be serious unless the Cocom lists are dropped". He emphasised that products manufactured by joint ventures cannot be competetive if this question remains unsolved. Not a single Western entrepreneur will invest into obsolete production.

There must be advance from both sides, Shcherbakov said. He said President Bush confirmed in principle that it is time to tackle this problem.

At the same time Shcherbakov intimated that it is yet difficult to say which of the Cocom restrictions will be lifted, and which will stay. He said the main problem is to have mutual guarantees that technical means will not have dual use. Shcherbakov said that there can be such guarantees.

Setting out the Soviet stand regarding its integration into the world economic system, Shcherbakov confirmed that the Soviet Union has already made an application to enter the International Monetary Fund as a full member.

"We wish to enter the world community not as a suppliant but as an equal partner", the deputy prime minister said. "if so, we should enter all international organisations as an equal partner".

"The Soviet Union does not ask for anything", Shcherbakov said. "We propose a different level of cooperation. We are being told that there are 156 countries in the International Monetary Fund, and that the alignment of forces will change when the USSR joins the fund".

This is not a simple matter, the deputy prime minister said. Each country is guided by its own interests. "Charity is out of place in such affairs. The Soviet side is aware of this. Applying for full membership in the International Monetary Fund, it agrees to have the status of an associated member for the time needed to discuss the application. We agree to a special status for the present, but the question of the Soviet Union's entry as a full-fledged member of the International Monetary Fund should remain on the agenda", Shcherbakov said.

Novo-Ogarevo Dinner Clarified

PM0508133991 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 2 Aug 91 p 3

[Statement by V. Borisenko followed by M. Chikin comment: "KGB Versus AFP"]

[Text] The report in your newspaper on the alleged confusion during the U.S. President's visit to Novo-Ogarevo was read with some surprise, to say the least. With reference to a REUTER-AFP report, the newspaper told readers how the Russians and Americans had clashed over where to dine.

The American and Soviet security officers, service personnel, and auxiliary staff, who were enlisted to look after the meeting between our countries' presidents, were located in an administrative building (promoted in the report to a presidential dacha). The second floor of the building was allotted to the American side, and the first to the Soviets. In fact, one of these spacious rooms housed the center of communication with the White House. But when aides from the White House apparatus, U.S. State Department, and U.S. Embassy decided to dine in this room they were rebuffed by the American Secret Service. The conflict which emerged between the Americans was settled via an invitation for them to dine on the first (Soviet) floor. Both sides are of the opinion that the dinner passed off in a warm and friendly atmosphere.

We are touched by the details quoted in this account. By mutual consent, the press had not been invited to cover the meeting in Novo-Ogarevo.

Representatives of the American Secret Services, the U.S. State Department, and the White House apparatus expressed heartfelt gratitude to the Soviet side for organizing matters in Novo-Ogarevo. Anybody wishing to verify this can telephone Kiev, where the U.S. President and his companions can be found at present.

Let me inform you that the U.S. President thanked our aides for the high standard of service and reliable security.

Alas, hopes for a scandal from the report on the confusion in Novo-Ogarevo were not vindicated.

[signed] V. Borisenko, deputy chief of the USSR KGB Directorate.

[comment] The most important thing is that everything went well—everybody ate their fill. Thank God. But, if anyone, the USSR KGB Directorate should know that these clashes arose not over dinner but over the **"PLACE** for dining."

In order to remove suspicions and be rid of those who are hounding us, we decided once again to refer to the source. The first part of our item concerned mysterious interruptions on the Americans' internal radio link and was taken from the REUTER report. The KGB did not deny it.

Second, the part about who should dine where came through AFP channels. We got in touch with the Moscow correspondents' office, where we were told that AFP's Washington correspondent, Mishel Kuper [as transliterated], was present in Novo-Ogarevo and "composed the material from the words of the AMERICAN security officers." Incidentally, the AFP bureau chief in Moscow told us that American journalists were also present in Novo-Ogarevo—which has relevance regarding the "mutual consent." One would like to believe that our ubiquitous colleagues from across the ocean penetrated this well concealed territory precisely during the dinner interval when the "confusion" took place and everyone was busy either giving interviews to outsiders or ensuring the complete secrecy of the talks. But whatever went on, AFP's coded message got through freely and at 10.17 GMT it was given the number EAA0114 4 1 0149 and was transmitted around the world.

And of course KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA is guilty. We print whatever comes our way. And incidentally, AFP received no complaints. Strange...

Observer Views Outcome

PM0508143091 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Aug 91 Union Edition p 5

[Article by Stanislav Kondrashov under the "Political Observer's Opinion" rubric: "What Did George Bush Take Away? And What Did He Leave Behind?"]

[Text] So George Bush has flown away, taking his copy of the treaty on strategic offensive arms reduction and limitation and leaving us—as a prologue to the new era—with a promise to develop economic relations. And, for a start, to submit to Congress for its approval a trade agreement which has lain motionless for more than a year, since the two presidents signed it during Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Washington. Is this a lot, or not much?

Under the agreement we are at last to receive Most Favored Nation [MFN] status, that is, the normal status that exists in U.S. trade with all countries. Since we have virtually no trade (the USSR accounts for half a percent of America's trade turnover, and they account for 1 percent of ours), this is purely symbolic, in the first instance. But it is clear from Bush's Moscow statements that the Soviet Union will now receive MFN status not only in trade, but, so to speak, in general political and economic terms. That is really something.

With reference to Soviet-U.S. relations, the U.S. President boldly used words that our leaders—in the light of recent experience—steer clear of and shun. Yes, those very words: friendship, friendly relations. Not yet allies, since the missiles are still deployed against each other, but friends? It is frightening and awkward to use these words, which have been compromised by the history of our relations with, alas, many countries. But it is also awkward to correct the U.S. President. He spoke emphatically about his friend Mikhail Gorbachev and our countries' friendship, though avoiding the epithets that spring automatically to our tongues—eternal, indissoluble.

One reservation: This characterization perhaps conveys not so much the present state of the emerging partnership relations, as the goal, which, in Bush's opinion, is fully attainable. His Moscow visit is a milestone on the road to that goal.

The U.S. President has already taken advantage of some of the rights of a friend. For instance, the right to be frank, to give advice—at times, I would say, in the tone of a mentor. This tone could be heard in the praise of American free enterprise, the encouragement of our enterprise, the calls for action addressed to our entrepreneurs. The President made it clear that ideological confrontation has been swept away even more than military confrontation. Gorbachev talks of "one civilization," and Bush, by way of clarifying this generality, slipped in a definition that I think rather embarrasses our general secretary—the "spirit of democratic capitalism."

Bush came into politics from a rich family, and after a successful youth in business. His career is of a different kind from those of our Union and republic leaders, it is not a party career. So it is hardly surprising that he seeks to impart the lessons of his own life, not someone else's, and the national experience of his own country, not another country. Especially when there are Soviet businessmen in the audience. There he rubbed salt into our fresh wounds by reminding us of the failure of the attempt to create the "new Soviet man" and rightly noting that "human nature cannot be destroyed and created anew."

But does this President, who comes from among businessmen, understand that our situation and our crisis are more complex than another country's—that we had a different history, in which human nature—through a combination of an elevated ideal and harsh coercive practice—was changed and "statized," putting the egalitarian distribution of benefits and their receipt at the hands of an omnipotent, paternalistic state above American-style equal opportunities? Was George Bush told that on the day of his arrival IZVESTIYA published a commentary by our Sverdlovsk correspondent Aleksandr Pashkov on how, in the Urals industrial city of Alapayevsk, worker inhabitants used force and weapons to drive out the gypsies who had settled there, seeing—and hating—them as businessmen growing rich on the population's impoverished situation? Like it or not, that is the workers' ethic. That is how they were raised—by ideology, by the state, by life itself, even if they were disappointed in their expectations of a "bright communist future."

The mentality of millions of people, when it has been nurtured over 70 years, represents a huge force of inertia. People in the know in the United States take it seriously. On the day that IZVESTIYA described the battle in Alapayevsk, the LOS ANGELES TIMES published figures from a major poll carried out in May by the Times Mirror organization in the European part of Russia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania. A total of 2,210 people were polled. A majority, though a small one (with the exception of the Lithuanians, among whom the majority was overwhelming), are in favor of a market economy, but when it comes to the choice between socialism and capitalism, they prefer the former. Of those who choose capitalism, only 17 percent of Russians, 23 percent of Ukrainians, and 29 percent of Lithuanians approve the American type of market economy. Only 10 percent of Russians, 5 percent of Ukrainians, and 16 percent of Lithuanians are prepared to agree, for instance, that newspapers should belong to private individuals. The American newspaper formulates one of the poll's main conclusions thus: "Soviet citizens, though depressed by their country's terrible economic lot, are in their overwhelming majority opposed to private ownership in basic sectors of industry and have serious doubts about turning the state economy into a market economy."

These facts established by the Americans bring Bush's hymns to enterprise down to earth on concrete historical

territory, but do not negate the significance of his attempts to find a common language with us, especially since the initiative for this quest came from our side. Gorbachev and Bush, developing the beginnings recently made in London, had a solid talk about widening economic cooperation. Various concrete proposals, projects, and requests were presented by our side, and the American businessman from the White House obviously seriously felt the desire to help. That is something too; official patronage is particularly important for the main protagonist—American private business. Maybe Washington is not as active as Bonn, Paris, or Rome, but its blessing makes the green light burn more surely and steadily in those capitals too.

I remember the energetic weaving of the fabric of economic cooperation between the two countries in the first half of the seventies, after Nixon's visit to Moscow and Brezhnev's to Washington in 1972-1973. At that time virtually all our 100 or so Union ministers passed through America as delegation heads. What they wove was a mirage. And not only because the arms race continued and was accelerated, but also because—let us again recall the points Bush emphasized here in Moscow—everything was done at the level of bureaucracy and the state, rather than at the level of business and the citizen. He is right: The fabric will be durable, lasting, and of the necessary quality and quantity when the job is tackled not by indifferent civil servants, but by interested people, businessmen.

And so we are at the beginning of a new era, in which not disarmament, but economic questions will predominate in relations between the two countries. The era now past lasted a long time. More than nine years passed after the upheavals of the "Caribbean nuclear missile crisis" in October 1962, before the first, "interim" agreement on the limitation of strategic nuclear arms between the USSR and the United States (SALT I). It did indeed prove to be interim, SALT II was wrecked, and in the early eighties the Soviet leadership did not immediately accept Reagan's idea—that these arms should not be limited, but reduced. And then another nine years and more passed before last Wednesday, when the historic treaty was signed.

More than two-thirds of strategic arms remain, but the sides now have a "breathing space"—to reflect and look around. How long will it last? The other owners of nuclear weapons must be brought into the talks, the proliferation of these weapons must be prevented. But the main question and the main point of uncertainty is the Soviet Union itself, its fate. This question is not discussed in public, but behind closed doors at the talks the Americans were doubtless trying to find out: What will happen to the nuclear weapons in the event of the breakup of the USSR? Who will inherit them? How responsible will the new owners be? The problem is that neither they nor we know the answer, which would probably illuminate the situation for years to come. The situation is not transparent. Yet the duration of the "breathing space" depends to a great extent on this.

During this respite, the Soviet Union has its own specific concerns. They include the concept of ensuring sufficient security in the conditions of a changed, reduced place in the world. They include the disarmament burden, which is, of course, lighter than the arms burden, but demands a sensible, thoughtful approach, as we have already seen. And another thing: How can the armed might and scientific and industrial potential left over from the era of confrontation be used effectively in the country's transition to a new peaceful condition? It is not only a question of conversion, but of how to use the strength factor in politics—not for the purposes of deterrence, but in the interests of peace and self-respect and to make others respect you. Incidentally, the Americans have never abandoned the strength factor, and use it with success, as exemplified by the Persian Gulf conflict.

Despite the existence of approximate parity in strategic arms, there is between us and the Americans a flagrant imbalance economically and an equally great imbalance in political stability, or rather instability. The factor of the Soviet Union's weakness could be perceived even in the nature of the statements on the Moscow meeting. The Soviet statements were mainly rhetoric, the American statements were mainly concrete and, again, frank. Awareness of the strength of the United States and the USSR's political and economic inequality enabled Bush almost bluntly to state his terms—about Moscow's aid to Cuba (reductions in military and then other aid), about Moscow's granting speedy independence to the Baltic republics, and even, rather unexpectedly, about the "northern territories" that Japan claims and that were not actually promised to it during Gorbachev's recent visit. The U.S. President hints: It would be no bad thing to demonstrate membership of "one civilization" by settling the aforesaid problems. These are the dues that must, in his view, be hurriedly paid if the "seven plus one" mechanism that sprang into motion in London is not to falter.

America's positions of strength can also be detected in the way in which Washington and the indefatigable James Baker dominate the quest for a Near East peace settlement. The Soviet Union is only involved insofar as its continuing political influence in the Arab countries can help the process which the Americans are directing. And in the Joint Statement on Yugoslavia the Soviet side's former emphasis on preserving the integrity of the fraternal country had disappeared, and the joint position proved closer to the American and West European position.

Finally, the most important question—the prospects for domestic evolution in the USSR and changing relations between the center and the republics. That was how the dialogue started on Tuesday between Bush and Gorbachev, who, prior to his morning meeting with the U.S. President, sat up late with the Russian president, working out a highly complex and sensitive compromise—on the taxation article of the Union treaty. And this question also arose, in a very ticklish form, on Monday evening, when Yeltsin refused Gorbachev's

invitation to take part in enlarged talks with the Americans although Vitaliy Ignatenko had already announced his participation as seemingly a decided thing. What was the reason—a "blunder" by the USSR president, or "unpredictability" on the part of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] president?

In the American press, naturally, this episode was covered widely, but it our press it went unnoticed. It is in a report by Michael Parks, Moscow correspondent of the LOS ANGELES TIMES, and not in my own newspaper, in English and not in Russian, that I read that Yeltsin stated: I do not intend to be an "extra in a crowd scene." In an interview for the American television company CNN he apparently explained his rejection of the invitation in some detail. It need hardly be said that this is at least as interesting to us as to the Americans. But the habit of keeping quiet about anything "inconvenient" dies hard. And the episode could be a highly significant indicator for the future.

Unlike American journalists, the American President also kept quiet about this episode. On questions concerning the internal distribution of forces in the Soviet Union, he was extremely cautious and restrained. Before leaving for Moscow, talking with Soviet correspondents, he expressed due respect for Yeltsin and his victory in democratically conducted elections, but said that he did not want to "equate" Yeltsin and Gorbachev. And he explained: "I don't think that that means we have a 'triangle' where I deal with Yeltsin on the same basis as I deal with Gorbachev. You can't conduct foreign policy that way. You have to have an ordered approach, and people in the Soviet Union, the whole Union, are entitled to know that the President of the United States will deal with respect with the president of the Soviet Union."

In Moscow, Bush became even more cautious, clearly realizing that the "ordered" approach he is accustomed to is not to be found in the Soviet Union. He tried to equate his contacts with republic leaders with the contacts that Soviet leaders could have with state governors in the United States. But the Russian leadership takes a different view. Gennadiy Burbulis, state secretary to the RSFSR president, described Yeltsin's meeting with Bush as a "continuation of Russian-American **interstate**zcontacts at the highest level." It can be concluded from this that Russia has—or will have, any minute now—its own foreign policy that does not necessarily coincide with the Union one.

If that is so, then a highly complex and hardly stable structure of dual statehood arises, whereby the already proclaimed dual sovereignty (of the Union and of the component republics) does not rule out dual or multiple foreign policy and the absence of a common security concept. Don't Bush's words fit this case: You can't conduct foreign policy that way? Or if you do, you should explain to the people, in detail and in good time: How?

In Moscow, Bush did not once stray into the mine field of Soviet domestic politics. In Kiev, deliberately broaching the delicate topic, he stated that American support for reforms extends both to the center and to the republics that are seeking democracy and economic freedom, and dissociated himself from those forces that want independence only in order to replace "tyranny from afar with local despotism."

But the U.S. President has flown away without receiving a clear answer to the question: What will happen next to the state with which his country has entered a new era of friendly, partnership relations?

Main Aspects of Summit Viewed

PM0508155591 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Aug 91 p 1

["Commentary" by Aleksandr Golts: "Presidents' Talks End, Mass of Work Ahead"]

[Text] I will venture to say, without counting, which words figured most frequently in the official speeches during the U.S. President's visit to the USSR and also in journalists' reports. These words are "new era." A qualitatively new phase is setting in in relations between our countries. It is determined above all by the fact that trust has emerged and the "cold war" has become a thing of the past as a result of the domestic changes in the Soviet Union and the changes on the international arena. The conclusion of the strategic offensive arms treaty, which, unlike all previous agreements, really cuts back nuclear arsenals [as published], is material evidence of this.

But most of those speaking of a "new era" are not saying: What next, what comes after these words? After all, whereas previously U.S. and USSR leaders used to meet—as one newspaper wrote without irony—"to deter one another," now there has to be talk of other things. How to structure bilateral relations so as to ensure that they are not only secure but also mutually beneficial. How to secure greater stability worldwide via cooperation.

What could be more natural than this kind of dialogue, one would have thought, between two great states if they do not feel hostility toward one another. However, let us not forget that one of these states is in profound crisis. And both presidents are, needless to say, perfectly well aware of that. It is no accident that M.S. Gorbachev stressed that the theme of their conversations was how to preserve the "element of movement" in dialogue. We will only see in the future whether they have succeeded in doing this.

However, even now one can say that the first steps are already being taken to develop the Soviet-U.S. partnership. Despite widespread self-destructive views we are still (at least in American eyes) a fairly influential world force. It is us whom they have chosen as partners in the matter of convening a Near East peace conference.

Needless to say, we are all particularly interested—and this interest is by no means platonic—in how bilateral ties develop. The United States has tried to demonstrate that it is willing to assist the Soviet Union within the framework of the London G-7 decisions. To all intents and purposes, it is a question of a fairly sizeable set of documents. The intention is to offer the USSR considerable technical aid in organizing oil and gas extraction. The U.S. President's proposal regarding the provision of aid to improve the operation of Soviet wholesale markets is also attracting attention. It is even intended that the U.S. agriculture secretary will personally take part in formulating experimental market projects for food distribution in two Soviet cities.

The fact that G. Bush intends to abolish the restrictions on the USSR's rights to U.S. government credits is also important. The President even indicated that he would agree to revise the definition of "national interests" since its present interpretation prevents official financial backing for "Marxist-Leninist" states. An extensive aid program is envisaged in the sphere of conversion. Representatives of the private sector will share their experience in this field and the Pentagon will outline how it helps areas where military production is shut down.

Lastly, the United States intends to grant both Most Favored Nation status in trade and conclude a trade agreement to ensure observance of both countries' interests in reciprocal trade.

It is easy to say that virtually every one of these projects is beneficial to the United States right now. But we will not accuse Washington of being mercenary. Perhaps, it is best to stop believing "in a king or hero" who, solely out of love for the Land of the Soviets, will suddenly up and organize a civilized market in our country. And ask nothing in return....

Leningrad-U.S. Trade, Economic Link Reported

OW0508013991 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1400 GMT 2 Aug 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Economic experts and U.S. State Department officials in Leningrad, together with the United States Consul General in Leningrad, Jack Gosnell, announced the imminent establishment of economic and cultural contacts between the USA and the City of Leningrad.

Speaking at a reception held by the deputy-mayor of the city, Vyacheslav Shcherbkov, Consul Gosnell said that "bearing in mind the establishment of the Leningrad Free Enterprise Zone, I have recommended to Washington that in plans for economic and technical cooperation with the Soviet Union Leningrad should be singled out. The stimulation of financial services, and the development of municipal transport, railways and the communications system should be included."

American diplomats reported that U.S. businessmen were keen to cooperate in the establishment of the Leningrad Free Enterprise Zone and to invest in the transformation of military-industrial enterprises to civilian usage.

Pavlov Meets With Matlock at End of Mission

LD0308154391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 2 Aug 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] USSR Prime Minister Pavlov received today Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the USSR, in connection with the end of his diplomatic mission and his forthcoming departure from the Soviet Union. They exchanged views on the possible prospects for cooperation between the two countries in the light of the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting.

Northeast Asia

ROK Delegation Visits Kazakhstan, Moscow

SK0408095591 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean 1330 GMT 29 Jul 91

[From "Various Aspects of Cooperation" program]

[Text] An ROK parliamentary delegation led by Kim Yun-hwan, secretary-general of the ruling Democratic Liberal Party, visited the Soviet Union at the invitation of the leadership of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.

The delegation also visited Moscow. In Moscow, Gennadiy Yanayev, Soviet vice president, received the delegation. In the course of talks, the issue of further developing relations between the ROK and the USSR was deeply discussed.

Kim Yun-hwan, head of the ROK parliamentary delegation, visited the University of International Affairs in Moscow and delivered a speech to professors and students. He made remarks on the history of relations between the USSR and the ROK and pointed out the need for [word indistict] development.

ROK Firm To Buy 5 Million Barrels of Crude

PM0508145591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Jul 91 Union Edition p 1

[Unattributed report from the "IZVESTIYA, TASS, NOVOSTI, REUTERS, INTERFAX, RIA" column: "Contract to Buy Soviet Oil"]

[Text] Seoul newspapers reported Monday that Jindo Industries had signed a contract to buy 5 million barrels of Soviet crude. The oil will start being delivered to South Korea this fall. The contract is the first agreement on direct shipments of Soviet oil to South Korea. Last

year that country received 210,000 barrels of oil from the USSR, but through Japanese firms.

Joint Venture Ship Services in ROK Ports

OW0608003391 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2119 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Soviet Business Report]

[Text] Korsov Co. Ltd, founded by the South Korean Daerim Corp. and the Soviet foreign trading company "Sovrybflot", is starting to serve Soviet ships in South Korean ports. The JV [Joint Venture] plans to provide intermediary fish-selling services and to service Soviet ships in ports, including the carrying out of repairs and the supply of spare parts. The JV plans to receive about $480 thousand for this work as early as this year.

Korsov Co. ltd. was registered in March of this year with $140.8 thous. capital each side paid 50 percent. The HQ of the company based in Pusan, South Korea, plans to set up branches in Seoul and somewhere in the USSR as well.

Japanese Academics Present Chernobyl Study Funds

LD0608020691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1745 GMT 5 Aug 91

[By UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent Tatyana Larina]

[Excerpt] Kiev, 5 Aug (TASS)—A Soviet-Japanese symposium on the probability theory and mathematical statistics opened in an unusual way in the Ukrainian capital today. Japanese mathematicians presented the Ukrainian Academy of Science's Institute for Oncology and Radiobiology with 260,000 yen (about $20,000) they collected to study Chernobyl's effects on people's health. [passage omitted]

Mongolian Party Chairman on Committee Plenum

LD0308190991 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1530 GMT 2 Aug 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] In Ulaanbaatar Budragchaagiyn Dash-Yondon, chairman of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] Central Committee, has held a news conference. He spoke about the work of the second MPRP Central Committee plenum and its decisions and answered journalists' questions.

[Correspondent T. Lordkipanidze] This time representatives of Soviet Television were given the possibility of filming during the plenum's work and also in the foyer when the chairman announced intervals. To tell the truth, few people believed that the plenum's participants would fit everything into the two working days scheduled by the standing orders.

It was a full agenda: a proposal for greatly esteemed draft, a new constitution for the country, a plan for a concept of universal charity, the adoption of the procedure for the party Central Committee' work, and organizational questions. At the 20th MPRP Congress, which took place at the start of this year, two wings of the party appeared. However the disagreement does not threaten schism. There is a struggle of opinions about the ways to renew the MPRP and its place in the life of the people. [video shows the plenum and the intervals]

Interviewed by "Vremya", Budragchaagiyn Dash-Yondon, chairman of the MPRP Central Committee, said the country is going further into the process of perestroyka. Basic improvements are taking place in the political, social and spiritual spheres. At the same time signs of ecoomic crisis are clearly arising. We understand that there is no way back. Dash-Yondon continued. Today it is necessary to mobilize the potential of the people and form a mood of universal zeal for the sake of progress and prosperity of the fatherland.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Renewal of ASEAN-USSR Contacts Viewed

PM0508152591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jul 91 First Edition p5

[Dmitriy Kosyrev "Viewpoint": "'London No. 2'"]

[Text] On the face of it, the parallels are obvious. London: For the first time in history the USSR president is a guest of the club of the seven most developed countries in the world. Kuala Lumpur, capital of Malaysia: For the first time in history a Soviet representative is invited to the annual meeting of the six ASEAN countries' foreign ministers and their colleagues from the United States, Japan, Australia, Canada, the EEC, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea. In both cases, our diplomacy is apparently incidental to the meeting concerned, but its presence is very strongly felt nevertheless.

An interesting point is that Kuala Lumpur certainly did not copy the London idea. Quite the reverse. This original form of participation by a new partner, the Soviet Union, in a well-established event was first invented here, in Asia. It is true, however, that the reasoning in both cases is largely similar. It could be summed up as follows: The USSR's role in the international arena is changing and its partners urgently need to know what kind of role it will play in the future. Our policy of "new thinking" began by carrying out an essentially one-shot task (albeit long and difficult): Clearing away the dense mass of obstacles in international policy which we put a lot of effort into creating in the past. Then it was time to think about what should be erected in their place.

There the similarity between the London and Kuala Lumpur meetings ends. The G-7 meeting was concerned with how to help the Soviet Union to become integrated

into the world economy to everyone's benefit. The situation in Asia is more complicated and paradoxical.

First, the initiative to invite a Soviet guest to Kuala Lumpur came from the host country—Malaysia (and, I do not doubt, from all the other states which make up ASEAN—Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines—the most rapidly developing economic group in the world). The Chinese foreign minister was invited on the same basis—also for the first time. Covert but stubborn resistance from Tokyo and Washington had to be overcome. It is no secret that those countries would prefer the Soviet Union's role in many world forums, conferences, and so forth to be that of an "associate," i.e. without the right to take part in decisionmaking. And it seems they would like to keep us out of Asia altogether. But now the leaders of ASEAN—a group of countries for which we were long "beyond the pale" as far as serious contact is concerned—have made considerable efforts to start opening the doors to us.

Why? This region's economic growth is evident. It is well known that reciprocal trade between the Pacific countries is now 30 percent greater than transatlantic trade. This trend is gathering momentum and the ASEAN countries are leading the field. Naturally, their diplomacy is also becoming increasingly confident. At present it is concerned with safeguarding their interests in an era of change on the political map of Asia. We have written about their nervous reaction to the possibility of a reduced U.S. military role: They wonder who will fill the vacuum. But, imagine, the Soviet Union's future role in Asia gives rise to similar questions.

Of course, no one in the region, heaven forbid, would want to maintain military rivalry between the two superpowers: It has caused Asia a lot of trouble, even suffering, in the past (think of the war in Indochina, for example). But our minimum objective must be to define the role that we, China, and others are going to play in Asia now. Here is a simple example from confidential diplomatic talks: Signs of rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Japan have set the leaders of Southeast Asian countries thinking. They wonder whether some people in Tokyo are thinking along the lines that they will soon be given a free hand, whereupon they will turn their attention to the south, to Southeast Asia, and play a military role there? In short, at the meeting in Kuala Lumpur they wanted to start to draw up a new scheme for a balance of forces in Asia that would allow its inhabitants to continue to quietly set economic records. That means dealing with all the participants in this political game on a regular basis.

What are we trying to achieve ourselves? Let us look at who went to the meeting. They invited our foreign minister. A. Bessmertnykh did not go to Malaysia because of the meeting in London, but we sent someone of even higher rank—Deputy Premier Yu. Maslyukov—which was evidently appreciated. He was accompanied by a large retinue: Not so much diplomats as businessmen eager to discuss specific economic issues and take a serious look at a region where other countries are making billions [currency not specified].

There is plenty to discuss. For example, it is obvious that, in the immediate future at least, our trade with Southeast Asia lies with small and medium private businesses. But the first, "frenetic" wave of business representatives are already beginning to put partners off with their unscrupulousness and lack of experience. It is time to give trade the help it receives everywhere else in the world: with the aid of banks, associations, and information centers.

The second problem is this: Who is going to take part in the development of our Far East and Siberia, and how? Allowing matters to drift will not be to anyone's advantage. The prospects are enormous. For example, there are piles of industrial waste and rotting timber that have accumulated over vast areas and are damaging the environment. We cannot clear them away ourselves, but for some people they are raw material fit for consumption, for which they would be willing to pay us money....

The results of the Kuala Lumpur meeting—like those of the London meeting—cannot be expressed in specific figures or treaties. Matters simply have not reached that stage yet. We must begin by ensuring that the Soviet Union is integrated into the negotiating process in Asia. That means both regular and unscheduled forums, meetings, and so forth. All this is just as necessary as setting up banks and stock exchanges to ensure that the economy functions normally. But the process, we must hope, has now begun.

Near East & South Asia

Mideast Conference Plans Viewed

PM0508105591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Aug 91 Second Edition p 5

[Editorial commentary: "From Words to Deeds"]

[Text] At last, instead of the numerous incantations about peace on the Near East, practical steps have begun for a real search for peace. The convening of a peace conference on a Near East settlement has been scheduled for October. Some 10 days before it starts the forum's participants will receive an invitation from its co-initiators—the Soviet Union and the United States. Preparation for the conference is already under way. Immediately after the Soviet-U.S. summit in Moscow U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker visited Israel and a number of Arab countries. Steps from Soviet diplomacy are also to come.

The joint Soviet-U.S. statement on the Near East notes that a historical opportunity now exists to initiate a process which could lead to a fair and stable peace and an all-embracing settlement in the region. On what is that conclusion based?

The international climate has thawed. Detente [razryadka] in relations between the great powers, the renunciation of confrontation, and the reduction of military arsenals lend impetus to overall detente [razryadka].

Experience in resolving regional conflicts has been accumulated. With varying degrees of success the search for a settlement has already borne fruit in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, and Central America. Against this background the situation in the Near East looks simply like an anachronism.

The crisis in the Persian Gulf zone has been a kind of shock to the peoples of the region and the whole world. It has shown the dimensions which can be attained by any routine aggravation of tension in the Near East when the Arab-Israeli dispute remains unresolved and hostility is preserved. It demonstrated that quagmire into which the arms race that continues here can draw people, particularly if it develops into nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological forms of the arms race. Hence the resolve displayed by the world community in actions to halt Iraqi aggression and the determination to curb the development of dangerous trends in the Near East.

A countermovement may also be noted. Virtually all sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict and consequently the potential participants in the talks have voiced their readiness to hold peaceful dialogue.

The load of problems accumulated over the decades of Arab-Israeli war is great. They include the fate of the Arab territories occupied by Israel. These include the Golan Heights, which belong to Syria, the West Bank of the river Jordan, and the Gaza Strip, where the intifada continues. There is also the fate of the Palestinian state and the 5 million-strong Palestinian people living under conditions of occupation and scattered over Arab countries, who have still not acquired their own home. There is the overcoming of protracted hostility. After all, wars have been waged between Israel and the Arabs for over 40 years and their flames are burning increasingly hotly.

The path of the talks will probably be thorny, difficult, and long. But how important it is to embark on it, emerging from the trenches of confrontation, to finally meet face to face at the conference table, since the conference presents a unique opportunity for direct contacts between the sides. How important it is not to block, not to break the fragile peace process with any ultimatums regarding the composition of the participants or with any preliminary conditions or policy for assimilating other people's lands (and in that respect Tel Aviv is still sinning). How important it is not to let slip the historical chance that has been provided.

Commentator Views Mideast Peace Process

LD0508210991 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 2000 GMT 5 Aug 91

[By Aleksandr Pogodin]

[Text] United States Secretary of State James Baker has had talks in Israel and with a number of Arab countries in a bid to receive consent from all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to take part in a peace conference on the Middle East. Aleksandr Pogodin of Radio Moscow comments:

At first sight it may seem there are good reasons to say Mr. Baker's mission was a success. The Israeli Government has finally made up its mind to say yes. Support for the idea of a peace conference has been voiced by the Arabs, including the Palestinians. However, I don't think, writes Aleksandr Pogodin, that the further preparations for the conference or the conference itself will be easy. The sides have interpreted their consent to take part in the peace conference in different ways. The Israeli prime minister managed to gain support from his cabinet members, far from all I should say, only on the basis of rather tough terms. For instance, Shamir had to promise that the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Arabs of East Jerusalem would be kept away from negotiations. He also said that the question of withdrawal from the occupied territories would not be discussed and that the peace in exchange for land formula was ruled out. Shamir added that that attitude met with full understanding on the part of Mr. Baker.

The consent to participation in the conference given by the Arabs, in the first place the Palestinians, looks in a totally different way. The PLO says that it will insist on having a say in the negotiations. According to different estimates the PLO is supported by 75 to 90 percent of the population in the occupied territories. Besides, the Palestinians argue that the peace in exchange for land formula must be part and parcel of the plan for the peace conference. This position enjoys wide understanding in the Arab states seeking the emergence of an independent and sovereign Palestine in the occupied territories.

As one can see, everybody agrees that there must be a peace conference in principle but sticks to one's own ideas of who should take part in it and what the conference aims should be. Yet, continues Aleksandr Pogodin, I am far from saying that the peace process just about to begin is already doomed. It is the hard fact that a dialogue, however difficult and controversial, is getting underway and it is very important not to miss the historic chance.

As you may know, at the recent Soviet-American summit meeting in Moscow the sides undertook to do the best they can to bring the peace settlement in the Middle East closer. In the capacity of copresidents of the peace conference scheduled for October, the Soviet Union and the United States will seek to ensure its success. Naturally, they cannot impose peace settlements or dictate terms on parties involved in the conflict, but one must agree that a great deal depends on how the two powers cooperate to overcome confrontation and find mutually acceptable solutions.

PRAVDA's Shishlin on Invasion Anniversary

LD0308122491 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 0630 GMT 3 Aug 91

[Text] Regular listeners to Mayak—its disciples, if there are any—know, of course, that we broadcast international news at this time. So, on the anniversary of Iraq's attack on Kuwait, it is probably appropriate to talk about the influence that the thwarting of the Iraqi aggression has had on the development of events in the Middle East. Here is a commentary on this from Nikolay Shishlin, political observer of the PRAVDA Newspaper:

[Shishlin] Of course, the situation has already changed radically, although I think there are still lessons to be found and learned from that aggression. Regarding Kuwait, matters there are clear, more or less. I know that Kuwait is, of course, undergoing the very difficult process of reviving its own country, but that process is under way, and it will, of course, be crowned with success.

We have to think of Iraq, too. Iraq is in a critical economic position, and who is suffering? The Iraqi people are. The other aspect, the political situation in Iraq, is distinguished by the overt hostility of Saddam Husayn's regime toward the Shi'tes in the south of the country and the Kurds in the north. Saddam Husayn's method of treating all ills is one and the same: to turn to the Presidential Guard, meaning, to resort to force. I have no doubt that, with regards bacteriological and chemical weapons and the program to develop nuclear weapons, Iraq will be deprived of them. But nobody has any interest in Iraq disappearing from the political map of the Middle East, and its role being reduced to something like zero.

I would also like to draw attention to the Gulf countries. The Gulf countries are, of course, highly appreciative of the activity of the anti-Iraq coalition, but I do not think they are at all delighted at the prospect of having their security guaranteed for decades to come by a U.S. military presence—or by any other kind of military presence, such as a United Nations presence, the presence of United Nations armed forces. This, I feel, is the most important element, for it has impelled all political forces in the Middle East—all sensible political forces, that is—to seek compromises. The Soviet Union and the United States have become actively engaged in this search.

A unique opportunity now exists. There are, I realize, some very complex problems there, which are very hard to unravel: the questions of the representation of Palestine, of territory, and so on. But ultimately, the paramount issue is the problem of achieving peace, because peace in the Middle East means well-being for Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, the Gulf countries, Iraq, Israel and the Palestinians. If the voice of reason speaks, if good will is shown—and it is there now—I feel that the Nineties will, nevertheless, become years when one more regional conflict—the most dangerous, the most alarming and the most dramatic—is overcome.

Likelihood of Afghan Settlement Pondered

91UF1032A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Aug 91 First Edition p 3

[Viktor Vinogradov "Observer's Column": "Is the Ice Shifting?"]

[Text] According to reports from Islamabad, leading Afghan opposition groupings based in Peshawar have announced their consent to acceptance of the "UN peace plan" as the basis for an end to the 13-year war in Afghanistan.

Although no further details were adduced, it is perfectly understandable that such news could not have failed to have attracted notice. Afghanistan itself, its neighbors, and this entire region are tired of the long armed conflict which has been tearing this country apart. Conditions conducive to its termination were created following the signing of the Geneva accords and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. But advantage was not taken of them. The reason for this was the obstructionist position of the Afghan armed opposition and its foreign patrons, Pakistani primarily. Continuing to put the emphasis on a solution of the Afghan problem by the military path, they are under no circumstances allowing the fire of the fratricidal war to die out, increasing the number of those who have perished in its flames.

Delivering an armed rebuff to the "irreconcilables," but endeavoring also to avoid further senseless bloodshed, the Najibullah government addressed a corresponding request this spring to the UN secretary general. Throughout May his personal representative in Afghanistan and Pakistan, B. Sevan, conducted intensive consultations with Kabul and Islamabad and met with the political leaders of the opposition groupings and the field commanders of the armed formations and also with prominent Afghan figures living outside of the region. It was as a result of this that the statement delivered by UN Secretary General J. Perez de Cuellar was prepared. He called on all politicians of Afghanistan, wherever they were, to seek an end to the lengthy war in the country and set forth the principles of a political settlement in the country formulated in the United Nations.

What are these principles of an Afghan settlement? They include, inter alia, the establishment of a transitional

period, the mechanism of whose action is to be determined by means of inter-Afghan dialogue; free elections for the purpose of forming a broad-based government; an end to military operations and arms supplies to the belligerent Afghan parties; and others. There is no doubt that their implementation would lay a good foundation for constructive discussion, primarily by the Afghans themselves, of how to achieve an all-embracing solution of the problem and determine the paths of Afghanistan's further development.

From the very first days following the announcement of the "UN plan" the Najibullah government has declared its readiness to be guided by it in its actions. The attitude toward it of the leading opposition groupings has been completely different. Their spokesman in Peshawar declared: "The UN proposal will not do for us. The sole solution of the Afghan problem is continuation of the war."

And the "irreconcilables" continued the war. In recent days alone they have subjected Kabul to rocket attack on several occasions. Once again there have been casualties among the peaceful inhabitants, and the city itself is without power. The rebels have stepped up offensive operations in the north of the country also, keeping pressure on the government forces in places.

But now reports concerning the opposition's consent to accept the "UN plan" as a basis. What is this: a maneuver or a sincere readiness for negotiations with Kabul? The next few days will answer this question, evidently. I would very much like to hope that at a time when important steps for a settlement of the Cambodia problem have been taken and positive movement in the Near East conflict has emerged, the mechanism of an Afghan settlement will finally move from standstill also.

Indian Prime Minister Praises START

LD0508104991 Moscow TASS in English 1014 GMT 5 Aug 91

[By diplomatic correspondent Konstantin Voytsekhovich]

[Text] Moscow August 5 TASS—Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao described the conclusion of the Soviet-American treaty of strategic arms reduction, signed on 31 July 1991, as a historic development. He has sent a message to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on the occasion of the signing of the treaty. The text of the message has just been circulated in Moscow by the Indian Embassy in the U.S.S.R.

Narasimha Rao stressed in the message, that "START will make an invaluable contribution in promoting trust and confidence and in consolidating the climate of peace. It demonstrates that even the most complex issues can be resolved, given the necessary political will". The Indian prime minister noted, that START has underscored that it is possible to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race and achieve a nuclear disarmament in reality.

The prime minister expressed hope that the treaty will be followed by even more far-reaching measures for nuclear arms reduction, not only between the United States and the Soviet Union but also among other nuclear weapon states.

East Europe

Kvitsinskiy Discusses SFRY Situation

PM0508140991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jul 91 Moscow Edition p 4

[Unattributed item under "Official Information" rubric]

[Text] On 26 July Yu.A. Kvitsinskiy, USSR first deputy foreign minister, received SFRY ambassador A. Runic, at the latter's request. During their conversation certain topical questions of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and the development of the situation vis-a-vis Yugoslavia were discussed.

Yeltsin, Silayev Cited on Talks With Markovic

LD0508225091 Moscow Radio Moscow in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] Today we want to remind you of Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic's two-day working visit to the Soviet Union, made last week. In Moscow, he held important meetings with top Soviet officials, including Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Russian prime minister Ivan Silayev. They gave interviews to our reporter voicing their views about the situation in Yugoslavia and talks with Federal Executive Council President Ante Markovic.

(Yeltsin is heard briefly in Russian, fading into Serbo-Croatian translation) We exchanged views openly about the situation in the Russian Federation and Yugoslavia, Boris Yeltsin said. Both us have difficulties, similar difficulties as far as political motives such as roots are concerned. We have drafted a scheme for the development of our relations and concluded that we must make direct agreements between Yugoslavia and Russia. So far, we have been resolving operational issues regarding delivery. Our markets are linked in hundreds of ways. Now we should establish direct links.

The Russian President stressed that the signing of an agreement on a wide-ranging contacts, is in the pipeline for 1992. I believe, he said, that talks were open and useful. We have learned in detail about the situation in the Yugoslav federation, in a more realistic way than through the media.

Asked about Russia's stand on the Yugoslav crisis, Boris Yeltsin said: I recalled the difficulties with which relations were forged between Russia and the centre, we had great difficulties, and how we used to clash with Gorbachev, Ryzhkov and Pavlov. But we have gradually come to realize that we have to be in one union, in a single state. We have started to come closer together and

work on a Union treaty. We have overcome many problems and questions, but not all. Today we have balanced relations between the centre and the Russian federation. I believe that after the union treaty is signed, after duties and property are allocated, things would start to move for the better, the Russian President said.

I believe that Yugoslav republics, said Yeltsin after crossing this historical point, will also come to think that state must not be destroyed, Yeltsin continues: the state must be unified within its single, unchangable borders, which is very important. Many generations have been creating it, and now to destroy it, would mean to take upon oneself a great historical responsibility.

Asked what Russia advocates, unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia or the right of its nations to self-determinaton, Russian Prime Minister Ivan Silayev, who also attended the talks, said:

[Silayev is heard briefly in Russian, fading to Serbo-Croatian translation] When comparing our situation to the situation in Yugoslavia, Yeltsin had in mind—and said so—that it is necessary to look for agreements even in the most complicated situation. Processes starting from someone's desire for national affirmation to break off from a state, are the result of rush decisions lacking deep analysis of possible consequences. We support the efforts of the Yugoslav government to preserve the state, to find possibilities for agreements by providing a high degree of independence to the republics. Russia is interested in having relations with Yugoslavia as a whole, as a strong and prosperous state, and with individual republics. This is our joint view.

Polish Border Crossings for Papal Visit

LD0608110591 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1000 GMT 6 Aug 91

[Text] Crossings into Poland by tourists and private persons via the Mostiska border control point in Lvov Oblast have been suspended temporarily, until 11 August. The reason is the upcoming pilgrimage to the Polish town of Czestochowa where the sixth World Youth Day is to be held, and where there will be a meeting with Pope John-Paul II.

From Lvov Oblast alone about 10,000 young men and women will be going there by bus and train. The authorities have attempted to simplify the crossing for them. They will be able to go through the border control point on Soviet passports without waiting in line. Tickets for passenger trains and buses will be sold only to leaders of groups.

West Europe

KGB Not Involved in 1981 Plot Against Pope

LD0608090191 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 6 Aug 91

[Text] The Soviet KGB security service was not involved in an attempt in 1981 on the life of Pope John Paul II. This is said in a letter sent by President Gorbachev to Italy's Prime Minister Julio Andreotti.

The letter says that a full investigation has not revealed any involvement of the KGB in the affair.

The Turk, Mehmet Ali Agha, who fired at the Pope is now serving a life sentence. During the investigation he said that Bulgaria was involved in the plot. The three Bulgarian citizens arrested were then released for lack of proof.

KGB Chief Gives Interview to German Television

LD0608122791 Hamburg DPA in German 1149 GMT 6 Aug 91

[Text] Mainz (DPA)—The head of the Soviet secret service, the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, wants to cooperate with the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and exchange information with his opponents from the West on a regular basis. "I am making this offer today for the first time", Kryuchkov said in Moscow in an exclusive interview with SAT-1 television station which is to televise the interview in his news program "Good Evening, Germany" this coming Wednesday [7 August].

The KGB chief emphasized: "There is no other way for us except perestroyka." The American CIA competition was financially and technically better equipped and therefore had an "unfair advantage." The KGB chief also feels under pressure from criticis inside the Soviet Union: "Today even those who ought to be afraid of the KGB are no longer frightened of us... I even get threatening letters. Revenge is threatened, but I am not afraid because I have a professional attitude toward threats."

Kryuchkov did not comment on the escape to the USSR of the former GDR head of state and party chairman Erich Honecker. He praised the legendary film "arch enemy" of the KGB, James Bond: "I have already seen many James Bond films. Ridiculous from the professional angle, but acting-wise these secret service adventures are wonderful."

An edited version of the interview was pre-released to DPA.

FRG Denies Soviets Evading INF Treaty

PM0608090991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jul 91 Moscow Evening Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Accusations Groundless"]

[Text] Bonn, 26 Jul—The FRG military leadership has moved to distance itself from attempts made by conservative circles in the United States to accuse the Soviet

Union of nonfulfillment of the Soviet-U.S. Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles [INF] Treaty, which stipulates the destruction of both states' ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,000 km. The grounds for these accusations were the fact that Soviet-made SS-23 missiles still remain in the possession of the armed forces of several of the countries which formerly belonged to the Warsaw Pact Organization.

"The Soviet Union has fulfilled the treaty," a spokesman for the FRG Ministry of Defense stated in an interview with the newspaper NEUE RUHR ZEITUNG. The SS-23 missiles, in his words, were handed over to the former Warsaw Pact members around 1985; therefore they do not come under the provisions of the INF treaty.

The Ministry of Defense spokesman confirmed that the Bundeswehr currently was in possession of 24 SS-23 missiles which had formerly been part of the armory of the GDR National People's Army. These missiles are in a non-combat-operative state, without warheads or launch mechanisms. They will be eliminated, in the spokesman's words, "in the shortest possible timeframe." He cited one of the causes hindering the speedy destruction of the missiles as "the extraordinary complexity" of neutralizing the rocket fuel, which contains toxic components.

The FRG press is coming out in condemnation of the campaign of accusations against the Soviet Union launched in the United States. There is a group of conservative politicians in Washington who do not want disarmament, FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU writes today. At one time they opposed the INF Treaty. And today they want to cast doubt on the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty, which is ready for signing. Such attempts on the part of the "eternal knights of the cold war" today look a complete anachronism, the paper stresses.

PRAVDA Shows Solidarity With Turkish Communists

PM0508130591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 91 First Edition p 7

["Own Information" report: "But Where is the Democratization? United Communist Party of Turkey Banned"]

[Text] There has been much talk in Turkey recently about the processes of democratization taking place there. It was that much more surprising and disappointing to learn about the Turkish Constitutional Court's decision to ban the activity of the United Communist Party of Turkey, citing in particular the fact that Turkish law prohibits political parties from calling themselves "communist" and acting to "undermine the unity of the nation and the country" and to establish the "supremacy of one class over others."

You can say what you like about the legal aspect of this ruling, but when Turkish Communists' advocacy of a "just, peaceful, and democratic solution of the Kurdish problem" is called "undermining the unity of the nation," when the aim of ensuring the "power of the working class and all working people" is equated to the "supremacy of one class," and when the word "communist" itself is prohibited, it becomes clear that the level of democratization in Turkey is still far from guaranteeing full human rights, including the right to the freedom of thought and belief.

Soviet Communists express their solidarity with Communists and all democratic forces of Turkey.

Officials Welcome Cyprus Peace Conference

OW0508214491 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1627 GMT 5 Aug 91

[By Mikhail Mayorov; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] As early as 1974 the USSR, for the first time, put forward the idea of a peace conference on Cyprus. On January 21, 1986 the USSR repeated it in proposals entitled "On the Principles of Solving the Cyprus Question and Ways of Its Settlement". The third European department of the USSR Foreign Ministry has recalled this in the wake of reports that a peace conference on Cyprus may materialize already in September this year.

One of the diplomats recalled that the Soviet Union's approaches to the territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of the state of Cyprus were consonant with the positions of almost all UN member-states, including the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. "This is not only our approach but the approach of the entire world community seeking the settlement of the Cyprus problem through United Nations mechanisms", DP's [Diplomatic Panorama] reporter was told. "We act within the framework of the resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council and support, like all the rest, the UN Secretary General's good-will mission in Cyprus."

As far as the Helsinki process is concerned, some aspects of the Cyprus settlement are discussed within the framework of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe. However, the Soviet Foreign Ministry said that in principle the Cyprus question was not on the agenda of the all-European conference. It must be settled exclusively through the UN machinery, including a peace conference. This is a universally recognized approach.

UK's Lamont Interviewed During Moscow Visit

PM0608084491 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Aug 91 Union Edition p 1

[By M. Berger incorporating interview with UK Chancellor N. Lamont in Moscow—date not stated: "First of the 'Seven': UK Chancellor Studies State of Affairs in Soviet Economy"]

[Text] UK Chancellor N. Lamont is the first of his G-7 colleagues to come to the Soviet Union to obtain first-hand information. The chancellor was received by USSR President M. Gorbachev 1 August.

The program for the visit includes meetings with Union government leaders, leading economists, and also entrepreneurs, bankers from commercial banks, and other representatives of the new economy.

Probably one of the most striking moments in the visit was the chancellor's visit to the Russian Commodity and Raw Material Exchange. It must be said that it would be hard to find better proof, more convincing evidence of the emergence of market relations in our country. The chancellor, the officials accompanying him, and foreign journalists, many of whom were also on their first visit to a Soviet stock exchange, were considerably struck by what they saw. It is not only a question of the very existence of such a purely capitalist instrument as a stock exchange, but also of the fact that they have seen nothing resembling our version, nor could they see it anywhere else in the world. They carefully studied the computer printouts for brokers' offices (the type of goods and conditions of sale), trying to penetrate the meaning of words like "prepayment," "noncash," "actual" ["po faktu"].

Nowhere else in the world do stock exchanges trade in absolutely everything, as happens here. The UK chancellor even asked a young broker where he got such brilliant training as to be able to deal with this whole range of goods, from video films to fertilizers.

For all the extravagant nature of what we call a stock exchange, what N. Lamont saw did not provoke irony. On the contrary, he promised to make efforts to provide help in developing this area of business.

In a brief interview for IZVESTIYA the UK chancellor said that Soviet stock exchanges may be a strange phenomenon, but are certainly a market phenomenon. True, from the viewpoint of world experience your stock exchanges are unique, but their existence is not only a symbol of the market, but also an important tool for developing it.

[Berger] What impressions did you find most encouraging, and what were the most pessimistic?

[Lamont] I regard as most optimistic the fact that the Soviet Government is reform-minded and speaks the language of reform. I am also very encouraged by what President M. Gorbachev said during his meeting with me. Pessimism arises from a recognition of the scale of the problems you have to tackle, and from thinking about the degree of resistance to reforms by those forces that are not committed to them.

[Berger] Will you be submitting any new recommendations to your government and your G-7 colleagues as a result of your visit?

[Lamont] Yes, of course. I understand better, for instance, precisely in what ways we can offer help: Organizing the stock exchange and training experts and specialists for it, setting up a strong banking structure, assistance in organizing accounting (a very important aspect!) which is in a state far removed from what is needed for market relations. Help with privatization, and with ensuring that as many British firms as possible are interested in working on the Soviet market.

[Berger] If you were president of a large commercial company, would you be investing money in the USSR in present conditions?

[Lamont] If it was an oil company, it would be possible to find a great deal that would interest it in your country. [Lamont ends]

The chancellor's visit ends Sunday 4 August. And presumably the conclusions and recommendations that result from the first visit of this kind will have considerable influence not only on N. Lamont's G-7 colleagues, who will follow him here, but also on the general policy of the developed countries' cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Yeltsin Meets Britain's Chancellor of Exchequer

OW0508013291 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1400 GMT 2 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russia's President Boris Yeltsin received Britain's Finance Minister Norman Lamont in Moscow on Friday. Russia's Prime Minister Ivan Silayev was present at the meeting.

Subsequently Boris Yeltsin told newsmen that their conversation was "frank and productive."

"When I frankly described to the minister the state our economy is in we discussed the ways to resolve a number of problems by joint efforts," said Russia's President. According to him, these problems are connected with the processing and storage of farm produce, the training of specialists, and support for individual farmers.

Participants in the talks, said Boris Yeltsin, expressed confidence that Russia will neither deviate from the road of political and economic reforms or slow down its movement along that road.

Russia's leadership, the President pointed out, asked for Western financial aid neither at that nor at other meetings. It prefers to search for ways to ensure mutually beneficial cooperation.

Russia's Prime Minister Ivan Silayev added that at the meeting the two sides decided to draft by the end of this year a bilateral agreement (between Russia and Britain) providing for the ways to encourage and support joint ventures in all areas.

U.K.'s Thatcher To Attend Business Forum

OW0508034291 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1630 GMT 2 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Former British Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, is to take part in a forum for East European business-people in Leningrad from 22nd to 24th October, 1991, under the auspices of the Union of Lease-Holders and Business People of the USSR (ULB USSR)[as received]. Mrs. Thatcher's invitation was delivered during the recent visit to Great Britain by a delegation of ULB USSR, led by its General Director, Ilya Baskin.

According to the ULD[as received] USSR's details, more than 300 people are due to participate in the forum, including representatives of East European governments.

The General Director of ULD[as received] USSR, Liya Baskin, told an "INTERFAX" correspondent that during the forum Soviet business-people will for the first time speak in the capacity of representatives of the sovereign republics. He also explained that the overall aim of the forum was to discuss the possibility of establishing a single economic area covering the countries of East Europe and the republics of the Soviet Union.

According to Ilya Baskin, United States President George Bush, supported the idea of the forum during a short meeting in Moscow with the Presdent of ULD[as received] USSR, Pavel Bunich.

Soviet-Belgian Communications Venture Noted

PM0508115591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jul 91 Second Edition p 6

["Own Information" report: "Telephone Call to Minister"]

[Text] Before the eyes of all those assembled yesterday at the USSR Foreign Ministry press center for the opening of the first commercial international satellite communications line in the USSR and the presentation of the "Kombellga" joint venture, the president of the Belgian "Bell Telephone Manufacturing Company" dialed a number and immediately linked up with his country's minister of post and telecommunications. A minute later he faxed greetings from the minister to the participants in the presentation.

What is "Kombellga?" This Soviet-Belgian joint venture was created to render services to Soviet, foreign, and international organizations, joint ventures, diplomats, banks, hotels, journalists, and private individuals in the field of swift and reliable international communications. Communications will be via a dedicated digital network.

But what is the advantage for Muscovites? There is an advantage: The new network will help unload existing international telephone channels which means that Muscovites will have more opportunities to link up with subscribers in other countries.

Finnish Officials Describe Soviet Crime Network

OW0508200591 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1515 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] Finland's consulate general in Leningrad referring to the Finnish-based Helsingin Sanomat reported about a sharp increase in the number of trials involving Soviet citizens in that country.

"Soviet criminal rings operate throughout Finland, masterminding and controlling theft, prostitution, illegal imports of thousands of litres of vodka, hormonal substances, and drugs—mainly, hemp, hashish and marijuana", the press-release says.

The Finnish interior ministry has set up special police brigades to combat Soviet mafia in Finland.

EBRD Sends Delegation to Moscow

OW0508072891 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1930 GMT 2 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A high-ranking delegation from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD], including board members and senior managerial personnel, is arriving in Moscow on Sunday for talks with government ministers, bank managers and heads of economic research institutes. The eight EBRD directors in that delegation representing the United States, Germany, Japan, Canada, Italy, Finland, Norway and the European Communities will also be visiting the Ukrainian capital Kiev, for the first time.

The USSR State Bank (Gosbank) has told IF [INTERFAX] that the results of the visit may have tangible effects on the pattern and volume of investments into the Soviet economy and individual republics and regions.

A senior USSR State Bank official has described the European Bank delegation's visit as a "prelude to serious business with the Soviet Union". He linked the arrival of the delegation with the presentation of a special report on strategy in relations with the Soviet Union (Country Strategy Paper) to the Board of Directors scheduled for the middle of this month.

According to USSR State Bank sources, the European Bank has already started examining specific projects in the Soviet Union, although until now it has displayed the greatest activity in training banking personnel for the USSR.

Political & Social

Commission on CPSU Draft Program Meets

LD0508172191 Moscow TASS in English 1700 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] Moscow August 5 TASS—A meeting of the 28th Soviet Communist Party Congress' commission on the preparation of the party draft program was held here today.

The meeting considered the draft program, which was revised with due account of remarks and suggestions made during the discussion of this document at the July plenary meeting of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee.

Speakers at the meeting noted that, in accordance with the recommendations of the plenary meeting, a considerable work was done to upgrade the theoretical basis of the most important provisions of the draft and to provide for its continuity of the program statement of the 28th party congress.

The draft carries a more profound reflection of problems of the party organisational and political composition, they said.

The commission decided to publish the draft program in the party press on August 8.

Constitutional Body To Consider Departyization

LD0508160891 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1350 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] The RUSSIAN INFORMATION AGENCY has received information saying that the Union parliament's Committee for the Supervision of the Constitution is to examine the issue of legality of the departyization decree on 10-11 September.

Fate of Party, Communism After Plenum Discussed

PM0608083191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jul 91 p 1

[Article by observer Leonid Nikitinskiy under "Afterword to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum" rubric: "The Evolution Which the Mensheviks So Long Said Was Needed Has Happened!"]

[Text] Splitting the atom causes an explosion of lethal power, although considerable energy is also needed to split it in the first place. Working on the basis of this law, we should hardly be surprised that the split in party ranks was not consolidated in organizational terms at the CPSU Central Committee plenum. The party's inner potential is almost exhausted and its energy reserves have been drained in the struggle for political influence with other social forces.

So it is understandable why the expected attack on Gorbachev did not take place. It seems that at the present moment, July 1991, he is invulnerable as far as the partocracy is concerned. Since his successes in the Novo-Ogarevo process and at the meeting in London, his rating has shot up again. He is the man who is now earning points for the CPSU (on the face of it, anyway), thereby saving it from losing its authority altogether.

On the other hand, as Gorbachev is not only and not so importantly general secretary in terms of the country as a whole, removing him from this post by the forces of the party nomenklatura alone—contrary to the wishes of the politically active masses and without the support of political parties and trends in opposition to the CPSU—is unrealistic. This chance could have been taken in February-March, when, after Vilnius and Pavlov's clumsy reforms, anti-Gorbachev feeling dominated public opinion. But the partocracy did not want to do it then, as it felt sure that Gorbachev was securely in check.

Commenting on the plenum, some observers suggest that the main eruption from the party volcano will now take place at the CPSU congress in November-December instead. Hardly: If present trends continue, the CPSU's energy will continue to ebb and it will go to the congress with an even smaller reserve of inner strength.

Also having its effect is the fact that, after decades of monopolistic prosperity and absolute inviolability, the CPSU—like any monopolist grown lazy—has lost the ability for competitive struggle. Hopelessly overgrown, it has developed into a party of conformists for the most part indifferent to lofty matters.

The party has its own trend of ideological fundamentalists who would rather die than betray their principles (which makes people treat them as opponents worthy of respect, incidentally). But, being comparatively few in number, they do not determine the party's true face. The mass of party conformists, most of whom are simply ordinary specialists in fields which previously only party members could get into (administration included), seem willing to fly a different flag.

Lacking the specific objectives and means of their achievement necessary for such a document, the program approved by the plenum is more a general manifesto than a center-left platform and in this sense is little different from similar manifestos issued by other progressive political trends. But even in these rather hazy features, anyone who has read anything at all will be unable to recognize the specific historical face of the organization which, until now, has been known as the CPSU.

Whereas it is still possible to perceive a Marxist basis in the draft program—albeit with certain provisos—the features of Leninism have essentially disappeared, and this fact cannot be concealed by appealing to the founder's sacred name.

By declaring a complete and unconditional rejection of violent actions, the transition to a parliamentary system, the achievability of revolutionary objectives through

gradual reform, and, finally, the possibility that the most sacred tenet of Lenin's theory of revolution—the dictatorship of the proletariat—may not, after all, be the shortest path to socialism, the former Bolsheviks have essentially admitted that the Mensheviks were right—almost 100 years after their historic dispute first began. You only have to open classic works like "What Is To Be Done?" (1902) or "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky" (1918) to feel sure that, from a Leninist viewpoint, the new program is an example of "Menshevism," "opportunism," and "revisionism," or, in normal language, progressive social democratic doctrine. Incidentally, Vladimir Ilich himself thought realistically when there was a threat to his power.

With regard to "communism," M.S. Gorbachev said that "our experience—and that of others—gives us no reason to believe that this objective is realistically achievable in the foreseeable future." In other words, in the foreseeable future we are talking about a utopia—is that not so? However, according to Gorbachev, the CPSU is still committed to the socialist choice, working on the basis that socialism and a market system are compatible.

As far as their compatibility is concerned, in my view, "our historical experience—and that of others"—suggests the following. Market elements stubbornly refuse to take root in the Soviet model of socialism, which has been proved by the economic chaos of recent years. On the contrary, elements of socialism and even communism—in the form of firm, extensive guarantees for working people and the disabled—may be grafted onto a developed market basis, which has been successfully demonstrated by powers traditionally called capitalist. Violent revolutions instead of a bright future lead to varieties of totalitarianism unknown to Marx; genuine socialism is patiently cultivated from the market economy of civilized capitalism.

This, however, is the very same social democratic idea propounded by Bernstein, the Mensheviks Plekhanov and Martov, the "renegade Kautsky," and others like them, against whom the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (Bolsheviks), the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and, later, the CPSU waged a persistent, deadly battle—until last Thursday, when the CPSU general secretary announced that "our ideological arsenal must incorporate all the wealth of Russian, Soviet, and world social democratic thought" and that the war must be waged on a quite different front: against "neo-Bolshevism."

It goes without saying that far from everyone in the contradiction-torn CPSU will agree to this change of direction. However, going on the basis of the traditionally predominant spirit of conformism, I think the overwhelming majority will follow Gorbachev. "Assimilating the new program," the general secretary said, "will entail a psychological revolution in our world outlook...." But if the majority of ordinary CPSU members have never really had this world outlook in the first place, it will not be much more difficult for them to bring about a "revolution" than for an excellently drilled line regiment to obey the command "left turn."

Essentially, General Gorbachev is making a very lightly veiled attempt—just at the right time, as usual—to break off the main section of the party corps and lead it away under a new flag, abandoning the shamanistic fundamentalists in the process.

Incidentally, transferring to a "parliamentary" system, this new version of the Communist Party will sooner or later have to agree—after it has huffed and puffed for a while and let off steam—to Yeltsin's decree on "departyization," because (leaving aside for the present the question of whether it is constitutional or not) no one has ever heard of parliamentary parties arranging primary organizations in the work place.

Democrats will welcome these new regiments of communist defectors into their camp. But complex theoretical questions on the historical continuity of ideas will inevitably arise, as will even more difficult practical questions to do with inheritance law. It is becoming doubtful whether this essentially new party has priority to its historical name and to CPSU property, even if basically the same members remain in it.

In my view, the most honest and legally correct step would be to adopt a decision at the forthcoming congress to disband the CPSU and form a number of new parties, with the corresponding reregistration of membership. If, as is most likely, the majority of CPSU members follow Gorbachev into the new camp, taking the "majority shareholding" with them, for all the inevitable loss of energy in the course of the move, this maneuver will not destroy the party's organizational structures but give it new substance.

One can foresee that, in the event of a split, some of the smaller trends in the present CPSU—in the shape of the "Bolshevist Platform" and "Communist Initiative"—will lodge individual claims to its entire property as the only true ideological followers of the former CPSU. It is hard to argue with the latter claim. But a clear line must be drawn between ideological and theoretical inheritance and property inheritance, as they are two different things. Ownership is ownership precisely because it does not change when the owner changes his political views. In the event of official demarcation, CPSU property must be divided between the newly formed parties in proportion to their size.

As far as ideological inheritance is concerned, there is no reason to ban anyone from propagandizing the communist philosophy as such. Nothing unlawful should be seen in the desire to build a society based on the principle "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need," as long as it is not accompanied by violence or calls for violence.

In just the same way, Marxism and other currents of world communist thought have an absolute right to exist in a rule-of-law state. But as far as Stalinism, Maoism,

Trotskyism, and, alas, Leninism are concerned, this right, in my view, must be accompanied by substantial provisos in the section of these doctrines where Marx's theory of the class struggle is translated into real violence and where all these trends could serve as justification for civil war.

On the other hand, I very much dislike the idea of the CPSU being put on trial, unless it is simply an allegorical form of historical research. As far as ideas and delusions are concerned, the best, most implacable judge is history itself. There are not and cannot be any legal grounds for putting the party on trial; generally speaking, collective criminal liability has only been known under the Inquisition in the Middle Ages and under Stalinism, which drew heavily on the latter. Individual party members may be put on trial—not for being members of the party but insofar as their actions constitute a specific crime.

However, perhaps an amnesty would be best of all. Even Kaganovich is now beyond the reach of a human court, as he died on exactly the same day as the historic plenum. So now, drumming their hooves in impatience and rubbing their clawed paws, the devils are chopping firewood and heating a special "Kremlin" frying pan for him.

New CPSU Central Committee Secretaries Interviewed

V.V. Kalashnikov

PM0508143591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Jul 91 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with CPSU Central Committee Secretary V.V. Kalashnikov by A. Petrushov under the "Who's Who" rubric; date and place not given; first paragraph is introduction: "And Trust Counts for Something"]

[Text] V.V. Kalashnikov, department head at Leningrad's V.I. Ulyanov (Lenin) Electrical Engineering Institute, was elected secretary of the CPSU Central Committee at the CPSU Central Committee July plenum. He has already started his new job. The first interview is, as a rule, a very frank one, but that is what makes it interesting.

[Petrushov] Vladimir Valeryanovich, do you think that the party masses know you as a politician?

[Kalashnikov] I do not think so. Leningrad Communists do, however. They elected me a member of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom [oblast party committee] Bureau one year ago. I am known to the delegates of the 28th congress, who promoted me into the party's political leadership. I worked pretty actively at the congress and played a direct part in drawing up the new CPSU Rules. As a Central Committee member, I worked in the Education and Culture Commission. And I have naturally taken part in the work of Central Committee plenums.

[Petrushov] You are still under fifty, I believe.

[Kalashnikov] I am 44. My parents are engineers. I graduated from the Leningrad State University History Faculty in 1970 and then served in the army. I then lectured, I was a university assistant lecturer, docent, and senior scientific associate, I was then elected faculty head in the Electrical Engineering Institute, and became dean of the Humanities Faculty. I have held elective party posts and been a member of the institute party committee.

[Petrushov] That is to say, you are familiar with party work.

[Kalashnikov] I am familiar with the work of primary organizations; higher up, everything is new to me.

[Petrushov] Are you a rich man, Vladimir Veleryanovich?

[Kalashnikov] Some stores were recently sold off in Leningrad, and I thought to myself that even if all the professors in our institute were to have pooled their savings they would still have been unable to buy a single small store.

[Petrushov] What questions of life inside the party will you be concerned with?

[Kalashnikov] As a history and political science specialist, I will naturally be or, more accurately, am already occupied with problems of ideology. The specific task is to very quickly finalize preparation of the draft party program and take account of all critical comments and constructive proposals expressed at the plenum. I will then be taking an active part in the conduct of the party-wide discussion.

[Petrushov] Your personal impressions of the plenum?

[Kalashnikov] I expected tougher criticism of the draft. There was anxiety that sharp confrontation might ensue. But despite the very trenchant and principled discussion, plenum participants showed a desire to tackle urgent party problems in a constructive way. That is encouraging.

[Petrushov] Your plenum speech was published in PRAVDA. That is to say, readers have an idea of your standpoint. What could you add?

[Kalashnikov] The situation in the party and the country demands that we abandon our own ambition, persistently seek the correct policy, and find people capable of implmenting it. In my view, the Central Committee should provide a clear and objective analysis of the year since the congress. We must establish what the Central Committee's omissions are and what the oversights of local party committees are. And we must reach consensus and work together. It is essential for us to grasp why we were forced to make compromises and why we retreated and suffered defeats.

[Petrushov] Do you recognize the division of Communists into "left-wing" and "right-wing?"

[Kalashnikov] Do you mean whether I recognize that there are streams, factions, and plaforms in the party? Yes, of course I do. There is such a division in the Leningrad party organization too. But most Leningrad Communists subscribe to reformist positions. The communist reformists are convinced that we need to go over to a new model of socialism. Society needs radical, democratic changes, including changes in the economy. I am in favor of a mixed economy and market relations, but the state must be firmly oriented toward defending working people's interests. That is one of the most important issues of the upcoming party-wide discussion.

[Petrushov] How often can someone change his convictions?

[Kalashnikov] Yes, quite a few politicians have emerged who change their views according to the season, as it were: In winter they hold certain convictions, in summer different ones.... Many of theose who left the party have done this, I am convinced, out of short-term considerations. For me socialism means a society of social justice, where someone's status depends on the results of his labor. Forsaking such views would mean becoming someone completely different.

[Petrushov] Vladimir Valeryanovich, previously when someone took on such a high party post it was non-stop congratulations. What is it like nowadays?

[Kalashnikov] People sympathize rather. As for the family, there in particular all is not plain sailing. After all, I quit a good, highly paid job. Here in the Central Committee I take a cut in salary, and quite an appreciable one. But could I refuse on this pretext? It signifies great trust. And trust counts for something, too.

I.I. Melnikov

PM0508103591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Aug 91 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with I.I. Melnikov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, by V. Nikiforova under the "Who's Who" rubric, date and place unspecified: "The Main Thing Is the Forthcoming Congress"]

[Text] Ivan Ivanovich Melnikov, party committee secretary at the M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University, has always been an easy person to talk to: He could quickly grasp what people were saying, get to the nub of a problem, and solve it. Around two years ago with a group of Moscow secretaries he took part in setting up the All-Union Council of VUZ [Higher Educational Institution] Party Committee Secretaries, which is now becoming a good support for Communists in higher education.

And now a new piece of news: Ivan Ivanovich Melnikov, party committee secretary at the country's main VUZ, was elected a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee at the party Central Committee's July Plenum. So now here are some questions for I.I. Melnikov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and his answers to them.

[Nikiforova] The PRAVDA Editorial Office congratulates you, Ivan Ivanovich, on your important and responsible party position. What thoughts and ideas will you be bringing to the party Central Committee Secretariat?

[Melnikov] Thank you for the congratulations. I hope for mutual attention and cooperation from PRAVDA. I will state bluntly that I wasn't ready for this "role," even though I was a member of the Central Committee Secretariat. All the more so as, in the current complex situation I do not think it right to be leaving the Moscow State University party committee. But the plenum decision has been adopted, and this needs to be taken into account and carried out.

It is well known that the plenum determined its position on the question of the timetable for the holding of the party's extraordinary congress—November-December. There is relatively little time left. Preparing for the party congress will be the main job for all of us, irrespective of the distribution of duties in the Secretariat.

The Communist Party is not only experiencing outside pressure from antisocialist forces, but is also going through a trial of strength as a result of the struggle of ideas and trends within the party itself. There has not been any noticeable solution to the crisis phenomena in society. Communists still haven't worked out new approaches and methods of working in the new situation. Nor have they worked out workable proposals and programs around which everyone interested in seeing our country out of the crisis as quickly as possible could rally. Under these circumstances, it seems to me that the Central Committee Secretariat's work should be made subordinate to our main goals—and I hope that I will be able to make my contribution to it.

[Nikiforova] The last Central Committee plenum was awaited with alarm and hope. It was not just Communists but nonparty people who were interested in it. What do you think, did it bear out the hope for a Communist Party revival?

[Melnikov] Hopes can only be borne out by work. I would not want to make such categorical conclusions. But it is indisputable that the plenum can be called collective and unifying.... This was probably the most constructive and businesslike of all those which I have attended. In my view, it reflects the position in the party itself, where the desire to consolidate and seek out a rational platform is becoming more and more tangible. Moreover, we are learning to listen to each other and discuss acute problems without name-calling or recriminations. The plenum adopted a statement on the well-known RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] presidential departyization decree. And presumably this statement will help Communists locally to remain firm and continue their active political work in the collectives.

[Nikiforova] You were made a member of the CPSU Central Committee last July at the age of 40. You have been elected a member of the Secretariat. You'll agree that this isn't very typical in our day and age. Could you please give us some brief details about yourself?

[Melnikov] I was born in 1950 in the city of Bogoroditsk in Tula Oblast. I studied at school and university. The year 1972 was particularly memorable: I graduated from Moscow State University and joined the CPSU. I started work as a lecturer at a Moscow State University special boarding school. I then did postgraduate work on an interesting subject, and produced my dissertation. I taught at the Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics. I became a candidate of physical and mathematical sciences. I'd already started a family and had three children with Natalya Ivanovna—my sons Ivan and Volodya, and my daughter Natasha.

What else can I say? I've contributed to several high-school books on mathematics. I've worked in the university's party and trade union organization. I was chairman of the Moscow State University Trade Union Committee and party committee secretary.

[Nikiforova] Naturally, your family has your attention. And you're probably drawn to science. Social work, and now your new and difficult job, all require time and effort. Will you be able to manage or will you have to give something up?

[Melnikov] I think the only thing I'll be giving up is my remaining spare time. Unfortunately, I'll be forced to postpone some scientific plans.

[Nikiforova] You'll be bringing to the CPSU Central Committee experience of working in one of the the country's major party organizations. What do you think could be the basis on which the renewed party's activity will be built?

[Melnikov] There is just one basis, in my view—the consistent and principled line of defending the interests of labor collectives and working people. The party can draw new strength from this, and all Communists can draw moral support from it and be confident that their work is right.

Tambov Plant Foreman Addresses CPSU Plenum

PM0208103591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jul 91 Second Edition p 3

["Account" of speech delivered by M.M. Drobyshev, foreman at Tambov City's "Elektropribor" plant, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 26 July]

[Text] The proposed draft program must be published for discussion after appropriate additional work. It indicates the most pressing problems and the intended ways of resolving them. Strategic and tactical goals and social guidelines and immediate tasks have been defined. There are no substantial inconsistencies within any level. For a person able to think at all levels, including the philosophical level, there are no obstacles to comprehension of the program in its entirety. And it is to be hoped that a person able to think only at a pragmatic, everyday level will correctly understand the goals, the ways of achieving them, and the priorities.

An idea capable of uniting society exists, or more precisely is perceptible, in the draft program. At all times the supranational idea which most reliably united people was the idea of a common enemy. This idea operates not on the level of reason but on the level of the subconscious, and therefore is easily perceived by the crowd. Hence its great popularity with all kinds of demagogues, leaders, and candidates to be such. And hence its lack of prospects, because it does not have a constructive foundation. It is extremely hard to renounce it; it takes hold of people too tenaciously, it takes hold of their consciousness, and it has already practically eaten its way into our genes. But this must be done. Otherwise society has no future.

The constructive development of society needs an idea that unites people on the basis of a precise, clear notion of contemporary realities. In the economy these realities are an increasingly deep division of labor and consequently an increasingly high degree of integration. In politics this present-day reality is the notion of the planet Earth as the supreme panhuman value along with man himself. Hence the main conflict of our time is the conflict between man and his habitat. And not just in the ecological sense. Society is an individual's intellectual and spiritual environment. And putting his own interests above all else, man is destroying his habitat and thereby harming himself. He who elevates himself will be humbled. This is also true in relation to peoples. Our present-day difficulties and dramas are in many respects a consequence of our own absolutized sovereignty, our own freedoms, and our own interests. More frankly and more strictly speaking, it is a notion of freedom that falls into the category of criminal thinking.

Society must outgrow this, but the severity of the process can nevertheless be controlled. It does not follow from what I have said that the old methods of control should be brought back. There is only one road to recovery—via democratization. And it is above all a realization of our own obligations and the readiness to take responsibility for our own actions. And consequently the law that goes with this. But not the reverse.

About the market. The market is one of mankind's greatest inventions. Its mechanisms regulate demand and consumption and the amount of labor and the amount of reward with greater accuracy than all other mechanisms hitherto known to us (which, all in all, our society has quite cogently proved by the rule of contraries). But because the market operates not by labor itself but by money, it does this in a far from ideal way. It does it as accurately as money equates to socially useful labor. But the concept of "socially useful labor" is far from

being an economic category; it is a moral category. Culture and morality come first here too.

Culture is of primary importance in relation to the economy. Therefore simply to take people and feed them does not mean raising their morality, which is what all sorts of democrats—some even with underground service—are diligently trying to persuade us.

The more clearly society learns to distinguish good from evil, the eternal from the empty, and the end from the means, the greater social justice—that is, an individual's most profound realization of his potential—will be. A society that has learned to do this will become rich, without even setting itself this task. But a society that loses its culture will inevitably lose its daily bread.

And therefore here, despite all these difficulties of our present times, we must raise the problems of youth in earnest, reorganize higher education in earnest, work out legislative initiatives, and submit this to the Supreme Soviet. Otherwise the party has no future. In 5-10 years the youth of today will form society. But morality is being lost. It is immoral and pointless to reject all attempts to improve the laws of economics. They are just as immutable and strict as the laws of physics. But it is no less immoral to try to build a society following only the laws of economics. That would be a more immoral and more lifeless society than all those history has hitherto known.

Our society has lingered too long in the phase of negation, and this has decreased its moral potential. The draft program is one of the real steps in the movement toward synthesis and toward removing negation, about which much has already been said here. To synthesize and dialectically combine the market's great economic potential with man's freedom and with his economic and legal protection is a necessary condition for the development the individual, toward the realization of which humane, democratic socialism aspires. The most serious obstacle on this path is the problem of removing man's alienation from the results of his labor.

And this problem cannot be solved just by means of changing the forms of ownership. Once already we have burned our fingers very badly on this and are now trying to repeat the process in reverse. Ownership is not just things, it is above all social relations concerning things, and therefore the relations are open to legislative regulation. The legislator will cope with the task of strengthening positive beginnings and limiting negative and injurious beginnings; this is a task primarily for legislators, and it is being decided by legislative means. Legislative intervention in market relations is as essential as the intervention of medicine in the process of natural selection. The whole question is one of sensing how far to go and of culture. Private ownership which has been mediated via market relations and which is administered by society serves the interests of society and exhibits signs of public ownership. The multitude of forms of ownership stems directly from the multitude of personal interests which go to form the public interest.

The effectiveness of any form largely depends on the extent to which the material interest coincides with an individual's interest in self-assertion. Under any form of ownership the problems of alienation cannot be resolved without profound democratization of the economy or without the development of workers' self-government within a legal framework. But for a law to work it must be a direct continuation of moral law. Otherwise not a single law will work. Society will plainly and simply reject it. An attempt to eradicate economic exploitation is tantamount to an attempt to create perpetual motion in the economy. It should be a question of decreasing exploitation to a level acceptable to society in a given phase of its development, through scientific and technical and organizational resources.

At the same time, any forms of political exploitation must be rejected—that is, the appropriation of another's will, including by a conscience-free press. And this is also one of the basic requirements of humane, democratic socialism.

A system of panhuman values does not reject classes and class conflicts; it merely decreases them and removes the halo of universality from them. "How can a hyena be at peace with a dog? How can a rich person be at peace with a poor person? For lions, hunting is wild asses in a desert, and grazing for the rich is grazing off poor people." This is a book by Jesus, son of Sirach, in the second millennium [as published] B.C. The thoughts have been framed in Eastern imagery in such class terms that at times Marx himself could be accused of plagiarism. There are, there were, and there will be classes and conflicts between them in the foreseeable future. It is important not to fall into a class frenzy and to observe a measured approach to class interests, as in everything, and not to cross the line beyond which reason turns into scholasticism, compromise into capitulation, and concern for a cause into concern for glorification in the name of the self.

It is important, it is very important to rid ourselves of the complex of children who have been deceived by their fathers and to feel like fathers ourselves who take full responsibility for our own children's heritage.

Yakovlev Explains His Changing Politics

PM0608093891 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 3 Aug 91 First Edition p 1

[Interview with A.N. Yakovlev by TASS correspondent T. Zamyatina in Moscow; date of interview not stated: "A.N. Yakovlev: I Have Come to Reject Marxism"]

[Text] What names has A.N. Yakovlev not been called over the six years that have passed since the spring of 1985? He is both the "ideologist of perestroyka," and "the architect among the ruins." The terms "degenerate" and "turncoat" are also used to refer to the man who was recently a Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU

Central Committee, and until literally yesterday was the USSR president's senior adviser.

A TASS correspondent met with A.N. Yakovlev, one of the initiators of the Movement for Democratic Reforms.

[Zamyatina] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, I think you will consider it normal for me to want to understand the evolution of your views over the years of perestroyka.

[Yakovlev] I am not claiming now and will never claim that I thought the same way in 1985 as I do today. That would not be true. And since I was born in the countryside and grew up in the countryside, I still have a country conscientiousness, you know, which does not permit me to call black white. It may be a nuisance, but I have to tell things the way they are.

Nevertheless I initially believed that it was possible to improve society and to renew the party. But as time went by I lost this faith. Read what I said at the 28th congress—I said explicitly that unless we rejuvenate and renew ourselves, we will find ourselves left on the sidelines.

Unfortunately, observations of subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums show that nothing is happening. And now it is too late.

Just imagine if the draft program which is being examined now had been submitted to the 19th party conference.

[Zamyatina] Yes, then it would have been perceived as revolutionary.

[Yakovlev] Indeed, people would have said at the time: "Look, we can do business with the Communists." After all, the draft program is both repentant and visionary.

But people have already lost faith. Ultimately the decisions of the 28th congress, which were market-oriented, were not bad either. But who implemented them? An active campaign of sabotage, of reviewing the decisions, began immediately. The same thing is happening now. Everything will be forgotten and people will go on doing their own thing.

Faith in any program is illusory at the moment. People will vote for any document—all they care about is that the authorities remain in place. And a sort of revanchism is on the increase.

I am afraid of the increasing strength of the revanchist front on the basis of a worsening socioeconomic situation.

This is why the idea of the Movement for Democratic Reforms was born. Its first task is to ward off reaction and to ensure that if a dangerous step is taken, then our movement will be able to rally people and declare: "Stop, do not mess with society. Enough experiments and humiliations."

Second, we naturally have to formulate a positive program. This movement is of a left-center persuasion, it aims to safeguard people against the infantile disorder of leftism and from the senile decrepitude of neo-Stalinism.

I am increasingly coming to the conclusion that our misfortune stems from Marxist dogmas. Stalin implemented what was inherent in Marxism in a ugly fashion. But he implemented it all the same.

I have read widely about Marx' and Engels' contemptuous and derisive attitude to the peasantry. And how much attention they paid to ideas like the class struggle and to violence! Universal harmony can only be reached via this class struggle! No way! First one class annihilates another, and then there is universal harmony. But revolutionary maximalism and the dictatorship of the proletariat based on violence are horrible things.

This is how I came to reject Marxism as a guide to action and how I realized socialism's defeat.

[Zamyatina] So the establishment of the Movement for Democratic Reforms was the consequence of your complex reflections?

[Yakovlev] Yes, the idea of the movement was born long before the 28th CPSU Congress.

[Zamyatina] Many people agree that the movement was established to support Gorbachev's policy. At the same time there are rumors that you are resigning from the post of the USSR president's senior assistant. Isn't there some contradiction here?

[Yakovlev] I would not put the question like this: support or opposition. We will be sticking to our independent line, supporting what is reasonable and rejecting what does not accord with our views.

And as far as my resignation is concerned, these are not rumors. I would be a very dishonorable man if, as senior adviser, I did not say what I intend to do. Three months ago I wrote a note to Gorbachev with my reasons for acting in this way.

But unfortunately he continues to believe that the party can be renewed. I no longer believe this.

[Zamyatina] Why don't you quit the CPSU?

[Yakovlev] I am interested to see them try to find an article in the statutes that covers me....

[Zamyatina] At the recent plenum the matter of expelling you from the party even went to the vote.

[Yakovlev] They voted on this in the Central Control Commission as well. It is very curious for me to observe this. After all, this also reflects the history of a struggle and ongoing death throes.

I can leave, and that's that. Get involved in academic work, which is far more interesting to me. I can write my books. Lord knows, I have plenty of commitments—in

the World Survival Movement, the Charity and Health Fund, of which I am chairman, and as cochairman of the Soviet edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. I have a lot to do!

But I would like to make another attempt to keep us from losing the democratic principles of our development.

There is currently a big response to the Movement for Democratic Reforms from the republics—from the Baltics, Moldova, Georgia, and Central Asia. Even on the part of the republics' leadership.

[Zamyatina] Well, your movement is certainly taking shape as an association of reputable people counterbalancing the organizations of the lumpen public.

[Yakovlev] Our organization is open to representatives of various parties, enabling them to provide a united front at the next elections.

I am speaking freely about elections and power because these things don't worry me personally, I am too old for any of this, too old to be in charge of anything. I repeat, we have to do something to enable Russia, our country, to become part of the general process of civilization. [Yakovlev ends]

From the Editorial Office

Our newspaper has recently published many articles on the political views of A.N. Yakovlev, who in recent years has been a prominent party figure, a member of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission from 1971 through 1986, a member of the CPSU Central Committee since 1986, and a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo since 1987. In publishing this interview with Aleksandr Nikolayevich, which came to us via TASS channels, we invite readers to draw their own conclusions about his position, especially as it is put forward in a most open manner.

We also received word that the extended text of the interview, two and a half times as long as the version offered to all the newspapers, arrived in the editorial office of the newspaper DELOVOY MIR. There is no clear explanation for this. We can only assume that A.N. Yakovlev preferred to set out the full details of his program and world view in a newspaper that is accessible only to a limited and specific circle of readers....

'Who's Who' Interviews Alksnis, Volskiy 5 Aug

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[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian at 1840 GMT on 5 August airs a 77-minute "Who's Who" program moderated by Central Television political observer Igor Fesunenko in which USSR people's deputies Viktor Imantovich Alksnis and Arkadiy Ivanovich Volskiy answer live phone-in questions from viewers. Fesunenko opens the program by profiling Alksnis and Volskiy by means of recorded interviews with passers-by in Riga and Moscow. Some know who they are; others have no idea. Some respect them; others do not. Biographical data on the men is given, illustrated with documentary video clips. Alksnis represents the Soyuz group of deputies; Volskiy represents the Movement for Democratic Reforms. Both movements are concerned about the destiny of the fatherland, and both want the country to get out of its crisis.

In the studio, the deputies are asked: What would be the first step to stop the decay? Alksnis says: We must attain civic consensus. Volskiy says: The economy must be made to work; it must stop being a hostage to politics.

More video clips about Alksnis are shown. A man says he is not normal—threatening the use of force to introduce order. Video shows OMON—Special Purpose Militia Detachment—men; one of them says civil war is already under way in the country, and if so-called democrats come to power, they will disappear into the forests to wage war to save the country, so that it is respected in the world. Our presence is a guarantee of order and security for the Russian population in the republics, says another OMON man. Alksnis says no one is behind his movement; they themselves wish to define their political line. They are for the silent majority that voted on 17 March for keeping the Union.

Fesunenko puts questions to Alksnis from listeners: Is secession of the Baltics a disaster for you? Did the Baltic republics join the Union voluntarily; do you really believe that? Another question asks whether it is not the time to set up a committee of red generals with Gromov and Makashov.

[Alksnis] "As far as the Baltic question is concerned, of course we have learned a lot of new things today about what happened at that time. Today this is my view: Yes, of course, obviously there wasn't a socialist revolution in 1940. But on the other hand, I consider that 1940 wasn't an occupation in the literal sense of the word."

[Fesunenko] "An occupation of the Baltics by the Soviet Union?"

[Alksnis] "Yes, by the Soviet Union."

Alksnis says he has seen documentary films from that period, showing well-attended meetings and rallies. These films were not faked. He contrasts them with similar films showing the Germans entering Prague as an occupying force, where people wept. "So let historians discuss this issue, because to try to discuss the situation in 1940 (?from today's viewpoint) seems to me a hopeless process."

Fesunenko repeats a listener's question on whether he would agree to flout the will of the majority.

Alsknis replies: "Let's look at what the will of the majority means. We know that there have been polls and referenda in the Baltic republics, and in the most varied conditions." He points out that neither in Latvia nor

Estonia was it the case that two-thirds of those with the right to vote voted for independence. "If we are building a state based on law, let's act according to the law. There is a law on secession. Fine. If the people see that they will be well off in an independent Latvia or Estonia, so that two-thirds of the population vote for an independent Latvia, that will solve the whole problem. After all, I am not calling for tanks to be used to halt the process of independence."

Fesunenko then asks what he thinks of a red generals' committee, to which Alksnis replies: "No, I don't support this view. I believe that the country should be ruled by civilians, with the support of the Army among others—and I stress among others—as one of the instruments of state policy."

Fesunenko comments on the warm welcome given Alksnis by the Riga OMON, and on their attitude toward events. He points out that their attitude does not tally with Alksnis' avowed desire for civic accord. Would he join the OMON in the forests? Alksnis says OMON men—whom he respects—are hostages to politicians and the bad policies they pursue. "While these questions should be tackled by the politicians, it is these lads who are forced to tackle them. They tackle them, evidently, with methods that a lot of people don't like."

[Fesunenko] "What about you?"

[Alksnis] "I don't entirely agree either. There are some actions I can't support. I know that often they do some badly thought-out actions; although on the whole, let me stress again, on the whole I consider that they are fulfilling their constitutional duty honestly."

Fesunenko says that they have often used violence, and that their duty is to observe the Constitution. Alksnis says that the good often has to be defended with fists. "If we admit the supremacy of the law, the supremacy of the Constitution, then obviously let's act in accordance with the Constitution. If the Constitution is flouted, by whoever it may be, whether by a citizen or by a republic, then evidently it is essential to see that the Constitution is fulfilled. If that isn't done, I assure you that we will never attain a state based on law."

Fesunenko then introduces more video clips on Volskiy.

Fesunenko asks Volskiy: Is it true you are a secret adviser to Gorbachev. If so, what shortcomings does the president have?

Volskiy replies: "Well, this secret adviser is—in my view—such a big secret that even I do not know about it. I think it is such a big secret that Gorbachev, too, does not know it. As for the president's shortcomings, I told this to his face repeatedly, including at the April Central Committee Plenum, that Mikhail Sergeyevich's work with the cadres is very weak. His retinue should be, without fail, stronger, pragmatic, and more authoritative."

Answering a question, Volskiy says it is true he worked as an assistant to Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov and was in charge of economic issues. Andropov did want to modernize society and the Party. He was the precursor of perestroyka. As president of the Scientific and Industrial Union, Volskiy is asked about future prospects. We are nowhere near market relations as yet, he says. The economy is hostage to politics: There is a war of laws, customs chaos, break-up of economic relations, a stupid decision concerning trade with Eastern Europe—all this means huge losses. It was an error to introduce hard currency settlements in trade with Eastern Europe, in view of the shortage of this currency there and in our country. We ought to go back to barter-type operations. There is a curtailment in extraction of oil and other mineral resources. Volskiy says economic stabilization will probably be in the first or second quarter of 1992.

In reply to a question about their attitude toward the confederative system in the Union and the full independence of republic-states within it, Volskiy says the differences between confederation and federation are in the realm of semantics—the main thing is to define this system as it affects relations among republics.

Alksnis says: "I disagree somewhat with Arkadiy Ivanovich, because it is a question of principle. On 17 March the people pronounced themselves in favor of the Union. I understand that everyone voted for his own kind of Union—of socialist republics, or of different types of republics, sovereign states. But in the final analysis I understand it like this: that the overwhelming majority of the population nevertheless voted for a single united state. A confederation is not a state; a confederation is a union of states, a community of states. And, yes indeed, if we do go over to the confederative principle today, complete disaster awaits us—economic disaster—because we will have to divide this economy between everyone according to their national homelands, which in fact is what is being done now, when all the republics declare the nationalization of Union property on their territories. What is interesting is that they reproduce this same administrative and command management, but they do so now at the republican level, because the economy requires such methods of management today, the totalitarian economy." This means bloody interethnic conflicts, Alksnis says. "I therefore consider that the path of confederation is the path toward civil war and the path toward a third world war."

Alksnis, Volskiy, and Fesunenko dispute the meaning of the word confederation, with different interpretations on the meaning of the word as applied, for example, to the Swiss Confederation. Volskiy suggests postponing the philological discussion until after the program.

Another question asks for the studio guests' views on the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 23 July appeal to the people. Alksnis says that in principle he supports this appeal, though it might have been a bit over emotional. In a follow-up question Fesunenko asks whether he is not shocked that Generals Gromov and Varennikov are

against the president? Alksnis replies: We have a unique political system—both generals are also deputies, and in that capacity they can state their views as deputies; but it would be impermissible for them to do so as military men.

Fesunenko then asks Volskiy for his attitude on the appeal.

Volskiy replies: "I consider, you know, that I am prepared to support and I hold a positive attitude toward any appeal aimed at concord. But this appeal is not directed toward achieving concord; it is aimed at vengeance, and therefore I would not sign it."

Fesunenko reads out a question from a viewer who points out that Volskiy was once nominated for a top post by Alksnis' Soyuz group of deputies. Alksnis clarifies the post for which the nomination was made—chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet—and says he doesn't regret having made the nomination. Volskiy says it is true that his candidacy was put forward—it is no secret; but he withdrew his candidature when it meant standing against Lukyanov.

Fesunenko reads out a question from a pensioner who recalls the high opinion held in his industry about Volskiy as a man who listened and who could get things done. In view of this, he asks how Volskiy could ever have become the NKAO dictator?

I was never a dictator, says Volskiy; I was fulfilling the will of the Supreme Soviet. Volskiy says: "I can say one thing. I am not yet ready to discuss the topic of Nagorno-Karabakh now. The scars have not yet healed. This was a difficult time in my life. But I can say one thing: I am very glad that good progress has now shaped up in the Karabakh question, and that President Mutalibov has met the Nagorno-Karabakh delegation. I consider this to be a very good and positive step, as is the fact that there are going to be elections for the republic president in Nagorno-Karabakh; the fact that as a consequence there will be enhanced status for Nagorno- Karabakh; and also a number of issues, say, connected with the restoration of the bodies of power. I consider that these are very good steps, and this position deserves the very highest approval."

Question to Alksnis: How would you normalize the NKAO situation?

Alksnis: It is a complex issue. What is taking place in our country is impermissible. On 31 July "Vremya" reported that some 50 people had lost their lives in our country. In what other period was this the case? In the Stalinist period, says Alksnis. He continues: "It is a paradox of our time that at present—under the banner of democracy, under the banner of perestroyka—our time is second only to the Stalinist period in terms of the blood that has been shed. As far as the number of refugees is concerned, we have already equaled the Stalinist deportation of peoples." Maybe in 10 to 15 years, Supreme Soviets will adopt declarations restoring the rights of the deported peoples—deported in the perestroyka period. He then says: "If we fail to put a halt to this chaos, if, in the name of saving people's lives, we fail to make use of all constitutional methods, including—yes, including here, I am not ashamed of this—including also force, then even more people will perish and millions, tens of millions of people will become refugees from their homeland."

Pressed by Fesunenko to be more specific about the aims of the Soyuz group in this context, Alksnis says: "We are of the view that at present therapy will be of no help; the time for surgery has already come. Of course, it is still a bit premature to speak of a state of emergency, the situation has not yet ripened so much. But I think that since the economy will inevitably collapse, and thousands upon thousands of enterprises will become idle and millions of people will take to the streets, demanding their daily bread, the introduction of a state of emergency in the whole of the country is inevitable." We do have a law on emergencies and it can be introduced legally, not as a junta would. Look at Yugoslavia now. Their reforms were killed by ethnic problems.

Alksnis continues: "There is a salvation: It is necessary now to freeze the political processes, having ensured maximal economic freedom." Pressed to enlarge, Alksnis says that a state of emergency would suspend the activities of elective authorities—all soviets, for instance. "The activities of the soviets are frozen, the activities of all political parties and movements are suspended, including the CPSU, since it finds itself ... all parties would be under equal conditions." Then a most radical economic reform can be implemented. Asked who would be in charge of implementing these reforms, Alksnis says that the executive authorities would be retained, in the centre, too. The Cabinet of Ministers "would be subordinated not to the USSR Supreme Soviet, which, well, has declared a moratorium on its activities, but it would be subordinated, for instance, either to the president—only not Gorbachev—or else to some sort of collegiate body ruling the country—only not the Federation Council."

At 1931 GMT, pressed to say who would be in this collegiate body, Alksnis says: "People of most varied political convictions should become members. They would be united by one thing: their alarm about the state's fate." Alksnis then rejects Fesunenko's suggestion that this question could have been resolved at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and stresses that he did not intend to dissolve the congress, adding: "The point was to convene an emergency congress, to resolve the question of Gorbachev, to set up this collegiate body in charge of the country, to declare a state of emergency, and to suspend activities, including those of the congress." Fesunenko presses Alksnis to say who, specifically, could become a member of this new collegiate body, to which Alksnis replies that Volskiy, Ilyin, Stankevich, and General Rodionov could be members and that anyone who joins must be patriotic.

At 1933 GMT Fesunenko asks Volskiy what the democratic movement would like to see happen, to which he replies that he is still affected by what is taking place in Yugoslavia. He adds that it is a shock for him and that it is essential to have consensus and accord to avoid tragedy. Volskiy says that the USSR could not survive a second civil war; that he does not believe that emergency measures would have any effect; and that consensus is a better way, considering the general dissatisfaction and the level of arms in the republics. It is our task to inform the people of what our movement wants, he conludes.

Fesunenko then reads a question from a number of viewers asking about the studio guests' attitudes toward Russian President Boris Yeltsin's departyization decree. Volskiy remarks that he is unsure about how the movement for democratic reforms will fare under the new arrangements, stressing that things are unclear. Fesunenko then asks Alksnis, to which he replies: "I have a complex attitude toward this decree, but, first, I, myself, am a supporter of the departyization of the Army, the KGB, the Internal Affairs Ministry, the Procuracy, and the courts. Although I am a Communist Party member, I consider this inevitable, and we will arrive at this, this departyization of these particular structures. As for the departyization of industrial enterprises and establishments that are not part of these structures, there the situation is more complicated. I consider that Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin is making a serious mistake in trying to resolve this issue in one stroke. I believe he has made a serious mistake, and this will not lead to anything good over and above additional confrontation. I believe that one should have moved by gradual steps regarding implementation of this departyization because partyization took place over 70 years and more, and to try to carry out departyization within the space of two or three weeks is [word indistinct]."

Fesunenko then asks: "Why do you say two or three weeks? No one's saying that. On the contrary, it's been said several times that this is a long and slow process. No one has any intention of forcing things along, as I understand it."

Alksnis replies: "Nevertheless, this issue cannot be resolved even within a matter of several months."

At 1940 GMT Alksnis replies to the question of how to get in touch with the Soyuz group and gives a "plug" for POLITIKA newspaper, the Soyuz group's own paper.

At 1942 GMT Fesunenko asks both Volskiy and Alksnis about spare time interests and activities. Volskiy says he likes soccer and playing with his grandchildren in the little spare time he has. Alksnis says he has no spare time but that he likes bookbinding and repairing television sets. Volskiy then points out that there is nothing wrong if former apparatchiks get a lot of money writing books and heading commercial organizations, if they are good. He says that he is not writing a book, that he has no car or dacha, and that his pay is undoubtedly lower than the interviewer's if he works in a cooperative. In general, there is nothing wrong with former party people tackling economic jobs if they are good at it, Volskiy reiterates.

At 1948 GMT Fesunenko asks Alksnis to comment on the USSR's UN Security Council decision to vote "in favor of a military solution to the Gulf crisis," to which Alksnis replies: "My attitude is negative. If we had abstained from the voting—as the PRC, say, did—then we would have retained more room for foreign policy maneuvers than we now have. We have some very serious interests in the Middle East. I believe it was a serious mistake for us to vote for military sanctions, especially since we have a friendship and cooperation treaty with Iraq." Fesunenko asks if it isn't time to break the treaty, considering Iraq's "absolutely odious, aggressive action" against Kuwait, to which Alksnis replies: "I believe that Husayn's actions should indeed be condemned, but there's the Iraqi people. Husayn does not personify the whole Iraqi people, and obstructing or persecuting the entire Iraqi people now is not the right (?thing to do). This treaty works not for the benefit of Husayn but for the benefit of the Iraqi people."

At 1951 GMT Fesunenko reads the following question: "Why are we destroying a greater number of missiles than the United States? Do we really have more weapons than they do or not?"

Alksnis replies: "There are different problems with different aspects. We really do have a serious superiority compared to the United States with certain weapons, but on some issues we have simply made some unilateral concessions [words indistinct]. Nevertheless, I believe that the USSR's present policy—its foreign policy—is disastrous for our country. I do not think there have ever been periods in history—not just of the USSR but of the Russian state, too, let's put it that way—when such a mistaken foreign policy was implemented. I hold the view that we, our grandchildren, and our great grandchildren will rue those five years of foreign policy that have been carried out. The main mistake, in my view, is the fact that we suffered defeat in World War II, paradoxical though it may seem. We suffered defeat in World War II, in 1989, 1990, and 1991 by the fact that we got out of Eastern Europe."

Alksnis says that talentless politicians squandered the USSR's World War II victory, warning that they will yet be taken to task over this. Alksnis agrees that, with the situation as it is today, the continued presence of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe has become senseless but says that the USSR should have tried to foster good relations with these countries to retain friends and allies. Alksnis adds: "It goes without saying that we have plenty of enemies as it is, but our foreign policy has done all it can to turn our erstwhile allies—well, to put it mildly—into countries whose attitude toward us is anything but friendly."

Fesunenko then suggests that the USSR should not have entered Eastern Europe and left troops without considering people's views, to which Alksnis replies: "We

entered Germany as the victorious power, and we entered these other countries in the same way during World War II. Yes, there is a problem with the CSFR and Hungary; yes, it is there, indeed, although I think that we will yet revise a great deal here in this respect, but—I beg your pardon—but I disagree with painting everything black, saying that we were the occupants everywhere. As for Eastern European events, I think where these events are concerned, we will get to the bottom of these events, too." Alksnis says he disagrees with the Soviet leaders' portrayal of Eastern European events as a brilliant victory for democracy and progress, pointing out that one monopoly for the truth has simply been replaced by another, with tens of thousands being persecuted on former GDR territory for their views and their previous role. Alksnis asks: What sort of democracy is this that persecutes former GDR army officers, ex-Socialist Unity Party of Germany members, or former employees of the GDR's state security bodies "who honestly went about fulfilling their duties." Fesunenko disagrees, saying Soviet foreign policy has been the USSR's greatest success.

At 1957 GMT Fesunenko ends the program by reading out complimentary remarks from viewers about both participants, mentioning that there are also remarks strongly criticizing Alksnis.

Shevardnadze Discusses Democracy Movement

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[Interview with Eduard Shevardnadze by D. Sabov, date and place not given: "Eduard Shevardnadze: To Have Any Opportunity of Doing Anything My Way, I Would Have to Speak Quite a Long Time, Like Everyone Else...."]

[Text] [Sabov] The CPSU Central Committee plenum which ended last week seems to have surprised even its participants by ending peacefully. But for you, Eduard Amvrosiyevich, it was essentially the first chance to take an outside look at the terrible force to which you are no longer subordinate. How would you comment on the picture we witnessed? What do you expect to come out of the extraordinary CPSU congress?

[Shevardnadze] The picture was contradictory, and personally I would not be in any hurry to draw conclusions either about internal weakness or about the dulling of contradictions within the party. Nonetheless, consolidation occurred at the plenum, mainly thanks to external factors. This was a reaction to the Russian president's departyization decree, which awakened the apparatus' instinct for self-preservation. An important role was also played by Gorbachev's ability to work out a compromise: The proposal to convene an emergency congress forestalled debate. Clearly the main events will take place there.

In principle, the situation in the party and society is now such that it will be incredibly difficult to preserve the CPSU's so-called unity. In my view, a split is natural and inevitable.

[Sabov] The political landscape in our society is changing very rapidly. Whereas the initiators of perestroyka, recognizing the need for the profound renewal of the CPSU, pinned particular hope on it for the success of the entire range of reforms, today's reforms are counting on other forces. Was the formation of the Movement for Democratic Reforms [MDR] a result of the hopes pinned on the party failing to materialize? When did you personally and your MDR comrades-in-arms realize this?

[Shevardnadze] Even at the time when there was hope that the CPSU could be renewed, certain members of the party leadership considered it necessary to set up a really constructive opposition, in the belief that this would be in the interests of and benefit the CPSU itself. Its long monopoly on power and its exclusively edict-style method of leadership had led to the will and initiative of the party's working procedures becoming atrophied, which affected its operations under the conditions of a democratization which was declared from on high. An opposition, bringing dynamism to the political process, could promote profound perestroyka in the party by advancing alternatives to which the CPSU would have to find an adequate response. Under the conditions of political competition, which would require all the intellectual potential of the party majority, the progress of internal reform would inevitably be accelerated.

Unfortunately, this did not happen, and we paid for it in the events of mid-to-late 1990 and early 1991. Revealing, on the one hand, the inability of leading party structures to reform themselves and, on the other, their desire to reverse the process and revive strong-arm diktat methods, they convinced me of the need for a number of steps.

[Sabov] Are you referring to your resignation? Or to your departure from the CPSU?

[Shevardnadze] Both....

[Sabov] ...This was interpreted as an attempt to dodge responsibility. At any rate, that argument was heard in certain speeches even at the recent CPSU Central Committee plenum. And it was also noted that your resignation from the party attests to a regeneration of your political views....

[Shevardnadze] Those are familiar words which reflect a definite type and mode of thought. Unfortunately, I myself gave them a considerable amount of respect in my time. Recognizing this, I also admit my own responsibility—although by no means responsibility for what the authors of the statement have in mind. I have always seen my duty to the party as being to liberate the will and creative ability of Communists, to release them from unthinking execution of their duties, and to act in the

interests of common sense rather than to suit dogma. A great deal of what we did in the republic party organization was contrary to top-level directives and rejected all-powerful centralism as a principle. There was a great risk inherent in this willfulness and it was often intimated to me that I might have to pay for it. If I am responsible to the party for anything, it is mainly for being unable to complete this process from within, and the only thing I had left to counter this with was my personal choice.

By talking about the "regeneration" of my political views, people want to convince others that former leadership members needed the creation of "parallel structures" to regain their lost power. But I myself—and I can only speak for myself—abandoned power voluntarily without any coercion.

[Sabov] But there are quite a lot of people accusing you of insincerity. Your previous statements are quoted and compared with your current statements. People are asking when were you telling the truth—then or now?

This all applies to the "regeneration" question. If you dislike the word, we can use "evolution." How did it come about? How rapidly and radically can a politician's views change? And can he be judged today by yesterday's yardsticks?

[Shevardnadze] You can do anything: You can discuss him and condemn him, but it must be in the context of a specific period of time, and always on the basis of his work, which reflects the main trends of his policy. The saddest and ultimately most unforgivable approach is to commit the age-old sin of oversimplification.

In a system where a certain selection of words represents a ritual sign of devotion to that system—and if you fail to do homage to it you run the risk of being deprived of any opportunity to do anything—people listen to your statements with particular sensitivity. God forbid you ever say anything contrary to the ritual—you'll be anathema in an instant. To have any opportunity of doing anything my way, I was quite frequently forced to speak like everyone else. For instance, that meant paying homage to the "number one," but at the same time hatching an experiment which would reduce the central departments' diktat over the republic's territory, or striving to preserve the article in its constitution about the Georgian language's state-language status.

I say this with sadness, recognizing the definite moral damage implicit in such an admission. But I am saying it.... And let he who has not experienced this split personality cast the first stone.

Unfortunately for all of us, this "double standard," this anomaly became the norm in the system. One need hardly say that many people—myself included—found this oppressive. But these "rules of the game" made no provision for any exceptions. There was just one way out—not taking part. However, not everyone could come to this decision: It was also clear what it would mean. For me, for instance, it would mean that I would be unable to act in a commonsense direction.

But even this explanation is simplistic. In Leningrad recently I was asked a similar question about when I was telling the truth.... And I replied that back "then" I believed what I said.

I was 18 when I became a candidate party member in 1946.... The war had only just ended. I had lost my elder brother in it. The victory over fascism was my victory, too, and I linked it to the Communist Party. But when people were killed in Tbilisi eight years later as a demonstration was broken up, and comrades sent from Moscow accused them of bourgeois nationalism, I spoke out against it and tried to tell the truth about the reasons for the tragedy. I said what I believed, and it was not a speech against the CPSU, but, rather, in its defense. "Regeneration" would have meant behaving differently. Was I speaking against the millions of people who had linked their destiny to the party? No, it's just that I do not go along with the extreme right-wing groups in the CPSU or with the Russian Communist Party, who arrogate the right to speak and act on behalf of millions. Remaining among them means identifying with their policies. And it is no accident that the MDR will be open to Communists who have linked their fate to the country's renewal.

I believe that politics can be whatever you like, as long as it isn't inhuman. If it is, it becomes obsolete. My evolution has been defined by a movement toward this truth. It has taken decades. But my past now is part of me—it cannot be erased and I do not disavow it. But nobody should question my present on that basis.

[Sabov] Your present is the MDR. What are you personally linking it with?

[Shevardnadze] I'm 63. This is not an age for forgetting that one's political life does not have much time left. I have observed titled heroes long enough to be convinced that they are an example of the pernicious nature of the desire to stay "at the top" for as long as possible and at all costs.

I am guided not by personal ambition but by a desire to promote the formation of a movement—or party, if the constituent congress so decides—which will help the country to get through the transitional period as painlessly as possible. According to my forecasts, this will take five-six years. That is how long I've given myself.

[Sabov] How do you explain the cautious attitude to the MDR? Does it annoy you?

[Shevardnadze] I can understand the fact that the movement is being attacked from the right. But I'm not very clear about the doubts expressed by the left. Even though I have worked out a great deal for myself by entering into dialogue with representatives of democratic parties and movements. Some people ask whether an apparatus version of a political niche for the president is being

created. Others ask whether an attempt is being made to swallow up existing movements or, even worse, to split them. Other people say that it will be the same imperial structure as the CPSU once was.

I can only speak for myself and about myself. None of the above proposals is acceptable to me. In the same way, incidentally, as the rejection of somebody for ideological reasons or out of party-group preference is unacceptable. If there is a principle which it is impossible to sacrifice, this is it. Any other approach would mean going over old ground. It would mean the triumph of the "class principle" which stifled our human impulses.

There is only one criterion which should be adhered to: the human scale. Does that sound rather abstract? For me it is entirely concrete—just as the people with whom I deal are concrete.

Movements are emerging in the country of farmers, leaseholders, "people for their own land," people who are clever, skillful, and industrious, owners, and entrepreneurs. I see the movement's task as being to remove the obstacles in their way and ease the transition to highly productive, civilized economic management.

Enlightened, cultured entrepreneurs cannot fail to be interested in ensuring social stability and eradicating the factors and causes of social tension. The movement's initiators envisage the elaboration of mechanisms which would minimize the social costs of the economy's transition to market relations. We are planning measures which would rule out the integration of shadow structures into the new economy and would oppose as resolutely as possible any attempts to exploit the transitional period in the interests of criminal clans.

On the other hand, a system of reliable social protection will be elaborated for the less well-off, who will find it difficult to "join in" society's move toward market relations. Any surge in unemployment will be stanched by the implementation of alternative programs to save our fellow citizens from these social "upheavals."

Whatever my opponents—in or out of uniform—may say or write about me, I advocate a strong and well-organized modern defense equal to the real demands of safeguarding the country's security. I am very familiar with the Army. I know many officers and generals personally, and these acquaintanceships are imbued with mutual respect and trust. I have clear ideas about how they live, work, and think. I believe that most of our fellow citizens in uniform are interested in seeing reform succeed—not least in the Armed Forces. I advocate that far more be spent on the upkeep of the personnel and on servicemen's social needs than is spent at present.

[Sabov] So are you gearing yourself to the widest possible social base?

[Shevardnadze] Undoubtedly. Workers are joining us. There have been many applications from the countryside. This really is a movement, and even if a party is formed at its constituent congress, the movement will nonetheless probably be preserved as a mass-based popular movement—and by no means all supporters of it will have to affirm their choice through party membership.

Specific forms of cooperation with our movement by other democratic parties and movements are a subject for dialogue. Nobody is planning to swallow up or split anyone else. It is a question of joint actions and a coordinated policy by democratic forces. And I believe that we will be able to reach agreement—the current lack of agreement just plays into the hands of reaction.

[Sabov] What form of democracy do you find the most sophisticated and suitable for us?

[Shevardnadze] Permit me first and foremost to raise the question of what democracy is. According to our former education there is bourgeois democracy and socialist democracy. I am far closer to the modern interpretation of democracy, which has three distinguishing principles—humanism, universality, and diversity. The first stands for the primacy of human life and the individual; the second stands for the common application of democratic laws and statutes, which make no exceptions or special cases for anything or anyone; and the third stands for recognition of everyone's right to an "alternative"—be it a choice, opinion, or way of life. Provided that the law is observed. Freedom is the regulation of the will. My rights end where someone else's begin.

[Sabov] Is this yet another utopia? Is this goal attainable, given our conditions? Is it possible in general to unite democratic forces in a society where all the social poles have not yet even shown themselves to date and where different shades of social, professional, and national interests are only beginning to receive political identification?

[Shevarnadze] I do not fully agree with the latter. Let us say that those who are familiar with the life of the republics other than by hearsay can confirm that national interests never died away, they were merely repressed beneath the deadweight of an official doctrine which interpreted the principle of internationalism in a vulgar and primitive way. Paradoxically enough, it was the precept of the "fusion of nations" which promoted, as you say, the political identification which, because of a whole series of taboos, assumed highly specific forms. My personal experience and knowledge of the situation dictated the need to give an outlet to national self-awareness via a normal channel, not one linked to excesses. Unfortunately, the factor of centralism acquired such a self-sufficient character that the tackling of many problems of national life and interethnic relations constantly ran up against insuperable barriers.

Democracy, which is based on the aforementioned principles, is capable of tackling these problems. I do not oversimplify them, they are incredibly complex, but if I regarded this cause as utopian, I would not have signed the "Declaration of the Nine."

[Sabov] And how would you formulate the Movement's tasks in your sphere? Your critics claim that the movement's main problem is that it aspires to be unionwide in scale and consequently does not take account of the interests of the republics, where the democratic movement identifies itself with the idea of national statehood?

[Shevardnadze] That assertion contains no revelations for me. I have long known that to be so and I do not think it possible to ignore that factor. The movement toward national-state sovereignty is a fact which a politician has to reckon with in practice. And although it is difficult to agree with the reference to the democratic nature of all the national movements, scope for the actions of democratic forces does exist. I never tire of repeating that every local democratic movement is sovereign and independent and that we are dealing not with some kind of single superstructure, but with unity around a common purpose determined by objective factors.

The main one is the interconnection of interests. Democracy at "the center" needs the support of the democratic movements in the republics, including those which will not sign the Union Treaty. The democratic parties and movements in the republics need support just as much, being subject to the double pressure of reactionaries from the center and a "home-grown" ultraconservative alliance, which easily find a common language and form a bloc with each other.

A true democrat cannot desire sovereignty and independence for his own people while denying it to others. Democracy is not established at the expense of others....

Our movement's program is in the process of being drawn up, and for the time being I would venture to express only my own opinion. Being democratic both in its essence and in its objectives, the movement favors the solution of questions concerning the sovereignty and status of each state by the free expression of the will of the people and through the acts of lawfully elected legislative organs. The movement, however, stems from the predetermined objective factors of the general interest of the republics in forming a single democratic space. The main thing is that a sovereign formation should, regardless of its status (inside or outside the Union), have a democratic system, since the transformation of even one of them into a totalitarian, dictatorial formation will have catastrophic consequences both for itself and its neighbors.

The movement functions as a free association of independent, autonomous parties which stand on a democratic platform. Each of them can set its own tasks in the light of distinctive national features. The main thing, I repeat, is allegiance to democratic principles, commitment to the law, and the achievement of one's ends through the election of heads of state and parliament.

The movement goes on even if in one or several of the republics forming part of it democratic parties win a majority in parliament. For example, the Socialist International uniting both the ruling French Socialist Party and the opposition Labor Party in Israel.

The movement has no center in the generally accepted sense of the term, or branches or sections. Consultations, conferences, and congresses are held to coordinate action and concert the tactics and strategy of forming a single democratic space.

I would stress once again that the idea of a unitary political organization seems unacceptable to me.

[Sabov] How has your initiative been regarded in the republics?

[Shevardnadze] In such a way that we can talk about our movement having a very broad geographical spread.

[Sabov] Do you rule out the movement putting up a candidate in the Union presidential election? And how would you regard your own candidacy for the post?

[Shevardnadze] That is too important and responsible a decision to to be hurried. If it is examined, then it will clearly be at the conference of the movement or party.

As for me personally, I think that such a turn is not realistic. And in general the ideal option would be to put forward the candidacy of a young politician, someone of a new stamp. I personally would favor such a decision.

[Sabov] Apparently incompatbible forces have come together in the Democratic Reform Movement. Recent leaders of the CPSU and the democratic movement. Supporters of new political thinking and leaders of our country's military-industrial complex, which, by all accounts, recently dealt a serious blow to Soviet foreign policy by transferring 20,000 tanks beyond the Urals, which nearly upset the accord you had previously reached. How do you explain this union of apparently incompatible forces? Do the old contradictions not hinder progress toward the new goal?

[Shevardnadze] We wish, you see, to advance to a new goal while guided by old premises. Gross, irreparable mistakes are inevitable with such an approach. It is a false premise to present a very complicated situation as something unidimensional, unified, and impersonal. You merely have to utter the expression "military-industrial complex," for example, for the image of a dark force hostile to everything new to be summoned up instantly.

Yet what is the military-industrial complex? It is, whether we want it or not, the basis of our existing industry and, by destroying it rather than skillfully placing it on a new footing, we are destroying the one thing that will help the country survive economically. It represents millions of very highly skilled workers, engineers, and designers, a golden asset for our economy which it is very easy to lose and which it is impossible to create quickly. It also represents their families—parents,

husbands, wives, children—our fellow-citizens, real people whose lives are just as tough now as people doing other jobs.

I am not alone in predicting a deterioration in the economic situation by the end of the year. Unfortunately, the trend toward a deepening of crisis phenomena is easily discernible. Given the backdrop of wide discontent, also predictable without undue difficulty, attempts to carry out actions which in the very difficult circumstances may appear to some to be the only ones feasible, are possible. If the way out of chaos and disorder is conceived solely in terms of "strong-arm" policy, it is difficult to envisage very wide support for it. The consequences will be tragic—for all of us, for Europe, amd for the world.

Despite the impressive success of democratic forces in Russia, Moscow, and Leningrad, the threat remains and is even increasing. If the threat is to be removed and the offensive of reaction halted, it is not enough just to close ranks. Real mainstays for democracy and the broadening of its social base and the support of allies are essential.

Do you want me to weaken it by rejecting its most active force? I will not and counsel others not to do so either. Otherwise there is no point in attempting to sign up as democrats.

Now let's set one mistake to rights. It was not the military-industrial complex and, in a certain sense, not our Armed Forces that moved the tanks beyond the Urals. Quite specific persons are responsible for this. But in this case too I will refrain from leveling any accusations at the departments which make up the country's foreign policy complex on a par with the USSR Foreign Ministry. The fact that they were transferred is not the issue—that does not constitute a contravention of the provisions of the treaty in law. The point is the way in which it was done—secretly, behind our negotiating partners' backs, slowing up the negotiating process, undermining trust in our country's foreign policy, and weakening our positions. The result for us proved worse than it might have been.

[Sabov] Aren't you afraid that now these "specific persons" have started the ball rolling the strategic offensive arms treaty that has just been concluded will suffer the same sorry fate?

[Shevardnadze] I don't think that's possible. I have a good knowledge of this treaty—every word and phrase of it. I can say that we and the Americans have good experience of reliable verification and complete transparency in this sphere. That virtually rules out the possibility of any shenanigans.

[Sabov] One last question—about the attacks on you. They come from various, sometimes unexpected, quarters, massing under a common banner our homegrown "ultras," U.S. extreme right-wingers, the partocracy, and those who declared war on it in Georgia, say. The attacks are synchronized and the attackers share out their "ammunition." To what do you attribute this phenomenon?

[Shevardnadze] I noticed a long time ago that extremes come together, even when they have nothing in common and seem unable to have anything in common. I think that we are dealing with a new phenomenon: The "hawks" in our country and across the ocean are losing their heightened ideological sensitivity and loyalty to "class principles," there is hardly a threat to the dogmas on which their political and ideological capital, and even their well-being, rests. There is nothing new in the methods themselves: Any system sensing danger seeks salvation by shaping an enemy image...

It seems that everything is going smoothly in my case. It only took one U.S. newspaper—one that by no means reflects the brightest hues of the U.S. political spectrum—to publish an article inspired by the extreme right "denouncing" my actions during my work in Georgia for several of our self-styled Communist publications to rush to reprint it.

There have been times in my life—there were bound to be—and things I have done for which it is easy to reproach me without explaining the specific circumstances, specific situations, or motives that guided me. But it is not, after all, a matter of my real or imaginary defects. Evidently, I represented a certain trend, a certain way of thinking and acting, a mode of behavior, a policy that some press organs and the groupings behind them do not like. They are trying to discredit the man so as to discredit the trend, the mode, and the policy.

I have no intention of responding since I have no desire to pander to those who are lusting for a trial, not of me again—in this case of reformers, the Movement for Democratic Reform. Needless to say, it would be in the interests of the case to show how this is happening. But I will refrain for the moment. I'm not in the mood for that....

[Sabov] How can you not be in mood for that...? Shall I quote for you the last "section" of the abuse? "In the history of the Russian state Shevardnadze will be regarded as a man who committed a serious misdemeanor before the state...." "He will be cursed in the history of our country...." You are compared with Penkovskiy and Pol Pot. Aren't you afraid?

[Shevardnadze] I'm not afraid for myself. I have been faced with mortal danger quite frequently—and I am by no means speaking metaphorically—and it did not frighten me. All the cursing, the devious attempts to linked my name with the state system—not with the Soviet system, mark you, but with the Russian system—the distortion or hushing up of facts linked with the principle of panhuman values, and the desire to muddle the departments and people who, in conjunction with the Foreign Ministry, implemented the foreign policy decisions adopted by the country's top leadership are symptoms of an ailment born of a flaw in the system that now

seems incurable for some of its custodians. These hysterical inflammatory speeches addressed not to reason but to instinct, using not facts but "signs" and "symbols," are the tools of moral terror—tools that were extensively tested long ago in our history—that always preceded and prepared the ground for physical terror. Anyone willing to castigate "evil" was always hunted out.

Perhaps that's how things stand in my case. But we're not after all, talking about me.

Shevardnadze Memoirs Excerpted: Part 1

914B0275A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 29, Jul 91 p 6

["Extracts" from E. Shevardnadze's recently published book "My Choice": "E. Shevardnadze Recalls"]

[Text] **Three factors undermined the USSR economy: Chernobyl, the earthquake in Armenia, and the anti-alcohol campaign**

The morning began with a ringing of telephones, which are usually quiet at this time of day. I had to postpone my traditional Monday meeting and respond to agitated questioning, which amounted, by and large, to just one question: What has happened in the country? But there was nothing I could answer: I did not yet know in those morning hours that there had been an accident at one of our nuclear power stations.

Gorbachev called and asked me to come over. By that time approximately 15 ambassadors were urgently seeking immediate meetings with me or my deputies, giving as the reason for their urgency special instructions from their governments to obtain explanations from us in connection with the radioactive elements which had shown up in the atmosphere, soil, and water on their national territory. They were linking all this with the Soviet Union inasmuch as no malfunctions had been detected in the operation of the nuclear power installations of their countries. Things were assuming the nature of a scandal.

I had already left the office when an aide notified me of one further telephone call. This time it dealt with the motion picture "Repentance." The director Tengiz Abuladze had completed work on it in 1984, but had been unable to get a screening for it. The film had suffered the fate of many good films: it was banned and ended up on the shelf. Now Abuladze was seeking my advice: Could he apply to Gorbachev for assistance and appeal to the cinematographers' congress, which was due to begin on 12 May.

At the time Abuladze was sharing his intention with me I was not confident that the film would be put out for general release. I even said so to the director, adding that the film should be shot, for all that. This was taking a risk, but a carefully calculated one in terms of all the conceivable ingredients—from the film's financing through the studio where it could be shot without having to worry about it being "closed" on orders from Moscow.

When the film was ready and negligible modifications had been made, I had left Tbilisi. And the appropriate departments thereupon received demands that the sole copy of the film be destroyed, and the author, punished. Concerned for the fate of his creation, Abuladze took pains to get a videotaped copy. The people who helped him do this were charged with duplicating an anti-Soviet work. They were fired. The film was impounded.

In my first months in Smolenskaya Square I continually experienced painful pangs of conscience: I had encouraged a person in unusual behavior, supported his intention, helped him shoot a film—and abandoned him at the most difficult time for him. One day I could not forbear from telling Gorbachev about this: "I am indebted to many people at home, but now I cannot repay all the debts. But there is one debt which I am duty bound to repay come what may, and you can help me here."

Gorbachev viewed "Repentance" and said that its way to the screen should be opened. It should for fairness' sake be mentioned that many and various people were involved in the fate of the film. Not to mention Abuladze's colleagues—filmmakers—Aleksandr Yakovlev, and, as I was told, Yegor Ligachev involved themselves with the film. But there was just as strong opposition also. The prevailing opinion in the Politburo was that in involving ourselves with the past we could become bogged down in it and not extricate ourselves from the present mire. Satisfaction of the numerous demands for the party rehabilitation of a whole number of prominent figures of the past would cause a chain reaction of a revision of history. It was in this context that the fate of "Repentance" was examined. The very title of the film and the meaning contained in it instilled alarm in quite a large number of people. After all, repentance presupposes in respect of all things recognition of personal responsibility. Public condemnation of the past was frightening because of its inevitable conclusion concerning the need for a decisive break with the "usages" that had been predominant in it.

I asked that it be conveyed to Abuladze that Gorbachev knew of the film and that it would necessarily be given the "go-ahead," only he should wait a little.

The truth about Chernobyl could not wait, but making it public was extremely difficult. For the same reasons that the brakes were applied to "Repentance's" progress to the screen.

Literally three days prior to the Chernobyl catastrophe, I had, addressing a meeting devoted to the 116th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth, quoted Gorbachev's words: "We are categorically opposed to those who urge the measured dosage of social information: there cannot be too much truth...."

While raised in the spirit of a mystical reverence for the "top secret" stamp, I nonetheless did everything in my power to ensure that the truth about Chernobyl become known to the country and the world in the first days following the accident. I was not that successful, but even that which I managed to do was accorded a hostile reception by certain members of the Politburo. Employing the vocabulary of the political patriarchate, it could be said that my colleagues and I came in for it well and truly for the information we communicated to our foreign partners.

The absence of full and truthful information was compensated by massive "ideological support" for what was unprovable and the manifestation of the reflex rejection of "the provocative propaganda racket kicked up in the West in connection with the accident at our nuclear electric power station."

M.S. Gorbachev spoke on Central Television on 15 May and dotted all the "i's."

Chernobyl was the first test of glasnost, and it failed it. All is in the future, I thought, we are only just beginning.... I had myself encountered directly a manifest endeavor to conceal from representatives of the leadership of the country important details of the April execution in Tbilisi, and for this reason I can believe Gorbachev's claim that he learned about the Vilnius events only after the fact. But there then inevitably arises the supposition concerning some "shadow" force operating in circumvention and in defiance of the legitimate authorities, a force interpolating disinformation in general orders of battle involving tanks. Or, which is harder for me to believe, concerning a desire to "cover up" this force and remove it from the zone of glasnost.

In the evening of 7 April 1989 Gorbachev and I returned to Moscow from Britain. We were informed at Vnukovo-2 Airport that at the urgent requests of the leaders of Georgia a subunit of interior forces, which had prior to this been transferred from Armenia from Tbilisi, had been sent to Tbilisi. The reasons given for the requests, we were told, were the need to maintain order, a threat to which had arisen in connection with an unsanctioned mass meeting on Rustaveli Avenue outside Government House which had begun on 4 April. The report disturbed me—memory and experience are stronger than any words, any assurances. The events of 1956 and 1978 had shaped a syndrome of categorical rejection of the use of force as a means of the solution of a political conflict, all the more so under the conditions of a mass gathering of people. I was therefore heartened by Gorbachev's words: "Settle the situation by political means at all costs. Shevardnadze and Razumovskiy can fly to Tbilisi for this, if necessary."

To be continued.

Ministers Petition Gorbachev on Print Industry

PM0508151591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jul 91 Second Edition p 3

[Undated "Open Letter to the USSR President, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, and the Union Republic Governments: In Debt to Society"]

[Text] Having examined the state of affairs that has developed in the country's periodical press and book publishing, we are expressing our grave anxiety and concern.

A reduction in the volume of print production is occurring, there is a real danger of many state publishing houses' being shut down, and many newspapers and journals are under threat of ceasing publication.

The rampant increase in paper prices, the repeated increase in service costs for the delivery and distribution of the periodical press, the sharp increase in the scarcity of all printing materials, the low wages in the printing industry and the exodus of skilled cadres from it, the fact that to a considerable extent printing equipment is worn out, and the increasingly slim chances of renovating it and replacing it without timely help and the government's taking of emergency measures, are leading to ruinous consequences for society, its culture, and for ensuring glasnost.

For the first time since 1941, readers have received 500 million books fewer than scheduled, including over 100 million children's books. Under the onslaught of chaotic commerce, book publishing houses and journal and newspaper publishing houses have found themselves unable to fulfill their cultural, educational, and social functions. Very soon society could find itself without various educational, children's, scientific, or technical books, reference books and encyclopedias, and national and foreign classics.

The real threat—of not receiving this year's subscription copies of newspapers and journals—gives millions of subscribers serious cause to doubt our commitment to the policy of glasnost.

Being not only concerned for the fate of printing but also bearing state responsibility for ensuring citizens' rights to information as guaranteed by USSR law, we appeal to the USSR president, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, and the Union republic governments not to allow further destruction of the periodical press and book publishing and to take immediate measures on giving effective aid.

We believe that it is necessary to establish a fixed price for paper under the state order for noncommercial publications and to reduce payment for newspaper and journal delivery, partly compensating enterprises in the pulp and paper industry and in communications for expenditures for these purposes from the budget. We are also convinced that newspaper editorial offices, publishing houses, enterprises, and organizations working in the printing sphere must be taxed at privileged rates, as

is the custom in international practice. Only in these conditions will they find the potential and resources to solve their material and technical problems and to restore polygraphic machine building. Doing this is even more essential because today, while bringing in considerable revenues to the state, employees in the printing industry are one of the the lowest-paid groups in the country.

We express the common viewpoint that procrastination in taking specific measures to radically change the position in the press is increasing our unrepayable debt to society, culture, and the country's future.

[Signed] M.F. Nenashev, USSR minister of information and the press; M.N. Poltoranin, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] minister of the press and mass information; Yu.P. Dyachenko, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Goskompechat [State Committee for the Press]; A.I. Butevich, chairman of the Belorussian SSR Goskompechat; S.I. Strizhnev, first deputy chairman of the Uzbek SSR Goskompechat; V.I. Nabokov, first deputy chairman of the Kazakh SSR Goskompechat; B.A. Nikolayev, deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Goskompechat; P.P. Yeran, deputy general director of the Latvian Republic's "Litta" Production Association; A.E. Erkebayev, minister of the press of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan; B.A. Makhmadov, chairman of the Tadzhik SSR Goskompechat; K.K. Kurbanov, deputy chairman of Turkmen SSR Goskompechat; K.A. Simonyan, chairman of the Armenian Republic Goskompechat

Text of Gorbachev Greetings to ZIL Work Force

PM0608094991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Aug 91 Second Edition p 2

[Greetings message from USSR President Gorbachev to workers of Moscow's Likhachev Automobile Plant on plant's 75th anniversary; undated: "Congratulations on Your Anniversary, Automobile Plant Workers!"]

[Text] To the workers, engineers, technicians, and employees at the I.A. Likhachev Moscow Automobile Plant [ZIL].

Dear Comrades!

I warmly congratulate your plant's many-thousand-strong labor collective—a collective rich in good traditions—on its 75th anniversary.

The automobile plant workers have traveled a long and complex path in three quarters of a century—from small repair shops to a giant automobile plant whose output is well known and valued within our country and outside it. The ZIL plant workers have always lived according to the deeds and hopes of the people and are continuing to do so. Whole generations of the plant's workers have participated actively in the industrialization of the country, in saving it from fascist aggression, and in the postwar restoration.

Today too the automobile plant workers are people who generously devote their engineering and working talent and their skilled hands to the production of the reliable equipment and high-quality consumer goods which are so necessary to the national economy. I hope that your association will promote in every possible way the stabilization and renewal of the economy and the cause of the profound reform and improvement of our society.

I wish the leadership, the social organizations, and all the plant's working people success in overcoming the present difficulties on the paths of the modernization of our domestic automobile construction, the collective's social development, and the strengthening of concern for people's everyday working and living conditions. Good health and prosperity to all the automobile plant workers and your families.

M. Gorbachev

Komsomol 'Not Affected' by Departyization Decree

PM0608105791 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 2 Aug 91 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Komsomol Not Affected by Decree"]

[Text] After the signing by the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] president of a decree "On Halting the Activity of Organized Structures of Political Parties and Mass Social Movements in RSFSR State Organs, Institutes, and Organizations," the RSFSR Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee turned to S.M. Shakhrayu, RSFSR state adviser on legal policy, for clarification as to whether or not the decree applies to Russia's Komsomol structures.

In his reply the state adviser announced officially that "RSFSR Komsomol structures are not subject to the provisions of the aforementioned RSFSR presidential decree... According to the USSR Law 'On Social Associations,' the RSFSR Komsomol cannot be defined as a political party—that is, a social organization whose main task is to found organs of power and government and to exercise power through representatives elected to the soviets of people's deputies thereby to realize its own programs. The RSFSR Komsomol is not a mass movement inasmuch as it has a fixed membership."

Cabinet Decision on Return of Crimean Tatars

LD0608094191 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 0900 GMT 6 Aug 91

[Text] The USSR Cabinet of Ministers has adopted a decision on the organized return of the Crimean Tartars to the Crimean Autonomous Republic and on guarantees that they will be provided for. It has been recommended to the governments of Russia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan that commissions be set up in each republic for the all-around

resolution of all problems. Citizens among the Crimean Tartars wishing to return to the Crimea should apply to these commissions. They will determine the individual order of priority for return and will guarantee the resolution of all organizational issues. Responsibility for the accomodation and employment of the Crimean Tatars will rest with the Council of Ministers of the Crimean Republic. The decision will be published.

Comparison of Gorbachev Meeting With Workers

PM3107140191

Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian on 31 July 1991 carries on pages 1, 2 a report by Viktor Andriyanov, Oleg Kulish, and Vadim Raskin on M.S. Gorbachev's 26 July meeting with worker and peasant members of the party Central Committee and Central Control Commission. Comparison of the RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA item, entitled "Reforms Need the Support of Workers and Peasants: A Comradely, Frank Discussion Between the Country's Leaders and Representatives of Labor Collectives," with the Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN version published in the 31 July Soviet Union DAILY REPORT page 33, reveals the following variations:

Column one, paragraph four, sentence one reads...also answered questions. RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA today offers for...[subbing "RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA" for "SELSKAYA ZHIZN"]

Column one, paragraph five, sentence one reads...you a question. The plenum, in whose work you took part, has just finished. What kind of impression did it make? What worries you and what are you thinking about after the discussion?

V. Savchenko, weaver...[picking up paragraph six, retranslating]

Column two, paragraph two, last sentence...will stand firm.

T. Pupkevich, walking-excavator operator at the "Estonslanets" Association "Narvskiy" opencut mine and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet: The next elections are, in my opinion, a very important matter. After all, we have so far lost everything that could be lost. We have lost everything to demagogues with big promises. We must therefore at our enterprises and at a neighborhood level make very serious preparation for the new elections. There is only one way: Building a rule-of-law state and seeking to obtain everything by lawful means.

L. Tsybikzhapova, chairman...[picking up paragraph three, supplying passage]

Page 33, column two, paragraph three, last sentence reads...the decisive role.

How Are We To Make the Transition to the Market [subhead]

M. Gorbachev: Let's...[picking up paragraph eight, omitting passages]

Page 35, column one, paragraph one, last sentence reads...problems. Go ahead.

A. Kolpikova, operator...[picking up paragraph five, omitting passage]

Same paragraph, last sentence...for the child.

B. Kovalev, engine driver instructor at Novosibirsk-Glavnyy Station Engine Depot: Mikhail Sergeyevich, You and Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov were asked a question at the plenum.

Why have prices risen strongly? After all, there was talk just before it happened that would they increase two-threefold at most. Well, okay, luxury goods have gone up ten times. But the picture is the same with everyday necessities. Felt boots used to cost 15.60 rubles [R], but now cost R80-100. Is that a luxury item in Siberia?

By virtue of my job I meet with new people every day. When I return from the plenum, there will be a host of questions. I am convinced that I will again be immediately asked about prices and speculation.

A. Lukyanov: A law to combat speculation was passed. Very strict criminal accountability was introduced by the Supreme Soviet. The bases of criminal legislation were changed.

After that, as you know, the law was suspended and criminal accountability for speculation on the territory of Russia was abolished by the republic Supreme Soviet. And the explanation given was that speculation is, apparently, a normal activity for entrepreneurs.

As soon as we assemble in session at the Supreme Soviet, this question will be raised again. Comrades are proposing that an even stricter law to combat speculation and corruption be adopted.

V. Pavlov: I will return to the problems of prices on children's goods. Prices for the children's range are not fixed at Union level. All prices for light industry goods, including chidren's goods, are set in the republics. And a republic can therefore, of course, reverse the prices.

But that is not the whole problem. Some 8-10 years back representatives of light industry demanded that prices be raised, arguing that it was not profitable for them to make goods for children and the elderly. There was only one question: Whom to subsidize? There was a subsidy to industry of approximately R6 billion per annum. Now another variant has been chosen: The compensation is intended to enable every child to acquire clothing and footwear.

If the subsidy is not enough, it will be necessary to increase it or again give to the producers. But the main thing is finally to set the working of light industry to rights. It dies without raw materials.

I. Korniychuk, metal...[picking up paragraph seven, supplying passage]

Column two, paragraph four, sentence three reads...on horizontal ties.

M. Gorbachev: It...[picking up Page 36, Column one, paragraph three, omitting passage]

Column one, paragraph six, last sentence reads...in oil extraction.

M. Chekotovskiy, shop party bureau secretary and oxyacetylene torch operator at Tallinn's "Dvigatel" plant: We previously made reactors, but have now switched to trashcans and garden receptacles, and yet our workers are highly skilled.

Ye. Yarkin, leader of a team of shipfitters at Zelenodolsk's Plant Named for Gorkiy, Tatarstan: The defense industry accounts for more than 50 percent of industry in our city. And we never get an answer to how workers in defense enterprises are going to be protected.

Comrade Chekotovskiy is right. You have very highly skilled people working in defense industry enterprises. To train a shipfitter, say, takes at least five-seven years. At least. And now these highly skilled people are forced to go and work in small enterprises and cooperatives. But all this will have an impact on the country's defense. And then we will again be trying to catch up. Perhaps a law on defense enterprises is needed to afford people social protection.

A. Lukyanov: The conversion program... has proven too expensive. People thought, we will restructure production at once, this will require neither time nor money. But that does not happen. It is an illusion. The program is therefore currently being revised. Now for the law. Each time something goes wrong, it is invoked: The hygiene conditions are bad, bring in the law, conversion isn't working, bring in the law. It is necessary to get the program up and running, and then pass a law.

Economic Reasons Versus [subhead]...[picking up paragraph six, supplying passage]

Column two, paragraph five, sentence four reads...in Armenia and Moldova about how to...[subbing "Moldova" for "Moldavia"]

Column two, paragraph eight, penultimate sentence reads...Ukrainians, Belorussians, Poles—and each has links with their relations in other republics. Is all that-...[supplying phrase]

Column two, paragraph nine, penultimate sentence reads...a historic mistake.

What do we...[picking up paragraph ten, omitting sentence]

Page 37, column one, paragraph eight, sentence six reads...and republic budgets. In fact far more. Although each bank...[supplying sentence]

Page 38, column two, paragraph six, penultimate sentence reads...it any more.

From the audience...[picking up paragraph seven, omitting sentence]

Economic

Official on Need to Revamp Conversion

91UM0801A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Jul 91 Union Edition p 5

[Interview with USSR Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister V.P. Karpov; place and date not given: "Searching for the Optimal Variant of Conversion"]

[Text] **IZVESTIYA usually goes to V.P. Karpov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs in charge of disarmament, when some important stride has been taken in various arms reduction negotiations, or, conversely, when for some reason such a stride has been delayed. This time the subject of our conversation was conversion which, for quite comprehensible reasons, is close to the heart and interesting to the country's most experienced negotiator.**

[IZVESTIYA] Viktor Pavlovich, it is no secret that the recently started transition to a market economy has struck a painful blow to enterprises of the defense industry. This situation is not likely to be rectified as a result of the implementation of the conversion program recently adopted by the government. What, in your view, are the reasons for the problems that have arisen?

[Karpov] Perhaps the main reason for today's difficult situation with the defense industry is that, in the Soviet Union, it has always been a kind of isolated economic "enclave." As a result, in Soviet industry a sector has developed which is distinguished by a high scientific and technical level and production potential, which is not below the world level and in some ways surpasses it, but which at the same time functions as if for its own sake, according to its own laws.

To tell the truth, since the times of industrialization we have essentially never had a harmoniously developing economy; instead we have had one oriented primarily toward military needs, which has gobbled up not only a large, and also the best, part of the material resources, but also considerable scientific potential and the most skilled personnel of the country.

Of course, such an approach was justified at one time, if only because it enabled the country not only to get through but also to win the war against Hitler's Germany. But the colossal military-industrial complex we have created has turned out to be an extremely conservative, one might say, self-sufficient structure which reproduces itself. As a result, with the transition to peacetime, unlike our allies and our enemies in the war, we have never actually had a radical transfer of industry to a peacetime basis.

Therefore, it is not surprising that with the existing system of organization of military production, the result of "conversion" under the conditions of the still fairly timid steps toward the market has been merely a sharp increase in prices of civilian products produced in the military sector, a reduction of the standard of living of the most skilled stratum of Soviet workers, and the disintegration of existing production ties and large production systems.

[IZVESTIYA] Does this mean that the Soviet defense industry is incompatible with the market?

[Karpov] Unfortunately, many people think that this is precisely the case. Moreover, some people are inclined to see in the USSR military industry almost an enemy of perestroyka and market relations. Such views are superficial, to say the least. Being a concentration of our country's scientific, engineering, and working elite, the defense industry has truly colossal capabilities which could be transformed into the most valuable component of the Soviet market economy. Forced to compete as equals with the military-industrial complex of the West, the defense industry—essentially a preserve of the national economy—functioned, at least in so far as the competitiveness of its products was concerned, under the conditions of the world market. A fact remains a fact: Here is where we concentrated the forces which, in terms of their "total cost" undoubtedly met world standards. It is clear that to waste this potential would not only be extremely undesirable but, frankly, would verge on being criminal.

[IZVESTIYA] But does such a danger really exist?

[Karpov] Alas, yes. The problem is that conversion in the USSR was conceived and began to be implemented within the framework of the command administrative system. It was carried out from above, "on orders," through instructions. As a result, the output of civilian goods in military plants increased, not instead of, but along with the continuation of the production of military products at the same enterprises. And the main thing to be cut was not military production but the financing of military scientific research and experimental design work, which bled dry many nationally significant areas of scientific research.

[IZVESTIYA] But now the situation seems to be starting to change: After lengthy discussions, the separate measures have been brought together into an integrated government program for conversion. Does this give cause for optimism?

[Karpov] I do not think so. After all, this program was "imposed" by no means on the basis of concrete calculations of the defense branches and military plants, On the contrary, everything was done, as before, by the administrative superstructure of the military industrial complex, without glasnost or democratic oversight.

[IZVESTIYA] But is it only the ill will of the "generals from the military industrial complex" that is to blame here?

[Karpov] It is not only that. The fact is that on the world market one kilogram of weight of a modern combat fighter costs $2,000 and a kilogram of weight of a casserole costs $1.00. For the financial report it is clearly preferable to produce MiGs. And on the ultraexpensive technological lines of the military plants, producing a casserole is not advantageous from the standpoint of either the producer or the consumer. Obviously, even with the embryonic market that is making its way into our country, this kind of conversion is counterproductive and economically unsuccessful.

[IZVESTIYA] But where is the way out of the situation that has been created?

[Karpov] It obviously consists in offering enterprises of the defense complex economic independence, renewing of their production capital, and allowing them to enter the world market while preserving state subsidies for the most important scientific research.

[IZVESTIYA] Defense industry enterprises can hardly have any objection to that variant of conversion.

[Karpov] True, but then this question arises: Where are they to get the money? It would seem that the best variant of conversion of the Soviet defense industry would be the inclusion of its enormous economic, intellectual, and technical potential in large-scale international projects. This would make it possible not only to effectively restructure the mechanism for the functioning of the defense branches under the conditions of the country's transition to market relations, but also to find a worthy place for them in international economic division of labor.

The transformation of the defense industry during the course of the implementation of large-scale international projects of a national and global scale is apparently the key to the optimal—and, moreover, the only possible—conversion under the conditions of the growing economic integration and economic interdependence of the modern world. This is probably the only path on which the Soviet defense industry can find a truly worthy place in international economic division of labor.

[IZVESTIYA] And what does the West have to say about that?

[Karpov] Obviously, such an approach would correspond to the interests of the West, and not only in terms of purely economic considerations but also because it would create certain guarantees of the irreversibility of disarmament and the stability of the democratic reforms in the USSR.

Now, as we know, there are no large obstacles on the path to the establishment of direct contacts with Western partners with the goal of arranging constructive cooperation. But in this stage these efforts are fragmented and

frequently simply unprofessional. As a result, the new organizations that have been and are being created frequently duplicate one another, entering into a kind of unhealthy competition, which disorients Western firms and undermines their confidence in the reliability and competence of their Soviet partners.

Obviously, the time is coming when all these efforts will have to be coordinated. Taking general national significance into account, this work should be coordinated by a single government organ. Providing for the immediate adoption of necessary political decisions, such an organ would be for Western firms a reliable guarantee of the fulfillment of the commitments made by the Soviet partners.

At the same time practice has quite clearly shown that in order to make the work of conversion more flexible and effective it is preferable to establish direct contacts with the Western world at the nongovernmental level, say, within the framework of an independent fund that unites interested enterprises.

[IZVESTIYA] Here it is appropriate to recall that Russian Finance Minister Count S.Yu. Vitte, who at one time tried to conduct analogous measures—convertibility of the ruble, attraction of foreign capital, the inclusion of Russia in world economic ties—was accused of "selling out Russia."

[Karpov] Of course, you can accuse people of whatever you want to even now. But it is simply ridiculous to argue with such maxims. Did the United States lose its independence when it became the largest importer of capital in the world? Incidentally, during the period of the industrial upsurge of 1909-1913 Russia, too, achieved unprecedented success through attracting foreign capital and using it efficiently in national interests.

Of course, now we are not talking about our national property being auctioned off.

After all, it is one thing to sell a Soviet plant, as they say, "lock, stock, and barrel" to a Western firm at the commercial exchange rate of the ruble. In this case a plant valued at, say, 300 billion rubles [R] would be sold for some $10 billion. But the real market price of this plant is by no means $10 billion but $300 billion! Defense and the "wooden" ruble are far from the same thing.

When "splicing" the potential of the defense branch and its technological possibilities onto the Western industrial potential and participating in joint projects, we are equal partners. At the same time, the defense branch, receiving large injections in the form of Western capital investments, would begin to function far more effectively. And it would no longer be working for war but for the development of the national and world economies.

This would probably make it possible to begin more rapidly the construction of a truly unified world economic space which would be a truly reliable guarantee against wars and military conflicts. Their probability would simply decline as it declined, for example, in relations between Belgium and the Netherlands.

[IZVESTIYA] It is hardly necessary to prove the fact that it is practically impossible to arrange cooperation with foreign partners without giving them objective and fairly complete information about our defense industry, our labor and material resources, and the effectiveness of production and conversion plans.

[Karpov] Quite right. The lack or incompleteness of this information impedes the implementation of concrete international measures in the area of conversion. For example, we do not know now any more than we did before either about the number of workers employed in military production or their geographic distribution or the technical capabilities of individual enterprises or production indicators.

In other countries much more detailed figures are published about the military economy and, as a rule, there are special laws concerning it. Because of this, extremely delicate problems concerning conversion are discussed openly, and anyone who wishes to can gain a fairly complete idea of what they are.

What kind of market, free trade, or foreign investments in conversion can there be when, until recently, our businessmen and certainly foreign ones not only were unable to start business but could not even freely visit certain parts of the USSR without the appropriate permission!

[IZVESTIYA] Is this not why large concerns in the West are still just looking at the potentially immense market in the USSR?

[Karpov] I think that is the reason. For they have just sent ahead the "light cavalry" consisting primarily of partners in our joint ventures that are still small.

Another difficulty which stands on the path to the integration of our defense industry into the world economic system is that the construction of the Soviet economy, which is primarily a military one, according to the planning-command principle has led to a distortion of the real picture of prices, expenditures, and the effectiveness of production. Prices of metal and raw material set God knows when, the cost of material and human resources, and expenditures on ecology were seriously miscalculated at one time. The prices of our combat equipment have not yet been disclosed and the real costs of its production remain a secret. Under these conditions it is impossible to make scientifically substantiated calculations of the economic effectiveness of conversion.

[IZVESTIYA] In all probability the defense industry will be going through some very hard times.

[Karpov] Undoubtedly. For previously it was living under hothouse conditions when it allowed itself to be

the most cost-oriented of all the cost-oriented branches and had the best personnel, resources, and intellect.

But now the defense sector will have to become a constituent part of the economy, and the economy, in turn, will be raised to the level where military orders can be distributed amongst the broadest group of enterprises. The time has come to begin a detailed discussion of the elements of market relations in a military economy, leasing, and even the arms market. The transition to economic management methods in relations between defense enterprises and the central organs of the Ministry of Defense is inevitable. But this is feasible only under the condition of broad application of a system of orders for the creation of arms and military equipment on a competitive basis.

As the economic reform develops, the enterprises subject to conversion will in all probability be removed from the defense complex as it is understood now (whether through their sale to other enterprises and associations or by some other means) and acquire independence. Otherwise belonging to the defense complex could change from a plus to a minus in the near future. That this is possible is shown by the experience of military and industrial complexes in countries of the West. Numerous investigations show that in terms of all indicators of effectiveness (labor productivity, output-capital ratio, material-intensiveness) military enterprises fall considerably short of the mark of their civilian counterparts.

In conclusion, I would like to say that there are possibilities of the survival of the Soviet defense industry under the conditions of the market. The main thing is to realize these possibilities not only on the scale of the state but also on the scale of the entire world economy.

But decisive and effective conversion of the defense industry requires above all a "conversion consciousness," the surmounting of remn... [remnants of the past] stereotypes, and ideological superimpositions.

Military

Yazov Reportedly Wants Draft Deferments Abolished

PM0408133591 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Aug 91 p 1

[Report from RIA, IMA-PRESS, URAL-AKTSEPT, TASS column: "Away With the Parliament?"]

[Text] According to reports from the Committee for Public Education, USSR Defense Minister D. Yazov has submitted an official memorandum to USSR President M. Gorbachev suggesting that daytime students be drafted into the Army this fall. There are serious fears that the abolition of the "deferment" will be adopted bypassing parliament.

Residents Near Semipalatinsk Offered Compensation

LD0408163391 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1400 GMT 04 Jul 91

[Text] The Defense Ministry has offered 5 billion rubles to residents of rayons bordering the Semipalatinsk testing ground in compensation for three nuclear tests of over 20 kilotons scheduled there. The Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet decided to hold a referendum on this issue among the local population in August.

Suleymenov, President of the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" movement, called upon the future participants to vote against the issue at the referendum. Five billion rubles is a sufficiently big sum for our country, and I would like to dwell on this information a bit further. Where is the Defesne Ministry going to get the 5 billion rubles? They can hardly be obtained as a result of an unplanned privatization of generals' summer houses. As a matter of fact, when the budget of the Defense Ministry for this year was being ratified at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, all its main articles were revealed for the first time. And no such article, mentioning a sum of 5 billion, was mentioned there.

Shell Falls on Aktyubinsk Steppe; Not Radioactive

PM0608100591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Aug 91 First Edition p 1

[By G. Loriya: "What Fell Into Steppe?"]

[Text] Aktyubinsk—A metal object fell, which was evidently of impressive speed and dimension, creating a crater two meters deep and nearly four meters in diameter.

Fortunately, there were no casualties since the shell—and that is what it is presumed to have been—fell in an uninhabited part of the steppe, having for some reason changed its trajectory.

The local military prosecutor's office did not succeed in establishing the provenance of the "unexpected guest."

So far all that is reliably known is that the gift "from the skies" (was it from the skies?) is not radioactive.

Expedition To Examine Sunken Nuclear Submarine

LD0608144991 Moscow TASS in English 1405 GMT 6 Aug 91

[By correspondent Valeriy Biryukov]

[Text] Kaliningrad August 6 TASS—The Soviet Navy and the Institute of Oceanology of the Soviet Academy of Sciences plans an expedition to monitor the radioactive and hydrologic situation near the Medvezhiy Island in the Norwegian Sea, where the Soviet nuclear-powered submarine Komsomolets sank two years ago.

The expedition will work on board the Soviet ship Akademik Mstislav Keldysh equipped with modern deep-sea manned laboratories. It is expected to leave Kaliningrad on August 11.

During the 40-day expedition, specialists will examine the submarine on the bottom of the Norwegian Sea and work on possible ways to lift the submarine from a depth of 1,685 meters in 1993.

Surkov Address on Party Committee Plenum

PM0608092191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Aug 91 Second Edition p 1

[Report from PRAVDA, TASS, INTERFAX roundup: "Second Plenum of All-Army Party Committee"]

[Text] The Second Plenum of the All-Army Party Committee, which discussed questions of the ideological and organizational strengthening of party ranks in the USSR Armed Forces CPSU organization, was held yesterday in Moscow. Lieutenant General M.S. Surkov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and secretary of the All-Army Party Committee, held a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists on this subject at the M.V. Frunze Central House of the Soviet Army.

U.S. Group Visits Liepaja Naval Base in Latvia

LD0508203891 Moscow All-Union radio Mayak Network in Russian 1900 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] For the first time in many years a group of U.S. military men headed by Admiral Kaufman have visited Liepaja, until recently a closed Latvian town. According to information from the NOVOSTI agency they were able to visit the Soviet naval base, view military equipment and see how the sailors live. At the end of August the Americans in Liepaja will begin to make a documentary film about the life of the Soviet submarine fleet.

Admiral Favors Resumption of Student Call-Up

LD0508153391 Moscow TASS in English 1519 GMT 5 Aug 91

[By UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent Mikhail Stetsyuk]

[Text] Sevastopol, the Crimea August 5 TASS—The plan for the callup to the military service is not fulfilled in some republics and crews of naval ships are understaffed, commander of the Black Sea Fleet Admiral Mikhail Khronopulo said in an interview with FLAG RODINY, the newspaper of the fleet.

He suggested that at the forthcoming autumn session the country's parliament should discuss the resumption of student callup to the military service in order to restore social justice and strictly adhere to the law of the USSR on the compulsory military service.

Bush Grants MFN Status to Baltic Republics

LD0308152391 Moscow TASS in English 1455 GMT 3 Aug 91

[Text] Washington August 3 TASS—U.S. President George Bush ordered on Friday the granting of the Most Favoured Nation [MFN] status to the Baltic republics of the Soviet Union, the AP news agency reports.

According to White House spokesman Gary Foster, a separate instruction on the granting of the MFN status to the three republics, aside from a similar instruction concerning the Soviet Union, was needed because the U.S. "does not recognise the invasion of those three republics by the Soviet Union in 1940."

Estonia

Republic Delegation Departs for Talks in Moscow

LD0608095591 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 6 Aug 91

[Text] A group of experts of the Estonian delegation which is holding negotiations with the Soviet Union left Tallinn for Moscow yesterday. The group is headed by Indrek Toome, member of the delegation and specialist in economics. Today, the group of Estonian experts are to meet a group of experts of the Soviet Union.

The meeting of the Estonian and the USSR delegations which was due to take place today has been postponed because, allegedly, Laverov, Head of the Soviet delegation, has not yet returned to work.

In the telegram sent to the Soviet negotiation team, the Estonians requested an explanation of the reasons for the meeting date being dragged out.

Further on Talks in Moscow

OW0608110891 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1030 GMT 6 Aug 91

[Text] Groups of experts are meeting in Moscow on August 6 within the framework of the Soviet-Estonian talks.

BF [BALTFAX] has been informed by the Estonian radio news service that the meeting will focus on historical and legal foundations of the relations between the USSR and Estonia.

The Estonian delegation headed by Mr. Indrek Toome arrived in Moscow on August 5.

Government, Bank Dispute Ruble Exchange Rate

PM0408142991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Aug 91 Union Edition p 2

["Direct Line" report by Leonid Levitskiy: "Bank of Estonia Defends Economic Managers"]

[Text] Tallinn—The press published a report saying that the Bank of Estonia has devalued the ruble—changing its rate of exchange against the dollar. The report proved premature.

"The press clearly distorted our aims and exaggerated our capabilities," Elmar Matt, director of the Bank of Estonia, said. "We only wanted to protect enterprises engaged in foreign economic activity from requisitions..."

Let me explain briefly. Every organization with profits in foreign currency is obliged to sell 20 percent of this foreign currency to a special republic fund. Admittedly, "selling" is hardly an appropriate concept in this case. The valuation of the dollar is extremely low, although the official rate of 1.83 rubles [R] to the dollar is used. The same Bank of Estonia buys dollars from the population for R32-33. At a recent auction a dollar was worth R75; that is the enforced sale of foreign currency constitutes a legalized master key to enterprises' safes.

The Council of the Bank of Estonia tried to defend the owners of foreign currency—it decided to buy the mandatory appropriations at their real market value. As bank director E. Matt said, the decision is quite lawful, but the government hardly shares that view. Finance Minister Rein Miller said in an interview with ETA:

"I don't approve of this suggestion. After all, we would have to give enterprises 15-20 times more rubles, of which they have so many. That would cost the Estonian budget R40 million. There is not that much in the government reserves."

The bank's director was surprised at this comment:

"If the government intends to carry on handing out foreign currency right and left at its own discretion, then of course money will have to be paid out of the budget. But if economic laws gain the upper hand, the problem will disappear on its own. The main thing is that foreign economic activity is increasing."

Economic managers are impatiently looking forward to the day when the dispute between the banks and the government comes to an end.

Draft Deadline Extended Because of Poor Response

PM0408133191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jul 91 First Edition p 2

[Captain Third Rank V. Maryukha report: "Draft Continues"]

[Text] Tallinn—Due to the nonfulfillment of the plan for drafting people for active military service in Estonia, it has been decided to defer the date of the end of the spring-summer draft to 25 August.

"As of 26 July, just 32.2 percent of young men of draft age had been drafted," Colonel B. Kuznetsov, chief of the republic military commissariat military-political

department, told the editorial office over the telephone. "Of these 65 are Estonians, which represents just 7.4 percent of the young Estonians subject to the draft."

But there are no problems with drafting people for alternative service in Estonia. Departments guarding the region's border operate autonomously of military commissariats when staffing their subunits, but, unlike the latter, they are getting palpable assistance from district elders and republic government bodies. Suffice it to say that men drafted for alternative service are in line for all kinds of allowances and payment of minimum monetary remuneration of 125 rubles. That is several times in excess of drafted servicemen's pay.

Nevertheless, the local authorities are not entering into overt confrontation with troop subunits but are, on the contrary, trying to smooth out conflict situations. Thus, for instance, joint street patrols involving police and details from Soviet Army subunits stationed in the city have been instituted in Tallinn by decision of the city authorities.

Latvia

U.S. Consul Officials Meet Latvian Chairman

LD0508223691 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1730 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] The Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia today there was a meeting of the new U.S. Consul General in Leningrad, Jack Gosnell, and the U.S. Consul in Leningrad, (George Krol), and Anatolijs Gorbunovs, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Council. The U.S. Consul General confirmed during the meeting that part of the funds included in the United States' aid program to the Soviet Union will be channeled directly to the Baltic states.

Jack Gosnell mentioned one of the most important tasks in taking up his post as seeking those spheres at cooperation that will promote the interests of both the United States and the Baltic States. In the view of the consul general, such spheres might include education and business, and everything connected with business development.

Anatolijs Gorbunovs accepted during the meeting that it will be very important to develop unhampered economic links with the expanded structure in Latvia; for example, with the anticipated U.S. trade center, which will promote mutually beneficial cooperation and solve cultural problems as well.

More on Meeting With U.S. Envoys

OW0608115691 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1030 GMT 6 Aug 91

[Text] U.S. Consul General in Leningrad Mr. Jack Gosnell and Consul Mr. George Krol who are on a regular visit to Riga met on August 5 the head of the Latvian Parliament, Mr. Anatolijs Gorbunovs, and the republic's foreign and economics ministers, Mr. Janis Jurkans and Janis Aboltins respectively.

BF [BALTFAX] has been informed by the Latvian Foreign Ministry press service that the U.S. visitors briefed the Latvian leaders on plans of cooperation between the U.S. Consulate and Latvia and discussed technical aspects of their implementation.

Economics Minister Attends USSR Cabinet Meeting

LD0508225291 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1730 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] The press office at the Ministry of Economics informs us that Latvian Minister of Economics Jabis Aboltins took part in a meeting of the USSR Cabinet led by President Mikhail Gorbachev. Four questions were discussed: the production prognosis for agriculture for 1991 and the provision of food to residents; the fuel supply to the economy; the stabilization of finance and the money supply; and the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers on the organizational measures for implementing the plan for socioeconomic development in 1992 while forming the market economy. The economic situation in the Soviet Union is quite complex, characterized by a gigantic budget deficit and rapid inflation. As Janis Aboltins noted, in this context the Latvian economic situation, with the stabilization of the budget from negative money (?flow), is to be seen as more favorable. Janis Aboltins thinks that in the future there must be active economic talks with the structures of the USSR, and with Russia, as our biggest partner and source of raw materials. The result of the talks must be an agreement on price policy and a system of accounting. In Moscow Janis Aboltins also met British Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman Lamont, who was interested in the economic problems of the Baltics and Latvia.

More on Meeting With Soviet Cabinet

OW0508231291 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1900 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] As BF's [BALTFAX] reporter has learned at the press center of Latvia's Ministry of the Economy, Mr. Janis Aboltins, the republic's Economy Minister, attended on August 3 an enlarged session of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers that involved representatives of all the sovereign republics but Lithuania. The session discussed, among other things, this year's likely produce yield and ways of stabilizing finances.

According to the press center, the Latvian minister found the Soviet Union's economic situation to be very complicated as a result of the huge budget deficit and mounting inflation. He praised his republic's budget stability and negative monetary emission as a favorable contrast.

Mr. Aboltins said the Latvian Government was planning, as a matter of priority, active talks with the USSR and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] as the biggest raw material suppliers, with a view to concluding an agreement on a single pricing policy and a mutually acceptable system of payments.

Ivans Connects Border Killings to Kremlin

LD0508205391 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1730 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] After the Latvian delegation returned from Lithuania, where it took part in the funeral ceremony for those who perished at the Medininkai border post, the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council Dainis Ivans, and Janis Dinevics, chairman of the people's front faction, today met journalists.

Regardless of what organization is to take responsibility for this crime, there is no doubt that it is linked to the Kremlin, Dainis Ivans emphasized, because the signature is too familiar. An examination of the border post determined that the attack was well organized, and testifies to professionalism. It was sudden and organized with the idea that those who were shot at would not get up again. Nevertheless, it is possible that one of the customs men may be saved by doctors, though there is no 100 percent guarantee of that. This action, Dainis Ivans said, has dispelled any illusions that the Kremlin and its repressive structures are content with the idea of having to lose their legal position in the Baltics.

More on Ivans Comments on Attack

OW0508231391 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1900 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Mr. Dainis Ivans, First Deputy President of Latvia's Supreme Council, told a news conference in Riga on Monday that "the events at the customs checkpoint at Medininkai (at the border with Belorussia) dispelled the illusory hopes that the Soviets would voluntarily surrender power to the Lithuanian Republic."

As we have already reported, an attack on the Lithuanian checkpoint on the night of July 30 resulted in the death of 7 policemen and custom officers. One more is in hospital in bad condition.

According to Mr. Ivans, "Lithuania is now facing a serious problem: whether to continue its talks with Moscow at all." He said Lithuania would be urging the USSR to withdraw the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] and interior troops from the republic's territory, and to surrender the occupied radio and TV stations. Latvia should insist on the withdrawal of such Soviet structures from its own territory, too, Ivans said.

Police Role To Be Discussed With Ministry

OW0508231491 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1900 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Latvia's Interior Minister Alois Vaznis is leaving for Moscow on August 6 for talks with senior USSR Interior Ministry officials. The further presence of special police in Latvia will be discussed.

A conference at the office of the republican Vice Premier Ilmars Bisers on August 2 discussed proposals from the USSR Interior Minister Boris Pugo for the activity of the Latvian special police force. Bisers has told BF [BALTFAX] that the Latvian side disagreed with those proposals. Bisers briefed Pugo on Latvia's position by telephone on August 2. The USSR Interior Minister said that he was about to leave on vacation and that further talks would be conducted by his deputies.

From unofficial sources BF has learned that Pugo suggested making the Latvian special police force subordinate to the Latvian Interior Ministry.

More on Meeting With Interior Ministry

OW0508142991 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1405 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] In an interview with BF [BALTFAX] Chairman of the Latvian parliamentary commission for defense and internal affairs Talavs Jundzis said that the republic's leadership is to meet with the USSR Interior Ministry representatives this week.

The meeting is expected to focus on the fate of the Riga OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] and on arms supplies to the Latvian police.

Mr. Jundzis said the Latvian Government demands that OMON units be withdrawn from the Latvian territory or disbanded.

Disbanded Assault Troops Organize 'Pogrom'

LD0308144391 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1350 GMT 3 Aug 91

[Text] Yesterday disbanded assault troops, 120 people, first celebrated their day in Riga, and then moved to Jurmala. The OMON [special purpose milita detachments] took part as well. The disbanded assault troops organized a genuine pogrom. They drank vodka in the parks, and then on Jomas Street [town's main street] in the town of Jurmala they broke into catering establishments, and organized a genuine pogrom. The militia, which was mobilized, arrested some. One received a firearm wound. Nine people in all were arrested, of whom two were OMON men. But the arrested OMON men had to be released, as the OMON came to Jurmala to rescue them, and threatened the head of the Jurmala militia.

More on Paratroopers' Actions

OW0508035491 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1300 GMT 3 Aug 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On August 2, the Day of Airborne Forces, nearly 120 drunk demobilized paratroopers committed acts of hooliganism at the central square of the town of Jomas in Yurmala. They beat several passers-by and turned over a cab. The police soon restored the order.

Republic Protests OMON Activities

OW0508231591 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1900 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] BF's [BALTFAX] correspondent reports with reference to the information service of the Council of Ministers and the press center of the Interior Ministry of the Latvian Republic that Interior Minister Alois Vaznis sent the USSR Interior Ministry on Saturday a message of protest containing a detailed description of the week-end's incidents involving OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment]. The message mentioned the detention and checking of ambulances and a threatening call to a secretary of the republic's Prime Minister from the OMON base at about 1 p.m. on August 2 (the call was registered automatically).

Mr. Vaznis' message described at length the unrest in Jurmala on Paratroopers' Day (August 2), when nearly 120 ex-paratroopers had crashed windows and beaten passers-by until the police interfered.

"Among the 9 persons detained were 2 OMON militants (in plain clothes and without weapons or identification cards)," the message said. "Late Friday night a group of OMON servicemen arrived in Jurmala from Riga to free their colleagues. The 2 detained OMON men were released in order to avoid bloodshed," the Latvian Interior Minister wrote.

Shots Fired at Black Beret Base in Republic

OW0508040791 Moscow BALTFAX in English 0930 GMT 2 Aug 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] BF [BALTFAX] has been informed by the group coordinating the actions of the Black Berets of Riga and Vilnius, that at 11 p.m. on Thursday fire was opened from a passing ambulance at the base of the Riga Black Berets. No one was hurt. A spokesman for the press service of the Latvian Interior Ministry did not confirm the report in a telephone conversation with BF's correspondent.

Republic Interior Ministry Academy Opened

OW0508050591 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1900 GMT 2 Aug 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Studies began on August 2 for 400 cadets of the Latvian Interior Ministry Academy. During one month they will be taught the professional skills of policemen.

At its recent meeting the Presidium of the Latvian Supreme Council passed a resolution establishing new police ranks: rank and file policeman, corporal, sergeant, senior sergeant, vice-officer, lieutenant, senior lieutenant, captain, major lieutenant-colonel, colonel and general. The resolution says the post of Interior Minister can be occupied by a civilian or "a man with a rank."

Government Set To Increase Alcohol Prices

PM0508152091 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jul 91 Union Edition p 1

[IAN report from news agencies roundup: "Alcohol Prices Go Up in Latvia"]

[Text] The Latvian Council of Ministers has adopted a decision to ban commercial trade in alcoholic beverages, withdraw coupons for them, and raise their prices on average by 50 percent. A bottle of vodka will in future cost 20-24 rubles, IAN reports. The reason for the price rise is the significant rise in the cost of alcohol as a raw material.

Lithuania

Landsbergis Asks Gorbachev To Withdraw OMON

OW0608112291 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1030 GMT 6 Aug91

[Text] Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Parliament, has sent a telegram to President Gorbachev once more calling on the Union Government to do everything possible to withdraw special police units (OMON) [special purpose militia detachment] from the republic's territory.

He pointed out in his message that "the escalation of a dirty war against the Lithuanian Republic has experienced a sharp increase," citing the killing of seven Lithuanian customs officials and policemen in Medininkai on the border with Belorussia in the night of July 31.

Mr. Landsbergis stressed also the need for an immediate one-on- one meeting between the Soviet and Lithuanian leaders. "Terrorists will keep on killing, and events may become unpredictable..." the telegram says.

He expressed his concern that the buildings of the Lithuanian radio and television as well as other facilities continue to be kept by the military. Mr. Landsbergis

informed in this connection that the building housing the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences' Institute of History archive and at present occupied by an interior troops unit was on fire on August 4.

Further on Appeal to Gorbachev

LD0508202791 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] Today, Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, sent a telegram to USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev. It says: Mr. President, we do not have much time. The Special Purpose Militia Detachment [OMON] must be withdrawn without delay and we must meet. The terrorists will continue to kill and events will be unpredictable. I cannot believe this is what you want.

Landsbergis Addresses Public on Killings

LD0508130191

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian at 1300 GMT on 4 August carried an 18-minute recorded address to the Lithuanian people by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council. The announcer notes that the address is a rebroadcast from Lithuanian Television at 1140 GMT on 4 August.

Landsbergis begins:

"Esteemed citizens of Lithuania. Once again, seven men have been murdered at their posts, while carrying out their duty—they were officials of Lithuania. They rest on a white, sandy hill [words indistinct] escorted and mourned by Lithuania itself.

"They shall remain clean, even though the men fell in a dirty Soviet war against Lithuania.

"Since January of this year we have perceived the total character of this war unfolding before us, marked by killings of unarmed residents, propaganda [words indistinct] and various lies prepared for almost everyone, not only for the subtle Western diplomat agonizing in his heart, so that it would not be necessary to condemn Mr. Gorbachev and not to [passage indistinct].

"The Soviet total war is the same as the Nazi one—violence and falsehood—without any limit. No one has been made accountable yet for the January killings—we have only heard about the awards."

In an indistinct passage Landsbergis alludes to conclusions reached by the USSR general procurator.

He goes on:

"The multitude of attestations and testimonies from witnesses of different countries only allows the conclusions to be drawn from them that the special KGB murderers are innocent, in which case the Soviet general procurator would obligingly concur with this. It is a law-based state with the law of the general, the CPSU, and the KGB."

Landsbergis continues: "Prisoners with their hands raised have been killed. In their rampages to date, the special troops perhaps have even gotten our men accustomed to a view—a rule, as it were—of surrender; you will then be humiliated and robbed; however, you will stay alive. Now, however, other rules come to light."

He adds: "According to the methods of fascism of all colors, those who do not resist are shot in the head."

In a mostly indistinct passage, Landsbergis notes that the killing of prisoners is clearly condemned and severely punished elsewhere in the world. He observes that these murderers have been invited by the West into the common European home.

Landsbergis observes that if Lithuania happens to undergo a basic change, it will not happen as a result of a Kremlin directive, but rather through the will of Russia, Ukraine, and other nations' democratic moves. He further points out that Lithuania is especially hated since it has set an example.

Landsbergis goes on to note remarks uttered by President Bush, referring to the Baltic situation as the darkest vestiges of World War II, and noting a way can be found by people of good will to find freedom for the Baltic countries. He observes that Western policy is already assuming a more concrete form toward the Baltics. However, Lithuania has received this latest "bloody reply."

Landsbergis refers to the fact that President Bush had to face an "unexpected question" regarding the Medininkai incident and repeated Gorbachev's words, concerning "a border incident," mentioning "Lithuania and Belorussia and not a word about the well-known Soviet policy of violence."

Next, Landsbergis cites what he calls accurate appraisals of the crime by Boris Yeltsin and the Bundestag statements. He also details some of the protest declarations issued by some states, regarding the killings.

Next, Landsbergis alludes to the demand for withdrawal of foreign troops from Lithuania, signed by 1.5 million Lithuanians in the summer of 1989. He notes this is one actual demand that has no connection with affection or the lack of it toward the "generals and admirals who threaten us." He says: "If you want us to feel affection toward you, remove the special units first of all."

Landsbergis mentions the January events and goes on to note that the Medininkai incident is being portrayed as "some sort of border confrontation with Belorussia. TASS also has reported great tension in Lithuania, while Burokevicius has even alluded to civil war."

He points out: "The KGB in Lithuania is not accusing the Lithuanian Republic of anything, since it wishes to shake off the poisonous circumstances."

Landsbergis notes that there are no plots or crimes in existence against Russians. However, the work of provocateurs, of the "Lithuania for the Lithuanians" variety, perhaps could begin disturbing even normal people.

Next, Landsbergis mentions the Lithuanian-Russian agreement and refers to Lithuanian brothers of all nationalities, noting the existence of an enemy who is known. He contrasts the lies, deceits, and murders as practiced by the "enemy," to the openness of Lithuanians.

He points to the various instances of small discontents that could be present within and between groups or departments, even in the Supreme Council or the government, that could be exploited by the adversaries. He stresses the virtues of friendly persuasiveness and the ability of explaining matters to those who have been misled.

Landsbergis concludes his speech by noting that the new graves have placed an extraordinary responsibility for Lithuania upon those who survive them.

Police Chief Reports on Medininkai Inquiry

OW0608114591 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1030 GMT 6 Aug 91

[Text] Commissioner General of the Lithuanian Interior Ministry criminal police department Mr. Alvidas Sadeckas has said in an interview to the daily "RESPUBLIKA" preliminary results of ballistic tests prove that customs officials at Medininkai were killed not by one but by several people.

"Shots had been fired from several AKM automatic rifles, and a policeman in the car had been fired at from a pistol" Mr. Sadeckas said.

He said investigators were trying to ask questions of the only surviving witness, Mr. Tomas Shiarnas, who is presently in a Kaunas hospital. However, being in critical condition, he was unable to give specific answers to all questions.

"I'd like to note that our specialists cooperate closely with specialists from the Moscow Interior Ministry's chief department of criminal investigation," Mr. Sadeckas said. He added the Moscow investigators, at the request of the Lithuanians, "began work in the Vilnius OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] unit".

More on Republic KGB's Denial of Involvement

OW0508214591 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1615 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] In an interview with BF [BALTFAX] a spokesman for the Lithuanian KGB A. Ruksenas said that it "categorically denies" any involvement in the incident at the Lithuanian customs post Medininkai.

As A. Ruksenas put it, "dishonorable representatives of certain political forces in Lithuania seek to use this tragic event to suit their own improper political aims." Though investigation is not finished, they already put the blame on USSR Interior Ministry, the KGB and the Soviet Army. Mr. Ruksenas explained such accusations with "an intention to further aggravate the situation in Lithuania."

Mr. Ruksenas said that after the republic's leadership asked the Lithuanian KGB for help in investigating the crime, it assigned its department on combat against organized crime to invesigation.

District Military Council Denies Involvement

LD0508161391 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak in Russian 1530 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] The military council of the Baltic Military District claimed total noninvolvement of Army structures in the criminal action committed at the customs post near the Lithuanian village of Medininkai. The military council expressed its condolences to the families of the innocent victims. At the same time the statement contains the protest against attempts by Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, to place yet again the responsibility for what happened on the USSR Armed Forces and the Interior Ministry. The military council has sent a telegram to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and the government informing them of its readiness to use all means at its disposal to assist with the investigation of the crime.

Report Notes 'Intesified' Soviet Troop Activity

LD0608104891 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 6 Aug 91

[Vytas Usas report from the Supreme Council studio on a news briefing by Supreme Council spokeswoman Rita Dapkute in Vilnius on 6 August]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] According to information provided by the country's defense department, during the last 24 hours the activity of some units of the Soviet military forces in Lithuania has intensified, especially paratroop forces in Kazlu Ruda and Kaunas.

Burokevicius Demands Landsbergis End 'Badgering'

OW0508143291 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1405 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] Chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council Vytautas Landsbergis has received a letter from the First Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Mykolas Burokevicius. The letter says "blessed" by Vytautas Landsbergis, "Sajudis" has

launched a campaign of "badgering Lithuanian Communists loyal to its people while groundlessly accusing them of being involved in the July 31 tragedy."

Mr. Burokevicius is convinced that it was a planned action aimed at "distracting people's attention from the sociopolitical crisis in Lithuania and hitting at the Communist Party."

He demands that "the campaign of insulting innocent people be stopped and an all-out effort to detain the criminals be made."

Misiukonis Considering Government's Propositions

OW0508075791 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1400 GMT 2 Aug 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Former Minister of Internal Affairs for Lithuania M. Misiukonis announced in an interview with the newspaper "TIESA" that he had received several propositions from the government for further work and now intended "to seriously think them over".

As "BALTFAX" has already announced the Lithuanian Government agreed to M. Misiukonis' resignation on July 31.

Earlier the Lithuanian PM, G. Vagnorius, obtained Parliament's permission to replace M. Misiukonis and named for the post either himself or one of the deputies at the ministry.

As a result M. Misiukonis, who took the post in autumn 1988, resigned and his deputy, P. Lubertas, was temporarily given the duties of Minister of Internal Affairs.

Text of Lithuanian-Russian Treaty Broadcast

LD0208213391 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1100 GMT 30 Jul 91

["Treaty between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] on the fundamentals of interstate relations"]

[Text] The Republic of Lithuania and the RSFSR, hereafter called the high contracting parties, putting to the past the events and actions that have been preventing each high contracting party from completely and freely implementing its state sovereignty; being convinced that after the Soviet Union's removal of the consequences of the 1940 annexation violating Lithuania's sovereignty, additional conditions have been created for mutual trust between the high contracting parties and their nations; deciding to create interstate relations for the benefit of their peoples on the principles of friendship, good-neighborliness, equality, and mutual benefit in accordance with the universally acknowledged norms of international law; confirming their loyalty to the aims and principles of the UN Charter and the documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and proclaiming their determination to adhere to the internal norms of human rights, agreed:

Article 1. The high contracting parties recognize each other as fully-fledged subjects of international law and sovereign states in accordance with their state status consolidated in the basic acts adopted by the Republic of Lithuania on 11 March 1990 and by the RSFSR on 12 June 1990. Each high contracting party recognizes the inalienable right of the other high contracting party to state independence, and completeness of the legislative, executive, and juridical power of the other contracting party on its territory.

The high contracting parties pledge themselves not to use force or the threat of force in their mutual relations; not to interfere in the internal affairs of each other; to respect sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the inviolability of borders according to the principles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The high contracting parties pledge themselves in their mutual relations to adhere conscientiously to the universally acknowledged principles and norms of international law and not to contribute to their violation by third parties with regard to one of the high contracting parties.

Article 2. The high contracting parties acknowledge each other's right to independently implement its sovereignty in the spheres of defense and security in the norms acceptable to them, by contributing to the process of disarmament and lessening of tension in Europe and also through the system of collective security, and [words indistinct] forms will be defined in a separate agreement.

Article 3. The high contracting parties prohibit by law and bar the way on their territories to the formation and operation of organizations and groups and also the activity of persons striving by force to destroy independence, sovereign statehood, and territorial integrity and to seize power by force of another contracting party. The high contracting parties will cooperate in the struggle against organized and international crime.

Article 4. The high contracting parties guarantee to their citizens—irrespective of their nationality or other differences—equal rights and freedoms.

The Republic of Lithuania guarantees the right to persons entitled to RSFSR citizenship and who by 3 November 1989 have been permanently residing and are residing on the territory of Lithuania and have permanent employment in the Republic of Lithuania or other legal means of subsistence, of their own free will and in accordance of the laws of the Republic of Lithuania, to acquire citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania without applying proof of the settled way of life, knowledge of the Lithuanian language, or any other conditions to grant citizenship, except those which are applied to all other persons.

The Republic of Lithuania guarantees the right to acquire citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania to persons who have the right to RSFSR citizenship and arrived in Lithuania since 3 November 1989 and until the day of the signing of this treaty, and who permanently reside in the Republic of Lithuania, have permanent employment in enterprises, institutions, or organizations of the Republic of Lithuania or other legal means of subsistence. These persons have the right to be granted citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania of their own free will and in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Lithuania. To these persons the requirements of proof of the settled way of life and knowledge of the Lithuanian language are not applied.

The RSFSR guarantees to persons who are citizens of the Republic of Lithuania or have the right to that citizenship and at the time of the signing of this treaty permanently reside on the territory of the RSFSR and have permanent place of employment or other legal means of subsistence there, the right of their own free will and in accordance with RSFSR laws to acquire citizenship of the RSFSR without applying to them any other conditions of citizenship except those applied to all other persons.

Persons mentioned in the third and fourth part of this article may freely express their will on acquiring citizenship of another contracting party up to the date defined in a separate agreement of the parties.

In cases when persons mentioned in the second, third, and fourth parts of this article—of their own free will and in accordance with the laws of the country where they reside and with the regulations of this article—do not acquire the citizenship of the country where they reside, they have the right to preserve or acquire citizenship of the other high contracting party according to the laws of the second high contracting party.

Article 5. Each high contracting party, according to the universally acknowledged principles and norms of international law, will define in its laws the rights and duties linked with the acquisition of citizenship of that country.

Each high contracting party guarantees to all persons mentioned in Article Four of this treaty residing on its territory—irrespective of their nationality—civic, political, social, economic, and cultural rights, and basic human freedoms in accordance with the universally acknowledged principles and norms of international law and of the laws of the country where they reside; and also to persons belonging to ethnic, religious, and language minorities the right together with other members of that group or with members of the officiallly registered community to make use of their culture, profess their religion and conduct its rites, and also use their native tongue.

Each high contracting party guarantees to citizens of the other high contracting party and to persons having the right to that citizenship temporarily residing on its territory, all human rights and basic freedoms recognized to such persons in accordance with the universally acknowledged principles and norms of international law and the laws of the country where they are present.

The high contracting parties, to the citizens of a high contracting party present on the territory of the other high contracting party, in accordance with the universally acknowledged norms of international law, guarantee the right to apply for legal, humanitarian, and other help to the authorized missions of their state.

Article 6. Recognizing the right of each high contracting party to pass its own immigration laws and pursue independent immigration policy, the high contracting parties will regulate issues arising in this sphere in accordance with the universally acknowledged principles and norms of international law and by concluding separate agreements.

Separate inter-governmental agreements will also regulate migration problems linked with employment.

The high contracting parties will define in all agreements to the citizens, migrating of their own will from the territory of one country to the territory of the other country, the order and conditions of migration, and also mutual pledges to render to them material and other aid.

Article 7. The high contracting parties recognize the necessity of cooperation and exchanges in culture, art, health service, education, science, information, technology, and other spheres.

Article 8. The high contracting parties find it expedient on equal bases to closely cooperate in the sphere of international relations.

Article 9. The high contracting parties recognize the necessity to coordinate efforts to take part in the united international system of ecological safety.

Article 10. Economic cooperation of the high contracting parties will be regulated by treaties and agreements envisaging the regime of the most favored nation. The high contracting parties will maintain the development of mutual economic relations at all levels of economic management, the establishment and work of joint Russian- Lithuanian and Lithuanian-Russian enterprises, and also the development of mutual ties by private businessmen. The high contracting parties will inform each other about economic solutions that may affect rights and lawful interests of the other high contracting party in the sphere of mutually coordinated bilateral relations.

Article 11. The RSFSR expresses its special interest and the Republic of Lithuania pledges itself to contribute to the preservation of favorable conditions of economic and national- cultural development in Kaliningrad Oblast. These conditions will be defined in a special agreement of the high contracting parties.

Article 12. The high contracting parties will conclude special inter-governmental agreements on financial and currency relations, banks, trade exchange, the movement

of securities, payments, prices, customs, and transport tariffs. This list is not exhaustive. The agreements will define the mechanisms and dates of transition to payment at world prices.

Article 13. The high contracting parties independently regulate the relations of property on their territories. The legal regime of state property of the high contracting party, the property of corporate bodies, and citizens on the territory of the other high contracting party is regulated by the laws of the high contracting party on whose territory that property is situated, unless something else is provided for in separate agreements of the high contracting parties.

Unsettled problems of property relations on the territories of the high contracting parties will be solved by the high contracting parties in accordance with legal procedures with the participation, if necessary, by third countries.

All other problems of property relations linked with the interests of the high contracting parties must be regulated by separate agreements.

Article 14. In order to ensure freight and passenger transport through its seaports, river ports, and airports and along its railroads, auto routes, and pipelines, the high contracting parties will draw up a special agreement to regulate—without discrimination—freight and passenger transit throughout their territories.

Article 15. The high contracting parties will adhere to an economic policy that will facilitate the formation of various relations between the countries and integration into the international economy.

Article 16. This is a bilateral agreement, and it does not concern the high contracting parties' relations with third parties.

In establishing additional agreements, the high contracting parties shall base themselves upon the principles formulated within this agreement.

Article 17. Bilateral consultations between the high contracting parties regarding questions of this agreement's implementation will be held whenever this becomes necessary, but no less frequently than once a year. All argumentative questions, which may arise in clarifying and carrying out this agreement, must be decided within the framework of bilateral consultations of corresponding magnitude. Each of the high contracting parties retains the right of declaring its initiative by way of consultations to start negotiations on the expediency of continuing the validity [galiojima] of this agreement or any of its individual articles. The statutes of this agreement may be supplemented or amended through a meeting between both the high contracting parties, according to procedures established by the high contracting parties.

Article 18. The high contracting parties, in seeking to implement the statutes of this agreement, including among them the Fourth and Fifth Articles, intend whenever the need arises and a bilateral acquiescence is present, to form corresponding commissions in unison. Basing themselves upon this article, the high contracting parties shall determine the order of commission formation and functioning, as well as its competencies, by means of special agreements.

Article 19. The high contracting parties regard an exchange of authorized missions as expedient.

Article 20. This agreement must be ratified. An exchange of ratification documents shall take place in Vilnius. This agreement will go into effect on the day of exchange of ratified documents.

This agreement is to extend for a 10-year period, with the exception of the First Article of the agreement, whose validity is unlimited.

The validity of the agreement will be automatically extended for an equivalent period of time if, not less than six months prior to its expiration date, neither of the high contracting parties expresses in writing its desire not to extend the agreement or to effect some changes in it.

This has been drawn up, in two-copy form, in Moscow on 29 July 1991—each copy in both the Lithuanian and Russian languages and both texts having equal force.

Signed on behalf of the Republic of Lithuania by Vytautas Landsbergis.

Signed on behalf of the RSFSR by Boris Yeltsin.

Treaty's Impact on Russians Viewed

PM0208145591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Jul 91 Union Edition p 2

[A. Protsenko article: "Russia-Lithuania: Let's Start Everything From Scratch"]

[Text] RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] President Boris Yeltsin and Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, signed the Treaty on the Fundamentals of Interstate Relations between the RSFSR and the Lithuanian Republic for a 10-year term 29 July in Moscow's House of the Soviets on Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment.

How did this happen? The delegations entered the small room crammed with journalists in silence. B. Yeltsin and V. Landsbergis sat at the table adorned with the Russian and Lithuanian state flags in silence and signed the treaty in silence. It was only then that the strained silence was broken: Applause burst out and champagne was brought in. And the tinkling of crystal wafted around the hall for a long time.

Meanwhile the two prime ministers, I. Silayev and G. Vagnorius, sat down at the table. They too silently signed an Agreement on Cooperation in the Economic and Sociocultural Development of the RSFSR's Kaliningrad

Oblast. Once again applause rang out, but there was no more champagne. Nor after Foreign Ministers A. Kozyrev and A. Saudargas had signed an agreement on exchange of plenipotentiary missions.

Boris Nikolayevich then made a small speech. He said that relations between Russia and Lithuania would now be based on a firm, legal basis. The sides recognized one another as sovereign independent states, subjects of international law. Economic ties between Russia and Lithuania will be developed on the principles of most-favored-nation status, while citizens of both republics are now guaranteed equal rights and freedoms. This treaty should hopefully provide impetus for settling relations between Lithuania and the USSR—"it's high time!"

As is well-known, many reproaches and accusations have been leveled at the Russian president for casting the Russian-speaking population here to the arbitrary will of fate by embarking on agreements with the "Baltic separatists." What will Lithuania's Russian-speaking population gain from the new treaty?

The main thing is the right to choose: to become a full-fledged citizen of the Lithuanian Republic or to remain a citizen of the RSFSR. But this choice must be made now. As is well known, Lithuania has a Law on Citizenship, whereby anybody who was permanently resident on the republic's territory before 3 November 1989 (the date that the law was adopted) had and has the right to become a full-fledged citizen of the Lithuanian Republic. Under the treaty people who came to Lithuania virtually before today—or, more precisely, before the day that the treaty was signed—if they are already permanently resident in the republic and have a legitimate source of subsistence, also obtain this right. The requirement of a residence qualification and knowledge of the Lithuanian language will not be applied to these newcomers.

Those who decide to become citizens of the Lithuanian Republic are guaranteed (I quote) "civil, political, social, economic, and cultural rights and basic human freedoms, irrespective of nationality, in accordance with the universally recognized principles and norms of international law and the legislation of their country of residence." Those who give up Lithuanian citizenship will obtain all the international rights of a foreign national, including the right to ask the Russian plenipotentiary mission for help.

That is virtually everything. The Russian-speaking population will get no special status (like subjects of the Russian empire had at one time on the territories of certain neighboring states)—there will be nothing of the sort on Lithuanian territory. Equal rights irrespective of nationality, religion, and so on and so forth, yes. No more, and no less.

What is more, the sides guaranteed one another the right to supervise their compatriots' living conditions on the neighboring territories.

Admittedly, the treaties with Latvia and Estonia did record special rights—for a transitional period the Russian-speaking population here may retain dual citizenship. Well, it has to be acknowledged that the Russian-Lithuanian treaty accords more with international norms. It is time to get accustomed to them.

But what is to happen to those people who do not want to live in the Lithuanian Republic? There is a special article in the treaty devoted to migration problems, which says that the "High Contracting Parties will settle questions that arise in this sphere in accordance with universally recognized principles and norms of international law by concluding individual agreements."

One such agreement has already been concluded—"On Assisting Citizens Invited to Work in Mazeikiai, Lithuanian Republic, in Moving to Vsevolozhskiy Rayon, Leningrad Oblast, RSFSR." Many Russian-speaking specialists were invited here at various times to work in the oil refinery. Lithuania will fund the comprehensive construction of housing in Leningrad Oblast's Vsevolozhskiy Rayon on the basis of the agreement and as the housing becomes ready everyone who so desires will move here, surrendering their apartments in Mazeikiai to the local authorities. And the Russian Government has pledged to provide the migrants with employment in their new area.

This agreement specially stipulates that it does not create a precedent for the subsequent regulation of migration issues. However, if things proceed normally, this sets a good example for resolving migration problems. But I think that after normal partnership relations are established between the USSR and Lithuania, as they are now between Russia and Lithuania, the number of people wanting to leave the republic will diminish. Let us at least hope so.

Another agreement was signed that day—on Kaliningrad Oblast, which has ended up cut off from Russia following Lithuania's secession from the USSR. But this document establishes the procedure for maintaining the RSFSR's ties with the oblast as if it directly bordered on other Russian territories.

So, the treaty has been signed. It is to be ratified at the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Russian Vice President A. Rutskoy said in response to journalists' questions that he thinks that this treaty is absolutely ready for ratification since the mistakes made previously were taken into consideration when drawing it up. Well, let's hope so. Although some members of the Russian Parliament have already shown that they have their own notions of democracy and the rights and freedoms of individual people and whole peoples.

Yeltsin Comments Upon Arrival in Tyumen

OW0508195991 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1830 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] President Boris Yeltsin has arrived in the city of Nadym, the Tyumen region. At the airport he told journalists he was interested in four problems. As for the first one—living conditions—nothing has been done to tackle it for the past ten years, although quite a few decisions were made.

Yeltsin said he was also concerned about the inter-ethnic problem and the relationship between factories and industrial associations, on the one hand, and government ministries, on the other. The President of Russia said he would like the Tyumen region to be more independent economically. Probably at the end of his trip a special status would be granted to the Tyumen region.

Contrary to the previous announcement, the Russian Prime Minister Ivan Silayev has proved unable to accompany Boris Yeltsin during his visit due to urgent questions. He is expected to arrive in Tyumen on August 8.

Visit 'Not Accidental'

LD0508145591 Moscow TASS in English 1427 GMT 5 Aug 91

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Prutkin]

[Text] Tyumen August 5 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin today leaves on a tour of western Siberia to inspect the country's biggest oil-and-gas complex.

It is not accidental that the Russian president will visit the region. Just about one-fifth of the world energy sources is extracted in the area. However, one of the most important raw material basis of the Soviet Union now undergoes a serious crisis.

"We are extremely concerned over the situation in the region", Yuriy Shafranik, chairman of the regional council of people's deputies, told TASS. He said that oil output is declining, the volumes of construction, geological survey and drilling operations dwindled sharply, and the social situation is deteriorating.

Shafranik said there is a lack of an overall plan for the development of the Tyumen region that would link the interests of the region's population of enterprises, the Russian Federation and the whole country in conditions when a market is forming.

"We expect much from the Russian president's visit", Shafranik said. "a package of documents for the creation of a special economic region has been drawn up at the regional council. We are not governed by parochial interests. We are sell non-renewable resources, and we demand an adequate pay".

Shafranik believes that part of the extracted resources should remain in possession of the people of Tyumen. For this purpose, there is a need of a special managerial body that would combine all the interests. Otherwise natural wealth will be squandered over decades until the deposits are depleted while local residents continue to dwell in ramshackle huts and caravans.

"We are prepared to cooperate with foreign firms and are working out terms ensuring mutual advantage and taking the interests of the region into account", Shafranik said. He believes the granting of a special status to the region will guarantee long-term direct contacts of gas extracting enterprises, geologists and builders with foreign partners.

Yeltsin will begin the tour with visiting Nadym, the city inhabited by gas workers. Within three days he will also visit Salekhard, Noyabrsk, Khanty-Mansiisk, Surgut, and will conclude the visit of western Siberia in Tyumen.

Further Reportage on Yeltsin Departyization Decree

Implementation of Decree Updated

LD0508212891 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1350 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] TASS, in a report entitled "departyization has started," updates the progress in implementing the decree by the president of our republic. The party committee of the Vladivostok sea and fishing port has already left the enterprise premises. According to information from the Leningrad Oblast Committee of the republican Communist Party, leaders of work collectives have decided—I am quoting TASS—to redeploy party committees and bureaus.

Impact of Decree Viewed

LD0508215191 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1600 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Excerpts] Departyization has begun in Russia. However,it has been greeted in various ways in labor collecives. Here is what TASS correspondents report. [passage omitted]

Vladivostok—Party committees in several Vladivostok enterprises have become public-political centers in connection with the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] presidential decree on departyization coming into force. The party committee of the sea fishing port has left the enterprise after a written instruction from the administration. The Communists in the kray executive committee have changed their party organization into a territorial one under the Frunze Rayon Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party.

Komsomolsk-na-Amure—We do not intend to stop uniting Communists on the production principle, but now the field of activities is to be transferred to housing estates. This is how Shors, the secretary of the city

RSFSR party committee, described his attitude to departyization. This is a natural act that corresponds to the development of society, according to (Ustovalov), the leader of the Komsomolsk-na-Amure territorial organization of the Russian Social Democratic Party. Our interests are not damaged by the decree.

Moscow City Party Committee Rejects Decree

LD0608014991 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2055 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Interview with A. Smirnov, head of the Moscow City Party Committee ideological section, by unidentified correspondent in Moscow; date not given; from the "Television News Service" program—recorded]

[Text] [Smirnov] We do not agree with Boris Yeltsin's departyization decree itself. We consider this decree undemocratic and hold that it damages the rights of Communists to unite in party organizations at enterprises and institutions. No one has repealed this decree, so we, as a party which operates within the Constitution and within the law, as a party which is in favor of a law-based state, naturally are taking certain steps to fulfill this decree. Some of our Communists will come over to the territory; territorial production party organizations will be created; some of our Communists will unite in industry branch party organizations which will operate on the basis of rayon party committees. A serious structural change lies ahead for the whole city party organization.

[Correspondent] What do you think? Is the CPSU now ready to become a normal parliamentary party, parliamentary in the sense that it is accepted worldwide?

[Smirnov] I think that this transfer will allow work on the territories to become more active, work to win over more votes of the electorate. Such a new structure will only help a more active transformation of the CPSU into a, in essence, new party, a party on the parliamentary model.

[Correspondent] That is, you can be understood that the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic presidential decree has only strengthened the Communist Party.

[Smirnov] It is an ill wind that blows no good. I think that it must be understood like this.

Yeltsin, Silayev on Talks With UK's Lamont

LD0208195191 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 0700 GMT 2 Aug 91

[Video Report by correspondent V. Martynov from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Active foreign policy activity by Russian President Yeltsin is continuing. We spoke about his meeting with Yugoslav Premier Markovic yesterday. Today talks took place between the President of the Russian Federation and Lamont, the British chancellor of the Exchequer. [Video shows Yeltsin and Silayev with Lamont] Accords were reached on the joint resolution of such problems as the processing and storage of agricultural produce, training and study visits by specialists, and the support and development of private farm holdings. Russian Prime Minister Silayev, took part in the talks. The British side was informed about the reforms occurring in the republic. The President stressed that Russia:

[Yeltsin] Will not deviate from this path, will not put a brake on things and will not roll back—irrespective now even of the position of the Union leadership. [Video shows Yeltsin and Silayev surrounded by officials and journalists in a hall foyer; Yeltsin speaking into microphone]

[Martynov] Prime Minister Silayev, in answer to a question by the Vesti correspondent, noted:

[Silayev] We proposed cooperation in specific spheres which, as the British chancellor of the Exchequer put it, are of great interest to them and are also advantageous.

Silayev Views Economic Cooperation With Germany

LD0208175591 Berlin ADN in German 1625 GMT 2 Aug 91

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—The Russian Federation is in principle prepared to conclude agreements on economic cooperation with Germany and individual federal states. This was stated to ADN today by Ivan Silayev, the Russian head of government. The prime minister said that the other side has not yet expressed a view.

Viewed historically, Russia has always maintained good relations with Germany, including relations at the federal state level. Treaties are already in existence with Baden-Wuerttemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Bavaria. Some very interesting projects are under way with those federal states; for example, the training of farmers and specialists. "We regard the level of federal state-Russian Government cooperation as optimal in coordinating efforts and creating the necessary conditions for the economy," Silayev said. The specific details of cooperation will then depend on direct consultations between enterprises and organizations. The prime minister said that the Russian Federation is presently of great economic interest both to the individual federal states and to the united Germany. Silayev stated that German firms must now take advantage of the opportunities.

New, Amalgamated, Renamed Ministries Listed

PM0508132391 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Aug 91 p 2

["RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Resolution on Amendments to the List of RSFSR Republic Ministries and State Committees"—ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA headline]

[Text] In accordance with RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Resolution No. 377-1 of 23 November 1990 "On Measures to Ensure State Management of the RSFSR National Economy During the Transition to a Market Economy" the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolves:

1. To agree with the suggestion made by the chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers on forming new RSFSR republic ministries and state committees and amalgamating and renaming existing ones as follows:
RSFSR Ministry of Health and Social Security;
RSFSR Ministry of Procurements;
RSFSR Ministry of Ecology and Nature Use;
RSFSR Ministry of the Economy;
RSFSR State Committee for Geology and Use of Mineral Resources;
RSFSR State Committee for Land Reform and Support of Peasant (Private) Farms;
RSFSR State Committee for Youth Policy;
RSFSR State Licensing Committee;
RSFSR State Committee for Supervision of Radiation Safety;
RSFSR State Committee for Defense Questions;
RSFSR State Committee for Strategic Stocks;
RSFSR State Committee for Emergency Situations.

2. To instruct the RSFSR president to submit to a scheduled RSFSR Supreme Soviet session a draft RSFSR law on the RSFSR Council of Ministers.

[Signed] R.I. Khasbulatov, first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet

RSFSR House of the Soviets, Moscow, 30 July 1991.

Supreme Soviet Clarifies Moscow Mayor's Powers

PM0508102191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Aug 91 Union Edition p 2

[V. Velikov report: "What Rights Does the Capital's Mayor Have?"]

[Text] The mayor's office in Moscow has received an explanation from the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation regarding the formation and activity of the city's local administration.

The creation of a new executive authority both in the capital itself and in its administrative and municipal [munitsipalnyy] organs has of late revealed varying interpretations of the legal status of the mayor of Moscow. This is, in particular, due to the fact that the special features relating to the authorities of the city's organs of power and management and the demarcation of competence among them are now determined by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolutions of 19 April and 1 July this year. It is well-known that the Russian Law "On Local Self-Management in the RSFSR" was adopted later.

A written question from Ye. Savostyanov, general director of a Moscow mayoral department, to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet committee raises the following question: Are previous resolutions by the federation's Supreme Soviet Presidium abrogated with the adoption of the Russian law?

This must be cleared up since these resolutions, as the question says, "give the mayor the right to adopt rulings reorganizing the city's organs of executive power, including suspending the operation of incumbent ispolkoms [executive committees] (abolishing them) and disposing of their funds, stocks, deposits, property, and land on their territory. What is more, since local soviets do not currently have their own executive organs, independent of the mayor, he evidently also has the right and responsibility to dispose of their budgets."

However, the practice of the last few weeks shows that it is this interpretation of existing legislation that meets with objections from rayon soviets and some deputies, making it difficult to take urgent practical steps to organize normal life in the city.

The explanation given by the Committee for Legislation and signed by its Chairman S. Shakhray, indicates that under Article 183 of the RSFSR Constitution the structure of Moscow's organs of power and management is determined by a special Russian law. At present this document is in preparation. IZVESTIYA reported on the Moscow Soviet's involvement in this work in issue No. 177.

RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolutions are valid until this law is adopted. It is even indicated that the adopted legislative act "On Local Self-Management in the RSFSR" makes no special provision regarding the special features for which Article 183 of the Russian Constitution makes provision regarding Moscow.

In conclusion the explanation says: "...Local organs of executive power and management in Moscow fall directly within the jurisdiction of the city's mayor, who has the right to reorganize them." Organs set up by the mayor implement local soviet budgets and also dispose of their management organs' funds, stocks, property, and land on their territory.

TRUD Interviews Russian KGB Chief Ivanenko

LD0308105091 Moscow TASS in English 0919 GMT 3 Aug 91

[Text] Moscow August 3 TASS—Russia's state security bodies will act in strict accordance with law, the Republic's KGB chief said in a newspaper interview today.

KGB workers will base their work on the Soviet bill on state security bodies, Major General Viktor Ivanenko said in an interview published in today's TRUD.

However, professionals and Russian authorities are unhappy about some of the bill's provisions, Ivanenko said.

The bill retains "some of the outdated unitary thinking, at the time when the centre tried to devolve as little power to Russia as possible", he said.

The Russian KGB will not violate the federal law, but Russian authorities plan to "specify some provisions at the republican level", he said.

The KGB is subordinated to the Russian president, parliament and government, he said.

"On some issues, in line with an agreement separating powers, we "will recognise the dominant role of the central KGB apparatus. However, we will not serve two masters. Russia's sovereignty has changed our hierarchy," he said.

"However, it would be foolish to fall out of a single network of intelligence and counter-intelligence," he said.

The Russian Committee for State Security (KGB) will combat ethnic violence and terrorism and deal with those who will publicly call for violent overthrow of the present state system, Ivanenko explained.

Finance Minister Discusses 'Emergency Budget'

PM0608102791 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Aug 91 p 1

[Interview with RSFSR Finance Minister I.N. Lazarev by correspondent Aleksandr Runov; date and place not specified; first paragraph is introduction: "Does Russia Need an Emergency Budget?"]

[Text] The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium adopted a resolution 30 July "On the Procedure for Changing the Law on the RSFSR Budgetary System." Our correspondent met with RSFSR Finance Minister I.N. Lazarev and asked him to comment on this resolution.

[Lazarev] The tense situation that has developed within Russia's budget reflects the overall situation within the budgetary system and the economy of the country as a whole and cannot be viewed in isolation. It is mainly due to the decline in production, unbalanced material and technical supply, and difficulties during the period of transition to market relations. These were the reasons for the buildup of adverse tendencies and the increase in financial tension that I gave at the Fifth Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, although the decisions regarding the new social programs and tax concessions to stimulate production undoubtedly helped to increase the budget deficit. But that is not the main reason.

One must also bear in mind the fact that, first, all major decisions (on price reform and compensation for price hikes, on the agro-industrial complex, the social sphere, and social protection for the population during the transition to the market) were adopted for the country as a whole at Union and then republic level following joint consideration, including by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Second, given the increasing price hike, support for the population and budgetary institutions, along with enterprises operating on fixed prices, was absolutely essential. Third and last, even if they reduce budgetary revenue this year, these measures should make an impact over the next few years.

[Runov] Nevertheless the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium deemed it necessary in its 30 July decision not to fully adopt measures that would entail additional expenditure or restrict RSFSR budgetary revenue without stipulating real sources of compensation for this....

[Lazarev] This decision should not have been postponed under any circumstances. By the end of July financial data for the first half-year became known: 46.8 and 37 percent of the annual values in terms of revenue and expenditure respectively. The level of implementation is lower than planned. As far as revenue is concerned this is largely the result of the adverse effect on Russia's budget of the price reform and the decline in production, while as for expenditure this situation is to a considerable extent the result of difficulties in capital construction: failure to assimilate resources, noncommissioning of installations, and so on.

[Runov] What is the total budget deficit?

[Lazarev] According to forecasts it is currently running at 70 billion rubles for the year. Undoubtedly, a very large sum.

I must say that RSFSR Supreme Soviet committees and commissions and the RSFSR Council of Ministers have considered measures, including emergency measures, to stabilize the situation and reduce the budget deficit in phases. These steps, along with the aforementioned measures (banning decisions on additional spending and reducing revenue without real sources of compensation), envisage tightening up the economy drive as far as spending is concerned: revising adopted decisions on tax concessions, including those adopted by Union bodies without coordination with the republic, based on their real effectiveness; changing sources of funding for production capital investment, apart from the agro-industrial complex and consumer goods production units, with a view to increasing the principles of economic accountability, and a number of other measures. One must bear in mind the fact that a number of financial problems will be disposed of [realizovyvatsya] in 1992, notably regarding free economic zones.

Given the state of the RSFSR budget, these measures are quite urgent. It would be too late if they were implemented in the fourth quarter of this year, say.

[Runov] By decision of the Third Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies the Council of Ministers should have submitted proposals regarding the emergency budget within a month, that is in April....

[Lazarev] Yes, the RSFSR Council of Ministers formulated and submitted proposals and emergency budget

calculations to the Supreme Soviet 20 April this year. Naturally, they were unable to take into consideration the progress made with the retail price reform that began 2 April and, needless to say, necessitated fundamental changes in RSFSR budgetary indicators.

Proposals regarding the emergency budget, finalized in view of the 2 April reform, were submitted for consideration to Supreme Soviet committees and commissions in June and were examined in July.

As you can see, it was not possible to adopt a decision on the RSFSR emergency budget previously, but I repeat, it was quite impossible to postpone this decision until the fall Supreme Soviet session.

The Supreme Soviet Presidium resolution laid the foundations for implementing the budget in the third quarter of the year and stabilizing it in the next quarter. A ceiling has been set on spending and the deficit for the third quarter—something that comes within the competence of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, moreover. But the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's adopting of decisions means increasing control over budget implementation and boosting the executive organs' responsibility for the use of monetary funds.

At this juncture there was no change in the RSFSR Law "On the RSFSR State Budgetary System in 1991." New budgetary indicators for the year were not approved. The third quarter was singled out as a special "peak" period during which the largest amounts of compensation for the price hike should "filter through" and the effect of price reform on the budget's sources of revenue really manifest itself. Singling out from overall spending in the third quarter current and so-called protected items of expenditure, that is, those items with mandatory funding that will be fully financed, guarantees the implementation of social measures. For instance, regarding budgetary personnel's wages, student grants, spending on food and medicines in hospitals and schools, compensation payments for the population due to the retail price hike, backing for private farms, a range of agro-industrial complex spending, and so on.

[Runov] You said that the budget deficit will have specific sources of compensation. What are they?

[Lazarev] They are stipulated in the resolution. The RSFSR Council of Ministers and the RSFSR Central Bank have been given the requisite instructions.

In conclusion I would like to point out another important problem that this resolution resolves—relations between the republic budget and the budgets of republics within the RSFSR and local budgets. RSFSR republic budget indicators in the third quarter have been determined with a view to clarifying these relations and on the basis of joint consideration with the territories.

Moscow Council, Defense Industry To Cooperate

PM0508153691 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 28, 14-21 Jul 91 p 3

[Andrey Borodenkov article: "Conversion: Moscow-Style"]

[Text] A recent meeting between top officials from Moscow mayor's office and captains of the defence industry factories situated in the Soviet capital proceeded, in the expression of the Deputy Mayor, Yuriy Luzhkov, "in a new vein".

This year, the defence industry was hit by a sharp decrease in orders, which made the factories to look for new contracts elsewhere, in order to avoid massive lockouts. Two parties in need—Moscow municipality and the defence industry—found each other, to their mutual advantage. On the one hand, are hundreds of powerful producers employing almost half of the nation's scientific potential, a force capable of not only ruining an average country but also of rebuilding it from the ruins. On the other hand, is ruin. The list of Moscow's needs is truly vast. It includes: water and air purification, new bakeries and telephone lines, as well as a magnetic suspension transportation line from the Sheremetyevo Airport to central Moscow. But what can the city give in exchange?

Luzhkov says, quite a bit: exemption from taxation for those who work for the benefit of the city; land for development, as well as plots for summer houses and gardens. In times of barter dealing such as these, this is more attractive than money. Of course, money will be involved, too. The realization of the top priority city-oriented projects alone will cost 500 million roubles a year. There isn't that much money in the city's wallet. The capital of two sovereign states— the USSR and Russia—only wishes it could get money as payment for its high status, for the national and republican budgets. But is its alliance with the defence industry going to be a happy one even if Moscow has the money?

According to one of the defence industry captains, defence is simply not designed to work for civilian purposes, because of vast overhead expenses upping the price of the commodities produced, and the inflexible system of the industry's management. All that can—with only little production effect—ruin any budget and squander millions upon millions of roubles. Independent commercial structures branching out from military production and designed to suit the civilian purposes can become a bridge between our needs and the potential of the military-industrial complex. However, the current concept of conversion repels any attribute of the market.

Consequently, the good news is that confrontation between the democratically-disposed municipal power and the military-industrial complex is being replaced by cooperation. The bad news is that the mechanism of this cooperation is still unknown to us. The old system of command management and the market economy are

incompatible, and the problem cannot be solved within one—even the nation's largest—city (which, incidentally, is now news).

Ethnic Leader on Volga Germans' Aspirations

PM0508155691 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 28, 14-21 Jul 91 p 7

[Interview with All-Union Wiedergeburt (Revival) Society of Soviet Germans Heinrich Grout by Yelena Nikolskaya; date, place not given: "Soviet Germans: To Go Or Not To Go?"]

[Text] Heinrich Grout: Having experienced lack of legal rights and humiliation, some Germans have bequeathed their children and grandchildren nothing but the desire to leave this country for good. Others have lost almost all national and cultural identity. Still others are trying to curb the Germans' ethnic decline and emigration. Three years ago the latter group set up the Wiedergeburt (Revival) society to achieve national revival and restore the German Autonomous Republic on the Volga.

The Soviet government set up a State Commission to deal with the Soviet Germans' problems. Its chairman, however, was appointed in keeping with the rules of bureaucratic absurdity. He is V.K. Gusev, former first secretary of the Saratov Regional CPSU Committee, notorious for his anti-German campaigns.

Instead of restoring the Autonomous Republic, the State Commission proposes to establish the Association of the USSR Germans which would be an exterritorial club, and the National Council to act as the government of this "republic without a territory". To pacify the German dissent, the authorities decided to hold a congress of Soviet Germans under the State Commission's control. The congress was supposed to open in Moscow on March 11.

MN: The press and television gave contradictory reports of the congress. Once it was reported as opening, another time as postponed indefinitely.

Heinrich Grout: The State Commission had planned to hold the congress with the singular aim of endorsing it as an option that would fall short of restoring the Autonomous Republic. The questionnaire circulated among congressional delegates just before the opening showed that the overwhelming majority were against both the Association and the National Council. Therefore, there was no point in the central authorities' holding the congress.

Accordingly, four days before the opening date, the Organizing Committee received the telegram signed by V.K. Gusev which said, "The country leadership has decided to postpone the Congress of the USSR Germans. The new opening date will be specified later."

MN: Is there reason to believe there may be a split in the Soviet Germans' movement?

Heinrich Grout: The split was forced on us, but in the long run the central authorities only managed to persuade a minor group numbering 20 or 30 people, mostly CPSU members. There are plans to have them form a Ministry of Germans Affairs or a "government" of the exterritorial German Republic operating under the USSR Cabinet.

MN: What are your relations with the Russian leadership like?

Heinrich Grout: In the Russian parliament we met with both understanding and readiness to resolve problems by concerted efforts. A Commission was set up under the Russian Supreme Soviet to develop the general principles of restoring German autonomy to the Volga Region. The commission includes seven Russian people's deputies and seven charges of the German population. This is a new hope for our future in Russia. The adoption by the Russian parliament of the Law on the Rehabilitation of the Repressed nations was an important event, too.

MN: What is the situation in the Volga Region like? Protests by the local non-German population have been used by the opponents of a restored German autonomy as an important argument.

Heinrich Grout: These protests were fanned up by the party functionaries. Today the situation is changing. The people are getting weary of staging anti-German rallies and protests "to order". The older generation still remember the Germans as peaceful and hard-working neighbors. Democratic movements, primarily the Democratic Russia, are becoming our allies, too.

MN: What are the results of the latest meeting between the group of Soviet Germans and the USSR President?

Heinrich Grout: Unfortunately, the Germans were represented at the meeting by the very people who had tried to prevent a truly representative congress. The establishment of the exterritorial body the State Commission has been insistently forcing upon us appears to be a likely outcome of the meeting. There is no question of self rule, because the body in question, whatever it is called, will be rigidly subordinated to either the State Commission or the USSR Cabinet.

Belorussia

Strikes Noted During Labor Leader's Trial

LD0208200791 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 2 Aug 91

[Text] The situation in Belorussia is not calm yet again. Here is our correspondent in Minsk, Maksim Taborov:

[Taborov] A few days ago, court proceedings against Nikolay Razumov, who was one of the participants in the strike movement in Orsha, began in Mogilev. He was charged with organizing an unauthorized meeting and blockading the Orsha railway junction. This fact violates the agreement in which the Belorussian Supreme Soviet undertook not to take repressive measures against strikers. The court apparently has an underlying political cause.

At the first sitting of the court, Nikolay Razumov rejected the court due to the fact that its members belong to the CPSU. His challenge was not accepted. In protest, Ruzumov declared a hunger strike.

The authorities did not dare hold the court proceedings in Orsha, fearing a wave of workers' demonstrations, and there were grounds for this [fear]. On Thursday, two works in Orsha stopped operations. Today, another works joined them. This morning in Minsk, a warning strike and a meeting were held at three works, and workers expressed support for Nikolay Razumov.

(Sergey Antonchik), co-chairman of the Minsk city strike committee, described the court procedings against Nikolay Razumov as a test case started by the party-bureaucratic leadership. If they manage to convict him, then according to the logic of events, they can prosecute any participant in strikes, and not just the April strikes. The Minsk strike committee and Minsk workers must do everything possible not to allow this, (Sergey Antonchik) said.

Now representatives of the Minsk workers union have appealed to Russian defenders of the law, relying on their experience in holding political trials.

Ukraine

Leader Calls Union Treaty 'Deception'

OW0508122391 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1130 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] One of the leaders of RUKH [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka] Bogdan Tenopolsky, said during an interview with the "Interfax" correspondent that the Union Treaty "in no way represented the interest of the Ukrainian people and that it left the republic with only second-rate opportunities." According to him until the existing Soviet system is changed any agreement will just be "a form of deception of the people".

B. Ternopolsky announced that RUKH plans to call an all-Ukrainian assembly in Kiev on September 15, the eve of the autumn session of the republican parliament, to reject the Union treaty. He said that the party was united in wanting Ukrainian independence although there was disagreement on how to achieve this goal.

B. Ternopolsky declared that if the Chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, CPSU member Leonid Kravchuk, strictly adheres to the declaration of the Ukraine as a sovereign state he will find support amongst the people. He at the same time expressed the opinion that the contender for the post of Ukrainian President, Levko Lukyanenko, a member of the Ukrainian Republican Party, deserves more confidence as he, unlike Levko Lukyanenko, has never changed his views on the necessity of obtaining Ukrainian independence.

Republic To Hold Presidential Elections

PM0508155491 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Aug 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by Sergey Tsikora from Kiev under the "Direct Line" rubric: "The Ukraine Will Have Its President Too"]

[Text] The first president of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] will be elected by citizens of the republic 1 December 1991.

Official documents on the elections and the conduct of the election campaign have been published in republic newspapers. There is one noteworthy point in the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet resolution, in which parliament is advised urgently to examine the draft law on citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR. Interparty friction prevented the discussion of this law in conjunction with the question of the president, and so a bizarre situation has arisen, whereby a decision has been made on electing the head of the republic, but those who are to elect him supposedly do not exist, as the law on citizenship has not been adopted.

No party has yet officially named its candidate for the Ukrainian presidency. But the party apparatuses are already working full out. At a recent press conference S. Gurenko, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, announced that the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee's special service has carried out a sociological poll to determine the names of possible contenders for the presidency. A total of 23 names were given—11 Communists and 12 non-communists. L. Kravchuk, the present chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, had the highest rating.

Let me remind you that under the law the president of the Ukraine must be fluent in the republic language and not be a member of any party.

Cabinet of Ministers Reintroduces Coupons

PM0508124591 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1200 GMT 1 Aug 91

[From the "Television News Service" newscast: Report by P. Savchak and A. Shubin]

[Text] [Announcer] By decision of the republic's Council of Ministers [as heard], coupons are being reintroduced in the Ukraine as from today.

[Savchak] Exactly a month has passed since the coupon system in the state trade network was abolished in the Ukraine.

Let me remind you that the coupon system experiment was in operation for six months. Then the republic's Cabinet of Ministers issued a document repealing it. However, it proved that this was premature. Experts have worked out that the coupon system had helped in partially stabilizing the economic situation. By contrast, in July, when we lived without coupons, sales of goods in very short supply had almost trebled. In virtually all the Ukrainian oblasts a drastic flushing out of the market was observed. In Lvov Oblast, for example, a specific situation has developed. Many goods are being exported to neighboring Poland both by foreigners and by our own tourists. The store shelves, which are not exactly crammed with goods, are getting visibly emptier. And so consumer coupons are again being introduced as from 1 August.

A directive for trade workers has been drawn up, according to which a new type of coupons is being introduced. They are currently being printed in Kiev, Lvov, and other cities. Let's wait and see how long the new coupons last.

Further on Coupon Shopping

PM0408131591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Jul 91 Union Edition p 2

[Sergey Tsikora report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "The Ukraine: Trade On Coupons Again"]

[Text] Kiev—The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers has again affirmed that it will not make any concessions on the question of protecting the interests of the republic's market.

IZVESTIYA has already reported on the tough measures taken by the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Cabinet of Ministers to prevent the export of grain outside the borders of the republic. Now there is a new protective operation—the Ukrainian Government has again introduced coupons that will be needed in the sale of all goods.

Commenting on this decision on republic television, Ye. Marchuk, Ukrainian SSR state minister for questions of defense, national security, and emergency situations, said that this is essentially a question of the republic defending its food sovereignty. The Ukraine has been virtually flooded with dealers.

The republic government has explained that its measures designed to restrict the export of food are of a temporary nature. They will "operate only until the republic has bought the minimum necessary volume of food products." Following the creation of a guaranteed food potential, farms that have concluded contracts on the basis of barter will be able to settle their accounts with their partners.

As of 10 August, the situation on the Ukrainian market should change radically. According to the latest Ukrainian SSR Cabinet of Ministers decision, on this day the export of food and nonfood consumer goods beyond the republic will only take place on the basis of quotas and licenses. A kind of prototype customs service will be formed in the republic with this aim—a Ukrainian SSR state inspectorate for supervising the export of material assets. Within a week it is to have "95 checkpoints points and 152 mobile groups supervising the export of consumer goods and other material assets at Ukrainian SSR border crossings."

Lists of goods in extremely short supply, which were prohibited for export during the period of the operation of "emergency interim measures," have been determined, and also norms for food products that you can take on journeys outside the republic's borders. One list contains 60 types of goods—from televisions and video recorders to furniture, stockings, and lavatory pans. The other is a list of 12 goods: One person can take 500g of sausage and butter, a packet of tea, a bottle of vodka or wine, ten eggs, and four packets of cigarettes on their journey....

Because of differences of opinion with the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, the Ukrainian Government was not able to print a special form of money for settling accounts for acquiring food goods in the republic at State Banknote Printing Administration plants. Therefore, they decided to return to the idea of new coupons. These will be issued to the population as of 1 August.

Implementation of Ban on Farm Exports Viewed

PM0208083391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jul 91 Union Edition p 2

["Direct Line" report by Anatoliy Kleva: "Export Banned—Period"]

[Text] Kharkov—In fulfillment of a Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers resolution, Kharkov Oblast has erected six fixed and a number of mobile checkpoints on the border with Russia, blocking all highways.

The same has happened in other oblasts adjoining union republics.

On 10 July, the Ukrainian Government adopted a resolution to protect the republic's market in agricultural

produce. It has banned the export of all agricultural produce outside the Ukraine and banned commodity market operations as well as direct deals.

The entire physical and psychological burden of implementing this decision has been placed on the militia, which makes no secret its negative attitude toward the resolution. The view here is that the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers has begun to break off the direct ties with Russian farms formed recently. For example, recently a convoy of timber from Siberia passed through the Belgorod checkpoint bound for the Kharkov house building combine, which is experiencing a shortage of timber structures. When concluding the deal with the Siberians, the city promised them sugar. But the trucks of Kharkov sugar were stopped. The ban on exports to Russia even applies to cabbage, and there is more than enough of that in the Ukraine's fields.

The checkpoints are operating without any instructions and at the discretion of the militiamen, and the trucks detained are being sent to adjacent rayons that are no longer able to sell the confiscated produce, especially that which is easily perishable.

Farmers Refuse To Sell Grain to State

LD0408142491 Kiev Radio Kiev Network in Ukrainian 0500 GMT 3 Aug 91

[Excerpt] [Announcer] We have already reported about the decision of the farms of Maryinskiy rayon, Donetsk oblast to temporarily stop selling grain to the state. Our correspondent Vitaliy Naumenko went to the scene of events.

[Naumenko] The decision of the 26 farms of the rayon—they all are members of the Donbass agro-industrial combine—to stop selling grain to the state, even temporarily, is nothing else but a direct ultimatum to the government. What incited the peasants to resort to this extreme measure? Viktor Oleksiyovych Manko, Director General of the Donbass agro-industrial combine, especially stressed in a conversation with me the fact that the decision of the Maryinskiy rayon farmers was not sudden. It is a reaction to the policy of state bodies with respect to villages in recent years.

Then the director general named the whole series of causes which made the peasants lose their patience. These include an extremely unsatisfactory supply of material and technical resources, in the first place of machinery and building materials; an unbalanced increase in prices for manufactured goods and agricultural products, which undermines the economy of farms; and finally the decisions by the government, when debts are not only written off the accounts of negligent farmers, but they are also stimulated by millions' worth of subsidies which, in the view of Viktor Oleksiyovych, are not very well thought out. Instead, those who worked better and thriftily do not get a kopek from the state. [passage omitted]

Opposition Leaders Comment on Bush Visit

LD0208132491 Kiev Radio Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 2200 GMT 1 Aug 91

[Text] Rukh has come out with a statement [on Bush's visit to Kiev]. Rukh Chairman Ivan Drach said, among other things:

[Begin Drach recording] Naturally, we welcome the U.S. President, for we watch America very closely to learn as much as possible about its democratic traditions. It would seem at first glance that the country and George Bush might be our natural allies. However, after becoming President, George Bush started to act as if he was hypnotized by Gorbachev. Bush's ties with the Moscow center are especially strong.

Although President Bush made a very positive step by opening the consulate in Kiev, members of his administration talk about stabilization in such a way that it is evident that, for them, the source of stabilization can be located only in Moscow. We must remember that President Bush regularly belittles democratic movements in republics.

Unfortunately, Bush is not going to see what is really taking place in the Ukraine. His itinerary was prepared by those who try to satisfy the Moscow center. Thus, we welcome George Bush as President of the democratic state, the United States, but reject him as a Moscow agitator in favor of the Union treaty. [end recording]

Vyacheslav Chornovil, chairman of the Lvov oblast council, who has been advanced by Rukh as a presidential candidate, says:

[Begin Chornovil recording] In the spring of 1989, I was invited to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to meet with Secretary of State Baker. His speech there signalled the turn in U.S. policy with regard to us. The secretary said then that he was satisfied with democratization processes taking place in the Soviet Union but clearly overestimated the size and strength of those processes. Not a single word was said about national republics and the national needs of the peoples. Quite the contrary, he warned about so-called destabilization in these territories. Unfortunately, this policy initiated by the new administration continues today.

We should not rejoice too much that we have become so popular that all at once Kohl and Bush want to pay us visits. They come here to calm us down a bit and to bring closer the signing of the Union treaty, which is, as it turns out, also needed by the Western world.

What will be needed tomorrow is this: Someone should tell him, especially on the site of the Babiy Yar monument, that Babiy Yar and the holocaust of 1933 are two faces of the very same holocaust.

At the same time, we should not lose hope that gradually the democratic world will turn its back to us, the republics. President Bush should be welcomed as the leader of

the world's greatest democratic state. On the other hand, he should be made to understand that he will face a great people who strive for independence. [end recording]

UK Chancellor Comments on Visit to Ukraine

LD0408162191 Moscow TASS in English 1551 GMT 4 Aug 91

[By UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent Aleksey Trotsenko]

[Text] Kiev August 4 TASS—Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman Lamont, who paid a visit to the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet government, has described his trip to the Ukraine as interesting and cognitive in many respects.

Lamont said his visit was actually the first step taken after the Group of Seven major European industrialised nations summit in London. He pointed out that following his meetings at the USSR Ministry of Finance and in the Ukraine, he now had a clearer idea of how economic reform was being implemented in the Soviet Union. He said he saw for himself that the majority of people both in the centre and in the republics gave preference to a market economy.

Lamont said it was very important for him to visit the Ukraine, a republic that is one of the more advanced regions of the Soviet Union. The tour of the Ukraine also helped him get a better understanding of problems between the centre and the republics and the way they were being resolved.

During his two-day stay in the Ukraine, Lamont visited the Almaz Plant, a defence industry enterprise that was built to produce electronic-optical guidance systems for SS-20 missiles. The plant is now being converted to civilian output. It now produces kidney dialysis machines and a variety of instruments, which several foreign firms have already found interesting.

The British minister also toured a collective farm near Kiev, where work to introduce advanced cereals growing technologies has been conducted together with British specialists for the fourth year.

Ukrainian Prime Minister Vitold Fokin gave a dinner in honour of Lamont, during which a lively exchange of information about prospects for Ukrainian-British partnership was held. "We will do our best to help British business people, who will wish to cooperate with Ukrainian partners, in their work," Fokin said addressing the guest.

Moldova

Local District Governing Councils Resign

LD0508225791 Moscow TASS in English 1946 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] Kishinev August 5 TASS—District governing councils elected 18 months ago in Moldova resigned on Monday before the end of their terms under the new law on local governing councils recently adopted by the Moldovian parliament.

The law envisages reorganising the existing 50 districts into 7-12 provinces and abolishes the territorial division in cities. The law will be enacted stage by stage but its main provisions will come into force next year, the MOLDOVA-PRESS news agency reports.

The republic's government has worked out temporary regulations on activities of governing councils during the transition period pending a new administrative and territorial division of the republic.

Under the regulations, new local administrative bodies will replace the abolished district and city councils to conduct current management.

The regulations say that "during the transition period chairmen of district executive councils and heads of new governing bodies in major cities are replaced, appointed and removed from their posts only by the president of Moldova".

Georgia

Gamsakhurdia Discusses Republic Economy

PM0508075691 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jul 91 Union Edition p 3

["Direct Line" report by Besik Urigashvili: "Georgia: Serious Budget Deficit"]

[Text] Tbilisi—A package of draft laws on the economy were submitted for consideration at the Georgian Supreme Soviet session. Ways out of the economic crisis for the republic were discussed.

The session considered the question of an emergency budget for the republic for the second half of the year. The budgetary situation is disastrous. The enormous deficit is a millstone around the neck of the economy which is already enfeebled. The following was said at the government session in which President Z. Gamsakhurdia participated: If the growth in the budget deficit is not halted by the winter, the republic economy awaits collapse. In his speech the president said that the economy's lamentable state is the result not only of the blockade by the center, but also of sabotage by mafia forces, as well as the inability of several of the new leaders to cope with their affairs. Unless the situation changes, the question of the government's resignation will appear on the agenda.

The Supreme Soviet adopted the Law on the Fundamentals of Entrepreneurial Activity and approved the laws on employment, and on the general fundamentals of taxation, as well as a number of others.

South Ossetian Delegation To Meet With Yanayev

LD0508204491 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1800 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] The delegation of South Ossetian deputies that is currently visiting Moscow, is to meet Vice President Gennadiy Yanayev, at the beginning of the week. The delegation arrived in Moscow to hold talks with representatives of the Union government on the possibility of restoring jointly with the Union the oblast's power and government structures which were abolished by the Georgian Government last December. In the opinion of (Larisa Astayeva), a member of the delegation who was interviewed by a RUSSIAN INFORMATION AGENCY correspondent, this will only be possible if the political issue—the restoration of South Ossetia's status as an autonomous oblast of Georgia—is resolved. Prior to this, the South Ossetian intelligensia had sent a letter addressed to president Mikhail Gorbachev which contained a request to grant the right to South Ossetia to sign the new Union treaty as a full participant.

Armenia

People's Deputies Complain of Police Attack

OW0508230991 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1830 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The USSR People's Deputy Sergey Belozertsev, Moscow City Council member Lev Balashov and Chairman of the Moscow chapter of the "Memorial" society Yan Rachinskiy have told a news conference on Monday that they came under a 9-hour fire attack by Azerbaijani special police in the Armenian village of Verishen, Geranboisk district of Azerbaijan on August 2.

Belozertsev said the people's deputies were in Verishen on August 1 and 2 in order to inquire into Armenia's information about deportations and genocide of Armenians in Azerbaijan. "There is no way of calling what's going on there other than genocide", Belozertsev said.

The people's deputies said that the Armenian village of Verishen was a target for continued fire attacks with the use of Howitzers and rockets from helicopters. The village Russkiye Borisy situated in the same area and populated by ethnic Russians is also subject to pressure and blockade. People have to flee their homes.

Belozertsev said that special police opened fire at unarmed people's deputies in good visibility while they were moving about the valley. He added that in Verishen reporters from Greece and United States came under fire, too.

The people's deputies are going to demand that the USSR Prosecutor General Nikolay Turbin start legal proceedings to investigate the attack against them, foreign correspondents and Verishen's civilians. Belozertsev said sceptically that "Turbin is more committed to the CPSU rules than the law." In his view, an inquiry into the situation in the area of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is not in the interests of the republican Communist party leadership.

Upon his return to Moscow Belozertsev said that in a telephone conversation Defence Minister Dmitriy Yazov told him that the 23rd Division of the 4th Army had been withdrawn from Verishen and that the special police force used exclusively its own weapons. USSR KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov added that the special police force was armed with heavy machine guns.

The lawmakers believe it is necessary to move a disengagement contingent to the area of the conflict—Interior Ministry troops or inter-republican forces.

Deputies Hold News Conference on Situation

LD0508222891 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 5 Aug 91

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] A news conference, with USSR People's Deputy (Sergey Belozertsev), and (Lev Balashov), Moscow City Soviet deputy who have just arrived from Shaumyanovskiy Rayon in Azerbaijan, was held today at the Moscow City Soviet.

According to the deputies, peaceful residents, observers, and journalists in villages are daily under fire from Special Purpose Militia Detachment [OMON] subunits and Soviet Army troops. In the opinion of the deputies, soldiers and OMON troops are one of the main factors destabilizing the situation in the region. (Lev Balashov) says that it is high time to settle this conflict by more effective methods. There is no solution so far. The blood of peaceful residents continue to be shed.

People's Deputies Present Plan for Shaumyanovskiy

NC0608104291 Yerevan Radio Yerevan Network in Armenian 1730 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] USSR People's Deputy Colonel Smirnov, Russian Federation People's Deputy Ponomaryov, and Leningrad City Soviet People's Deputy Zinnikov, who are currently in Verishen village in Shaumyanovskiy Rayon, sent a cable on 4 August to the presidents of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, and Azerbaijan and the USSR defense and internal affairs ministers.

In their cable, the three propose the following five-point action plan to stabilize the situation in the region:

First—the withdrawal of the Soviet Army subunits and their return to barracks.

Second—immediate termination of the resettlement of Buzluk, Manashid, and Erkech villages by the Azerbaijanis.

Third—withdrawal of the forces of the Azerbaijani Special Purpose Militia from the empty villages and the entire territory of Shaumyanovskiy Rayon.

Fourth—establishment of guard posts between Armenian- and Azerbaijani-inhabited villages.

Fifth—measures to allow the deported families to return to Buzluk, Manashid, and Erkech villages should they so desire.

The people's deputies sent yet another cable to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev the next day, attesting that the villages are being plundered and resettled by Azerbaijanis. This is being done to provoke the resistance forces into taking vigorous countermeasures, thereby providing a pretext for the organizers of these criminal acts to launch a large-scale military operation. Such a criminal state policy could only be carried out at the orders of Azerbaijani leaders Mutalibov and Polyanichko, who clearly do not want to resolve the problem by peaceful means.

Smirnov, Ponomaryov, and Zinnikov concluded their appeal by saying: We insist that a presidential commission headed by Bakatin, a member of the Security Council, leave for Shaumyanovskiy Rayon at once.

Russian MPs Urge Armenia, Azerbaijan Peace

OW0508022791 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1930 GMT 2 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Two members of the Russian parliament, Anatoliy Shabad and Viktor Sheinis, have held a briefing in Yerevan after their unsuccessful attempt to visit Nagorno-Karabakh and other areas affected by the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Their mission had been coordinated with the USSR Defence Minister Yazov. The Vice President of Russia Aleksandr Rutskoy had given his consent, too.

However, Viktor Sheinis said that the visit to Baku was a disappointment. The leadership of Azerbaijan strongly opposed the idea of Russian lawmakers visiting the named areas.

Viktor Sheinis said that they did not see their trip as utterly useless. They were able to get acquainted with the statement by the Azerbaijani President Ayaz Mutalibov to the effect that passport checks in the Armenian villages of Azerbaijan will be suspended. In their view this is a positive development. The Russian lawmakers' visit to the areas of the conflict was not banned but postponed until the beginning of next month.

Russia's lawmakers urged both rival factions to lay down arms and condemned the idea of revenge in connection with what in effect is guerilla war by Armenians in protest against acts of violence.

In Yerevan, Russian parliament members met with the Armenian leaders, including the chairman of the republican parliament Levon Ter-Petrosyan, and briefed them on the talks they had had in Baku.

Azerbaijan

People's Front Leader on Congress, Turkey

NC0508081891 Istanbul TURKIYE in Turkish 30 Jul 91 p 6

[By Ahmet Ali Arslan]

[Text] Washington—Ebulfez Ali Elcibey [Ebulfez Aliyev], leader of the Azerbaijani People's Front, has said the Front has redoubled its efforts for freedom following its recent congress, and added: "We wrecked the intrigues of the KGB and its collaborators which sought to sow dissension among us."

Elcibey indicated he was well aware that People's Front member Etibar Mamedov was working to create a political party, and added: "There is no question of any resentment on my part toward Etibar or of any divergence from the ideals of the People's Front on his."

In a telephone conversation with us, Elcibey stressed that he had no connection with the so-called Azerbaijani National Freedom Front active in the Swedish city of Uppsala, which has made unseemly territorial claims on Turkey. Elcibey added: "Those who make territorial claims on Turkey are puppet organizations set up by the Soviet secret service KGB. The enemies of Turkey are our enemies too."

Elcibey expressed his conviction that the struggle for freedom in Azerbaijan will triumph, but noted that this required that unity be maintained. He added: "The strength we derived from the general congress has made it possible for us to make more timely and practical decisions."

Elcibey noted: "The People's Front, which wages the freedom and democracy struggle of the Azerbaijani Turkism, reinvigorated itself with the congress it held in Baku on 13 July. Some of our colleagues in the congress expressed a wish to set up a political party and then declared its formation. They too seek to contribute to the freedom struggle. In time, all these political organizations will unite with the People's Front. Claims about the divergence of our paths are lies and slanders."

Aliyev Discusses Azerbaijan Party Campaign

OW0508185691 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1515 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] IF [INTERFAX] correspondent could not get a confirmation from the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet that a special parliamentary commission was formed to inquire into the republican government's activities under Geydar Aliyev.

When asked by our correspondent to comment on a campaign against him which has been waged by the Communist party and state apparatus of Azerbaijan since mid-June when he quit the party, Geydar Aliyev said he was struck off the Azerbaijani Communist Party register as early as in 1982 and has never occupied positions in state bureaucracy.

Geydar Aliyev said that in his statement on the occasion of quitting the party he blamed the Azerbaijani Communist Party for the tragic events of January 1989 in Baku, for the perpetuation of a tense situation arcund Nagorno-Karabakh, for the suppression of a democratic movement in Azerbaijan and for rigged results of a referendum on the preserving of the Soviet Union held on March 17. "Had I left them alone, they might have taken my departure from the CPSU without a bang or a whimper", Geydar Aliyev said.

Asked about the decision, made by the control and auditing commission of the Azerbaijani Communist Party after he quit the party, to conduct an inquiry into his activity as chief of the republic's party organisation, Geydar Aliyev said: "They would not understand that the most severe punishment the party has is to be expelled from it, whereas I have already quit it".

Baku Cites Interior Minister on 'False' Report

NC0608073091 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1700 GMT 1 Aug 91

[Text] On 31 July, central television's "Vremya" program cited an ARMENPRES report that people deported from the Armenian towns of Erkech and Tsamdzor in Azerbaijan have launched a guerrilla war against Azerbaijan. The report noted that the partisans attacked the units of the Azerbaijani Special Purpose Militia Detachment that have occupied their towns, killing seven and wounding 10.

Asked to comment on this report by an AZERINFORM correspondent, Azerbaijani Internal Affairs Minister Major General Mamed Asadov said: This information is false, and this is, regrettably, not the first time that, as a result of efforts by the Armenian side, the central media has distorted the truth when reporting on the operations carried out by Azerbaijan's law enforcement organs to eliminate the Armenian bandit groups from the republic's territory. The truth is that three members of the special militia units were killed when they were ambushed by Armenian extremists during a passport check in Gorenboyskiy Rayon. The security forces responded, and many Armenian bandits were killed. Only a small group managed to escape and hide in the forest.

I would like to point out that Armenian officials do not give statistics about the number of Armenian casualties, as they do not wish to demoralize their illegal combat units or embarass themselves. The ideologists of the extremist forces are well aware that hundreds of armed Armenians have been killed since the incidents began, and they also know that the people of Armenia will not forgive them for this. Meanwhile, the Azerbaijan Ministry of Internal Affairs will continue to take measures to obstruct the criminal activities of armed Armenian bands on the republic's territory.

Kazakhstan

Pavlov Signs Decision To Open MVD School

LD0308140291 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 3 Aug 91

[Text] The country's Prime Minister Pavlov has signed a decision to open the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] Higher School in the Kazakhstan capital.

Delegation From South Korea Visits Alma-Ata

PM0208135691 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jul 91 Union Edition p 2

["Direct Line" report by Eduard Matskevich: "Bridges of Cooperation"]

[Text] A South Korean parliamentary delegation led by Kim Yun-hwan, general secretary of the ruling Democratic Liberal Party, has visited Alma-Ata.

E. Asanbayev, chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet, briefed the guests on the Kazakh economy's development during the transition to the market. Kim Yun-hwan spoke about the ROK's economic revival and the prospects for developing its mutual relations with Kazakhstan.

At a press conference, in response to a question from IZVESTIYA's correspondent, the leader of the delegation stressed that the development of economic links with Kazakhstan will be accelerated through every possible means. Of the $3 million in credit being offered to our country by Korea, part of the money is expected to be spent on creating joint enterprises in the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and the delivery of Korean goods.

Over 100,000 Koreans live in Kazakhstan. This is one-third of the entire Korean population of the USSR. Our guests' Parliament operates a Korea-USSR Friendship Association. A similar group will be set up in the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet. There are plans to open a major Korean national cultural center in the Kazakh capital.

Consortium To Increase Gold, Diamond Output

LD0508123291 Moscow TASS in English 1150 GMT 5 Aug 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Ganzha]

[Text] Alma-Ata August 5 TASS—The setting up of Kazakhstan's gold reserves through increasing the production of noble metals from locally-mined ores, the increase of the output of precious stones and jewelry production are the chief purposes of the Kaz-Almaz-Zoloto [Kazakh Diamonds and Gold] state-owned consortium formed in Alma-Ata.

Its founders are large enterprises of non-ferrous metallurgy which mine and process gold-bearing and polymetallic ores, as well as jasper, malachite and other precious and semi-precious stones. The consortium has been founded under the auspices of Kazakhstan's Cabinet of Ministers.

Broad prospects have been opened for the consortium by the national geological prospecting service which discovered in Kazakhstan large deposits of ores of non-ferrous metals containing gold. Deposits of vein gold were also struck. Commercial exploitation of some of them will begin. Several deposits of semi-precious stones were also discovered.

The founders of the consortium are concerned over the problem of the storage of their future gold and currency reserves. There are no special storages required for the purpose in Kazakhstan at present.

Government Raises Purchase Prices for Grain

LD0408040891 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 2330 GMT 3 Aug 91

[Text] Purchase prices for grain have been raised in Kazakhstan. The republican government had to make such a decision since, as we know, the Kazakh fields have been affected by a long and serious drought.

Kyrgyzstan

Communist Support for Democratic Reform Movement

LD0308091991 Bishkek SLOVO KYRGYZSTANA in Russian 18 Jul 91 p 1

["Support and Develop Democratic Processes": "Statement by the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Kyrgyz Communist Party"]

[Text] A group of the country's political activists—members of leading organs of the CPSU and non-party members—has issued a statement on the creation of a "Democratic Reform Movement."

The Bureau of the Kyrgyz Communist Party Central Committee fully supports the appeal for dynamic activity directed at getting the country out of the grave crisis in the interests of the entire people.

The basic aims and tasks of the emerging movement are in the channel of aspirations of the Kyrgyz Communist Party proclaimed at the 5th plenum of its Central Committee. The consolidation of the healthy forces of society and the unification of them around the tasks of stabilizing the sociopolitical situation and improving the living and working conditions of Kyrgyz people are a priority aim of the republic's communists.

We are convinced that having started perestroyka, having opened up the road to processes of modernization of the country, the party is obliged to move ahead along the path of cardinal transformations and the

emancipation of society and the individual, and to make real steps to overcome the consequences of totalitarianism in all areas of our life.

This is even more important in that crisis phenomena have recently not been reduced, but increased. The new economic relations which are slowly forcing their way through are not succeeding in compensating for the disintegration of the previous economic structures; there is a growth in conservative forces' opposition and political internecine strife.

In this situation we favor unification and the joining of democratic forces.

At the same time, the Bureau of the Kyrgyz Communist Party Central Committee considers it impermissible to use this entirely understandable aspiration for splitting the Republic's Communist Party. There are sufficient healthy forces in its ranks not to allow the conservative tendencies within the party to prevail, to remain convinced adherents of the changes. We will have the readiness and will for democratic transformations for the good of our people.

It would be the greatest irresponsibility to destroy by this work the atmosphere established in our republic of civil accord for the sake of political ambitions and games.

Everything possible must be done for people to work peacefully, overcome the current difficulties, and lay firm bases for the new economy.

Tajikistan

Treaty on Relations With Belorussia Signed

LD0208161891 Moscow TASS in English 1556 GMT 2 Aug 91

[Text] Dushanbe August 2 TASS—Tajik President Kakhar Makhkamov and Belorussian parliamentary leader Nikolay Dementey on Friday signed a treaty on the fundamentals of interstate relations in Dushanbe.

The treaty, based on principles and norms of international law, envisages equal and mutually advantageous public, political, cultural and economic cooperation between both republics.

Under the treaty, both sides will have certain privileges in reciprocal industrial and agricultural supplies, as well as in expanding direct economic ties between industrial and agricultural enterprises regardless of the form of ownership.

The treaty envisages setting up joint ventures beginning this year to produce consumer goods and process natural resources.

The Tajik side will supply cotton fiber to Belorussia in exchange for fuel, lubricants and petrol, which will reach the Central Asian republic this autumn.

The treaty presupposes broad cooperation in science, culture and ecology. The document also protects the rights of Belorussians and Tajiks living in both republics.

The treaty was concluded for a period of ten years, after which it will automatically prolong for another ten years, unless either side decides to cancel by notifying the other party in writing no later than six months before the expiration date.

At a news conference in Dushanbe, both leaders said the treaty does not affect both republics' obligations before third parties. Stronger ties between Tajikistan and Belorussia will help strengthen the future Union of sovereign states.

Makhkamov and Dementey stressed the need for the earliest possible signing of the treaty. They said people in both republics hope that a new Union treaty will help stabilise the public, political and economic situation in the country.

Makhkamov, Dementey Comment

LD0308172991 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1530 GMT 2 Aug 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] In Dushanbe today official talks were held and a treaty and bilateral agreement were signed on economic and cultural cooperation between the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] and the Belorussian SSR.

[Correspondent M. Nikulin] [video shows Dushanbe street scenes; leaders of Tajikistan and Belorussia officially signing the treaty, then shaking hands] It must not be said that no links existed previously between the two republics. Tajikistan supplies its fraternal republic with cotton and raw materials for various branches of industry, receiving in turn from Belorussia ready-made clothing, machine-tools, and equipment for its plants and factories. But such an agreement is essential today when economic relations in the country are breaking up and being destroyed. The treaty signed today by Makhkamov, president of Tajikistan, and Dementey, chairman of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, envisages the development of interstate relations based on the principles of sovereignty, enhanced fraternal friendship, and mutually beneficial cooperation, and it corresponds to the basic national interests of the two states.

[K.Makhkamov] The potential of the two republics is great, and for the happiness of these two peoples we need to use them wisely and to our mutual benefit. We have marked the beginning of this today.

[N.I.Dementey] The treaty is a sort of legislative basis, the sort of legislative corridor which should today link the efforts of the Tajik people, their labor collectives, scientists, and all working here with those of Belorussia, and these joint efforts will improve our life. There is one

more thing. Our treaty is the first step toward the big Soviet treaty between the Union republics of sovereign states.

[Nikulin] Isn't it expected that this treaty will be like many other documents: everything will simply remain on paper?

[Makhkamov] Absolutely not, because we are now sovereign republics with our own declarations, and today we have agreed that before the end of August we will open a Tajik mission in Minsk, and a Belorussian mission in Dushanbe in order to start work now so that our agreement will not remain on paper but will start being implemented.

Newspaper Reports on Treaty

PM0508145191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Aug 91 Union Edition p 1

["Direct Line" report by Aleksandr Karpov: "Tajikistan and Belorussia Agree"]

[Text] Dushanbe—The signing ceremony of the Treaty on Cooperation Between Tajikistan and Belorussia has taken place.

The document—which was signed by Tajik SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] President K. Makhkamov and Belorussian Supreme Soviet Chairman N. Dementey—stresses that both sides are guided by a desire to further by every possible means the creation and development on a voluntary basis of the Union of Sovereign States. Each of the republics undertakes to guarantee on their territory the same rights and freedoms for their cosignatory's citizens as are enjoyed by the indigenous population, and full legal defense according to each republic's operative legislation.

In the economic sphere, the sides have agreed in particular to promote the maintenance and extension of direct economic links between associations, enterprises, and organizations, and to honor deliveries of raw and other materials and industrial and agricultural products as stated in the agreements. Both republic governments have agreed on a wide range of mutual deliveries for 1992 at a level no lower than in 1990.

President Makhkamov Meets With Afghan Ambassador

LD0408211991 Dushanbe Radio Dushanbe Network in Tajik 0700 GMT 4 Aug 91

[Text] President of Tajikistan Kakhar Makhkamov today met Mohammad Daud Razmyar, ambassador of the Republic of Afghanistan to the Soviet Union. The meeting was mainly devoted to the subject of expanding economic and cultural cooperation between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Mohammad Daud Razmyar, extended an invitation to the president of Tajikistan to pay an official and friendly visit to Afghanistan.

President Approves World Congress of Tajiks

LD0208154391 Moscow TASS in English 1219 GMT 2 Aug 91

By TADZHIKTA-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva:

[Text] Dushanbe August 2 TASS—President Kakhar Makhkamov of Tajikistan approved the request of representatives of the republic's cultural workers to hold a forum of Tajiks living all over the world and people of Tajik background in their historical motherland. The organizing committee of the forum to be held next March includes major figures in literature and the arts, as well as representatives of the Muslim clergy and Tajikistan's business community.

Millions of our blood brethren and emigrants from Tajikistan, who found themselves abroad on the strength of different circumstances, now live in different countries of the world, the Organizing Committee's Executive Secretary Nasrullo Asadulloyev, a journalist well-known in the republic, told TASS.

"Now that the iron curtain has crumbled and opened the way to wide-scale democratic processes in all spheres of this country's public life, many of them have shown interest in restoring connections with relatives. They want to visit the land of their forefathers and pay respects to the graves of their ancestors and relatives".

According to Asadulloyev, many major scientists, business people, [and] financiers who were forced to emigrate are now displaying a business interest in Tajikistan and readiness to help in training qualified specialists in banking and marketing needed in the republic during the transition to a market-based economy. They are prepared to invest in Tajikistan's economy.

"A forum of Tajiks of the world and emigrants from Tajikistan will undoubtedly expand not only ties between relatives but attract to this republic foreign investments and advanced technology, create preconditions for the establishment of joint ventures and replenish the Tajik market with consumer goods," Asadulloyev said.

"The Tajik public and our compatriots abroad hope that the republican Parliament will expedite the adoption of a package of laws guaranteeing the participation of foreign citizens in the creation of joint and individual industrial and trade firms and the opening of international bank subsidiaries here".

Central Committee Discusses Anticrisis Program

LD0408164791 Dushanbe Radio Dushanbe Network in Tajik 0005 GMT 4 Aug 91

[Text] A plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan was held in Dushanbe City. Those attending discussed an anticrisis program. The

plenum also discussed important internal party matters. A full report on the work of the plenum will be published in the press.

Republic Establishes Special 'Morals Police'

LD0508173891 Moscow TASS in English 1433 GMT 5 Aug 91

[By TASS Correspondent Nina Merezhnikova]

[Text] Dushanbe August 5 TASS—A special unit will be set up in Tajikistan by the republican Interior Ministry to combat the spread of pornography and the cult of violence. The unit is a sort of morals police, the creation of which was caused by negative processes recently developed in the Central Asian republic.

The commercialization of the entertainment market led to the creation of many small video-houses, where equivocal movies are shown. Book stores are full of erotic and pornographic editions printed by cooperatives. This has prompted public indignation and demands to ban the low-grade products.

Tajikistan is a Muslim republic, where such notions as sex, erotica and pornography are apprehended in a special way.

In order to take into account national, religious and cultural particularities of local residents, a special commission was set [up] under the new unit. The commission will control the quality of video films and books. The commission unites representatives of the Culture Ministry, writers, artists, film-makers, religious figures and customs officers.

Commercial Prices for Gasoline To Be Introduced

PM0508101391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jul 91 Union Edition p 2

["Direct Line" report by Aleksandr Karpov: "Yet Another Price Hike"]

[Text] Dushanbe—The Tajik SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Cabinet of Ministers has adopted a resolution permitting the republic's State Committee for the Supply of Petroleum Products to purchase gasoline and sell it to the population at commercial prices.

This is the result of the profound fuel crisis which has befallen the republic and has already lasted for around two years. The mountainous region's national economy has no oil extracting or refining industrial sectors. Violations of contractual commitments by supplier enterprises resulted in a serious shortage of gasoline and fuel and lubricating materials in Tajikistan. Motor transport problems have affected primarily major state services like the ambulance service, the State Motor Vehicle Inspection Administration, and the militia, while industrial enterprise machinery only operates intermittently. Owners of private automobiles are sometimes forced to wait for days at filling stations for fuel.

The government resolution was adopted with the aim of creating the necessary conditions to meet the republic's fuel demands more fully. The commercial prices at which the gasoline will be sold to the population should not exceed 60-70 kopecks per liter.

Uzbekistan

More on Expulsion of Journalists Allegations

PM0408133791 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Aug 91 p 7

["In the Sovereign Republics" report from DR-PRESS, URAL-AKTSEPT, and TASS: "No Journalist—No Problem"]

[Text] Over the last few months, in the opinion of the "Birlik" people's movement of Uzbekistan, deportation of journalists from the republic has become a regular practice for the authorities. Moscow Radio Liberty journalist Dmitriy Volchek and his assistant Viktor Polyakov were recently expelled. In this connection the "Birlik" movement's press center circulated a statement which indicated, in particular, that the ruling totalitarian regime in Uzbekistan is distorting the very concept of the sovereignty for which the republic's democrats fought so doggedly. Thus, even the arrival of journalists in the republic to study the persecution of democrats is described as interference in the sovereign state's affairs and is followed by their immediate, subsequent deportation.

Report on Military Draft Agreement With Army

PM0508080091 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jul 91 Union Edition p 3

["Direct Line" report by Andrey Orlov: "Army Draft by Agreement"]

[Text] Tashkent—The draft for military service has for the first time been conducted in Uzbekistan in accordance with an agreement between the republic government and the USSR Armed Forces General Staff.

"Taking into consideration the new relations with the Army, it was not only the military commissariats which dealt with the draft this year, but also the republic authorities including our department of military mobilization work created within the apparatus of the president of the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]," B. Kasymov, head of the department and doctor of juridical sciences, says. "I will say outright: The plan to draft men into combat and special units has been fulfilled by 101.8 percent; that is, there is no 'shortfall.' Unfortunately, Lieutenant General I. Matveyev, deputy chief of the Main Directorate of the General Staff, gave a another figure—clearly by mistake—of 84.6 percent for Uzbekistan in an interview with IZVESTIYA (no. 173). Some 90 percent of our conscripts are youths from the indigenous population. The majority of young men willingly

set off to join the line and motorized units and the Navy. The agreement between the republic and the Army in many ways ensures legal and social protection for the Uzbekistan conscripts.

"As far as the military construction detachments are concerned, they have not yet been completely formed. These detachments now only do their service on Uzbekistan's territory, by agreement with the General Staff.

"Nonmilitary formations have begun to be created for the first time. They comprise youths who for various reasons are not being drafted to do actual military service, and will work in the national economy."

Republic To Receive Japanese Satellite Equipment

LD0408033491 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 2230 GMT 3 Aug 91

[Summary] Uzbekistan will soon have an international satellite service. The Japanese NEC firm has started preparing equipment for the service. Thanks to greater financial autonomy, the republic was able to hand over an undisclosed amount of money in only two days, via the Uzbekistan Foreign Trade Bank.